YEMENTV — broadcast
20260920 200000 UTC
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[00:00:21] harmful to Yemen
[00:00:41] use it also in
[00:00:43] negotiations and also overcome side has some
[00:00:45] interests and attack
[00:00:47] American interests in
[00:01:06] Yemen and the region. All
[00:01:10] there an Iranian army in
[00:01:13] Distribution of a number of materials, aerial
[00:01:17] aid to enter, whether by sea or by that contain a number of values
[00:01:24] Iran wants to alleviate this armed forces and bags, as well as the distribution of some materials that
[00:01:27] concern the displaced. Of course, today we are in one of
[00:01:30] the camps for the displaced
[00:01:33] destruction. I mean, it cannot. It does who were displaced from some areas of conflict, such as Hodeidah,
[00:01:37] Mocha, and some other areas. This
[00:01:41] a naval capability to sail in support comes from our brothers in King Salman Center and is implemented by the Human Access Association.
[00:01:44] All these efforts come
[00:01:48] under the patronage of His Excellency Governor Mokhtar
[00:01:51] Al-Rabash.
[00:01:52] now? From where? And who We,
[00:01:54] is mediating? And who in the local authority,
[00:01:57] factions do not are always ready to receive all displaced people who have been displaced from conflict
[00:02:01] areas. The local authority pays great attention
[00:02:04] to these displaced people
[00:02:06] other factors that help the Houthis to because they were displaced from their lands and left
[00:02:09] their homes. Therefore, we have a humanitarian duty towards
[00:02:12] them, and we hope that they will find comfort
[00:02:16] and great attention from the local authority in the governorate.
[00:02:23] Zionist. No that escalation affect Thank you to the supporters, thank you to King Salman Center, thank you to our brothers in the Human
[00:02:26] Zionism is behind Access Association, and we wish everyone success. Peace be upon you.
[00:02:52] for those who are fooled, the truth is
[00:02:55] divergence.
[00:03:04] those who want to control. It was
[00:03:17] for Bab al-Mandab to become a card in that will affect
[00:03:18] Israel does not
[00:03:25] to disrupt navigation or close this interruption,
[00:03:34] 100%. Whoever doesn't believe and Israel? 100%
[00:03:42] respecting this displaced
[00:03:43] million 900 Bab al-Mandab. The closure of
[00:04:02] but they cannot
[00:04:14] that has legitimacy
[00:04:16] or Iranian power,
[00:04:55] a state supervising
[00:05:05] and Europe fears that
[00:07:15] Bab al-Mandab is a strategic maritime passage and a main artery
[00:07:19] for global trade, connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and affecting
[00:07:23] energy security and the movement of supplies between East
[00:07:26] and West. Today, this passage returns to the circle
[00:07:30] of danger with escalating tensions between the United States
[00:07:33] and Iran, and the movements of the Houthi militia on the western coast,
[00:07:36] amidst information about the presence of Iranian experts
[00:07:40] and movements to establish radar
[00:07:43] and military sites in Bab al-Mandab. International
[00:07:46] reports and analyses indicate that these movements may
[00:07:50] enhance the ability of the Houthi terrorist militia to monitor
[00:07:53] ship movement and threaten navigation at a time
[00:07:57] when ships and tankers have begun
[00:07:59] to avoid passing through the region due to rising security risks.
[00:08:03] The issue, then, is no longer merely a confrontation within
[00:08:06] Yemen, as the potential danger will extend to the Red
[00:08:10] Sea and to the Suez Canal, to the movement
[00:08:13] of trade and energy between Asia and Europe. If Bab al-Mandab is closed
[00:08:16] or the movement of ships
[00:08:19] through it becomes hostage to threats and blackmail, then the consequences
[00:08:22] will not be limited to Yemen alone.
[00:08:26] The bigger question is what it means
[00:08:29] the Iranian-American conflict, and what
[00:08:32] will happen if threats turn into an actual attempt
[00:08:38] vital passage? The repercussions will not
[00:08:40] stop at the Red Sea.
[00:08:42] Rather, they may extend to global trade, shipping and insurance
[00:08:45] prices, and supply chains and energy.
[00:08:49] If the security of Bab al-Mandab is an international interest, then is it
[00:08:53] not time to deal with the security of the Yemeni coast and its maritime passages
[00:08:57] as part of the security of the region and the world?
[00:09:00] And can Bab al-Mandab be secured in the long term without
[00:09:03] addressing the root of the problem, which is the presence of an armed
[00:09:07] terrorist militia that possesses weapons outside the state's
[00:09:10] institutions? In this special coverage, dear viewers,
[00:09:14] we examine the movements of the Houthi militia in the vicinity of Bab
[00:09:17] al-Mandab, the Iranian role, the risks of threatening international navigation,
[00:09:21] and what the security of this passage
[00:09:24] means for the world, and why restoring the state
[00:09:27] and its legitimate institutions and its ability to protect its coasts
[00:09:31] and territorial waters remains an essential part
[00:09:34] of the Red Sea security equation. So, welcome
[00:09:38] to you.
[00:09:50] Bab al-Mandab is no longer just a card in the Yemeni
[00:09:53] conflict, but has become central to regional calculations
[00:09:57] that extend beyond Yemen's borders, with the escalation of Houthi
[00:10:01] movements on the western coast, and in light of the expanding
[00:10:04] circle of confrontation between the United States and Iran, control
[00:10:08] over Bab al-Mandab appears to be a pressure card that
[00:10:11] can be used to serve Tehran's
[00:10:14] objectives and threaten
[00:10:17] international trade and energy lines. The Houthi movement coincides with
[00:10:20] a widespread escalation in the American- Iranian
[00:10:23] confrontation, which opens the door to using regional
[00:10:27] proxies as pressure tools in multiple
[00:10:30] arenas. With the continued tension in the Strait
[00:10:34] of Hormuz, the strategic importance of Bab
[00:10:37] al-Mandab increases, which makes any Houthi threat
[00:10:41] to navigation part of a broader
[00:10:44] regional scene. Experts affiliated with the Iranian
[00:10:47] Revolutionary Guard have arrived in areas near Bab
[00:10:51] al-Mandab as part of what is said to be military
[00:10:55] technical support for the Houthis
[00:10:58] to deploy radars in the region to gain
[00:11:01] greater ability to monitor navigation.
[00:11:04] This will give the Houthis the ability to identify
[00:11:08] targets and track ships,
[00:11:12] and thus the terrorist acts of the Houthi militia against
[00:11:16] global trade and international and regional security will increase,
[00:11:19] raising transportation costs and turning Bab al-Mandab into a zone
[00:11:23] of continuous threat and widespread
[00:11:26] disruption, which will have repercussions beyond
[00:11:31] of this necessitates that the international community take
[00:11:34] swift and effective measures
[00:11:37] to secure the region and protect international
[00:11:40] navigation lines, and support the legitimate government and the Yemeni
[00:11:45] in a way that enables them to play their role in protecting regional
[00:11:49] and international security and ensuring freedom of navigation
[00:11:52] in one of the most important maritime passages in the world. And again,
[00:12:10] I welcome you, dear viewers, to this special coverage, and directly
[00:12:13] to the topic, we will discuss the Houthi preparing to close Bab
[00:12:16] al-Mandab to serve the Iranian agenda. And joining me now
[00:12:20] via Zoom is Professor Hassan Maghles, writer
[00:12:23] and political analyst. Welcome, Professor Hassan, to Yemen TV.
[00:12:27] Hello, Professor Emad, and all the viewers. Hello,
[00:12:31] Emad. And I also welcome Professor Hassan,
[00:12:34] and I will start with you. Perhaps you are following
[00:12:37] the escalating rhetoric between Washington
[00:12:39] and Tehran,
[00:12:42] and to what extent can
[00:12:45] Yemen in light of the current situation,
[00:12:48] specifically on Bab al-Mandab?
[00:12:52] In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Greetings to you, Professor Emad, and all the brothers.
[00:12:56] By God, the people of the channel, the marathon
[00:12:58] negotiations between Iran
[00:13:02] and the United States of America
[00:13:05] have been prolonged, and perhaps they could have been settled, but it seems
[00:13:09] that the prolongation is an objective in itself.
[00:13:12] The prolongation of this dialogue, and to
[00:13:15] some extent, there is harmony, and sometimes there is
[00:13:20] I mean, you don't know if the United States of America
[00:13:23] is serious about ending the issue in the Strait of Hormuz, or if
[00:13:27] the United States of America itself has objectives in the region as a whole,
[00:13:31] including Yemen. I mean, we know
[00:13:34] that there was support provided to the Houthi militias
[00:13:38] more than once, political support, moral support, and even logistical
[00:13:42] support provided by
[00:13:46] countries that are considered sponsors of dialogues
[00:13:49] and also interfere in the region and in the area.
[00:13:53] European countries and even the United Nations, their last speech always
[00:13:57] drags them to
[00:14:00] the negotiating table at victory.
[00:14:03] All of these
[00:14:05] let us put a thousand
[00:14:08] questions. The negotiations between Iran
[00:14:12] and the United States of America, or the conflict between them,
[00:14:15] does it have a limit, or is it extended based
[00:14:19] on the indicators of Bab al-Mandab?
[00:14:23] I mean, today, Bab al-Mandab is an indicator,
[00:14:27] control it in the end, because
[00:14:31] the difference between Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz is that the Strait
[00:14:34] of Hormuz is supervised by the rogue state, a state
[00:14:39] to remain. Iran.
[00:14:41] With us, Bab al-Mandab, no, the legitimate
[00:14:44] state is the one that defends Bab al-Mandab,
[00:14:47] and the rogue gang supported by Iran is the one that wants to disrupt it.
[00:14:51] And there is a difference. I mean, there is no legitimacy for those who want to
[00:14:55] close Bab al-Mandab, and they are treated as
[00:14:58] such, as a rogue gang that possesses some
[00:15:02] somewhat advanced weapons due to smuggling and due to the cooperation
[00:15:06] of some major countries, even to keep these weapons with the Houthi
[00:15:09] pawn, right? This rogue
[00:15:12] gang that is present and wants to close Bab al-Mandab cannot. If
[00:15:16] Iran can negotiate as
[00:15:20] the gate for a long time, on the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:15:23] it and the Sultanate of Oman. But the Houthis are not recognized,
[00:15:27] and no one knows them, and they cannot be dealt with
[00:15:31] as a gang. I mean, it is said
[00:15:34] that this gang can be dealt with, and even some agencies
[00:15:38] or it occupied some areas,
[00:15:41] but in the end, it remains a gang whose fate is
[00:15:44] that the entire people are now revolting against it, and it will never
[00:15:48] win. This is the difference. I mean, please.
[00:15:52] Yes, Professor Hassan, this rogue
[00:15:55] gang and these Houthi militias that
[00:15:58] possess weapons outside the state's institutions, I mean, in light of
[00:16:02] the marathon you mentioned
[00:16:04] and the negotiations between Washington
[00:16:06] and Tehran, from your point of view, Professor Hassan, can
[00:16:10] Iran use this rogue militia
[00:16:13] as a pressure card
[00:16:16] to
[00:16:24] the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab as well, as well as against America's
[00:16:28] allies? To clearly
[00:16:32] understand the scene, after Iran entered the quagmire of this
[00:16:35] war, does it possess maritime
[00:16:39] capabilities to deliver
[00:16:42] aid or air aid to
[00:16:45] the Houthis, or is it old aid? The problem is that
[00:16:49] until now, who is allowing
[00:16:54] air? How many planes enter into Sana'a,
[00:16:58] civilian planes? What do they enter? They are planes in the name of the United Nations,
[00:17:01] in the name of so-and-so. Experts enter through these means. Unfortunately,
[00:17:05] it cannot enter. Iran is also in a state of
[00:17:10] not currently possess the ability to
[00:17:14] supply the Houthis. There are no borders between them, and it does not have
[00:17:19] the seas because it is still battered, as
[00:17:22] the Americans say. They say they no longer have frigates or anything. So how
[00:17:26] does aid reach the Houthis
[00:17:31] is essentially facilitating matters for the Houthis? Five planes
[00:17:35] enter Sana'a in one week. What do these planes do? Here
[00:17:38] we find that there is the name Iran, and there are
[00:17:44] survive. I mean, they are really present, and they may be an
[00:17:48] Arab country, I mean, it really helps
[00:17:51] the Houthis, and it was hinted at by al-Manan
[00:17:53] and also international cooperation is
[00:17:56] present to maintain even
[00:18:00] one should be surprised that
[00:18:04] these Houthis because there is a common interest, especially since
[00:18:07] the Houthis declared that they will not intercept American ships,
[00:18:10] and by that, they mean Zionist ships, even. I mean, he is just
[00:18:14] trying to lie to his friends only. He targets Saudi ships.
[00:18:17] I mean, this is the big lie, and he is
[00:18:21] closely related to "Death to America" and "Death
[00:18:24] to Israel." This is for simple people, but
[00:18:30] that America has been managing the Houthis for a long time,
[00:18:33] and now there is an obstacle to eliminating the Houthis by
[00:18:36] these, otherwise the Houthis are not stronger than the people, a large
[00:18:40] people, a million people, right? They are not stronger than the people, and
[00:18:44] they can be defeated. It happened more than once. It
[00:18:48] happened more than once, and we are dragged into negotiations. Why are negotiations
[00:18:51] dragged? This military equation. The Houthis are not
[00:18:54] strong. The Houthis have international supporters
[00:18:57] and pull our strength to
[00:19:01] the negotiating tables. We do not want negotiations anymore. The Houthis
[00:19:05] either surrender their weapons or
[00:19:08] fight. Otherwise, any talk about peace, no peace, this is prolonging
[00:19:12] the Houthi's life and not respecting
[00:19:14] the Yemeni blood that is shed and not
[00:19:19] Yemeni people. Please. Yes, the Houthis
[00:19:22] have not left any opportunity for peace, Professor
[00:19:25] Hassan. Please stay with me, Professor Hassan. Let me include Dr. Ali
[00:19:29] Al-Khawlani, who is the head of the Independent Yemeni Center
[00:19:33] for Strategic Studies. Welcome, Doctor, to Yemen TV.
[00:19:36] Welcome. Hello. Doctor, perhaps you are also following
[00:19:40] the negotiations and the escalation of rhetoric
[00:19:44] between Iran and the United
[00:19:47] States. Your reading of this escalation, and does
[00:19:50] what is happening currently between them open
[00:19:54] the door to re-using Yemeni geography,
[00:19:58] specifically Bab al-Mandab,
[00:20:01] I mean, in a broader regional
[00:20:03] conflict? Of course, the
[00:20:08] debate and bickering
[00:20:10] sometimes with statements or
[00:20:13] with military strikes, especially
[00:20:17] after the truce,
[00:20:21] I wouldn't say truce, but
[00:20:22] a ceasefire
[00:20:25] for almost a month, the statements
[00:20:29] and maneuvers
[00:20:31] have resumed with statements and limited strikes
[00:20:35] between the United States of America
[00:20:38] and Iran. And of course,
[00:20:41] I believe that it will escalate
[00:20:44] because the United States of America is betting
[00:20:47] that it wants to strike
[00:20:51] Iran effectively in any
[00:20:54] upcoming negotiations,
[00:20:56] whether that is through economic
[00:21:00] impact or by siege or by limited
[00:21:03] strikes. And Iran is also betting
[00:21:06] that the United States of America may
[00:21:10] concede in the end because America
[00:21:13] also was affected,
[00:21:15] and the precise munitions
[00:21:20] have become depleted significantly,
[00:21:23] and there are midterm elections in the United
[00:21:27] States of America. So each
[00:21:30] pressures and each side is also betting on
[00:21:34] certain scenarios that it may achieve
[00:21:37] some gains over time.
[00:21:41] But of course, Iran is
[00:21:44] betting on it. It faces great pressure,
[00:21:47] and the cohesion of the institution
[00:21:51] that governs it may collapse overnight
[00:21:54] because there is popular pressure. We know today
[00:21:57] that the rial,
[00:21:59] the Iranian rial, has become almost one million
[00:22:02] and eight thousand.
[00:22:05] I mean, one dollar equals one million and eighty thousand
[00:22:07] Iranian rials.
[00:22:10] And of course,
[00:22:14] pressure, and the pressure, or the societal pressure
[00:22:17] due to the economic siege, and
[00:22:20] the pressure from some factions hostile to the Iranian
[00:22:23] regime, it will try of course to
[00:22:27] open new fronts, and the new front it wants to
[00:22:30] open is igniting the Strait
[00:22:34] of Bab al-Mandab through using
[00:22:37] its strongest arm today. And I say strongest because there has been
[00:22:41] a significant impact on Hezbollah in
[00:22:44] Lebanon, and also the Shiite
[00:22:47] reach the capability of the Houthis. Therefore, the Houthis
[00:22:50] today have become the primary card that
[00:22:53] Iran uses to strengthen
[00:22:57] its negotiating position,
[00:22:59] and they are pushing the Houthi
[00:23:02] militias to control
[00:23:05] Bab al-Mandab,
[00:23:09] which is what the Houthi militias have done, so that
[00:23:12] there is an impact on the course of international
[00:23:15] navigation and the flow of fuels and oil
[00:23:18] to This is an important point, Doctor.
[00:23:22] I mean, Iran uses many pressure
[00:23:26] tools, but the most prominent of them is the Houthi
[00:23:28] militia in Bab al-Mandab. I mean, why does Bab al-Mandab represent
[00:23:32] a strategic card or a strategic pressure card different
[00:23:35] from the rest of the pressure tools that
[00:23:38] Tehran possesses? My dear
[00:23:41] brother, first of all,
[00:23:44] Iran is now using the war of the straits
[00:23:47] and the choke points, whether it is
[00:23:51] the Strait of Hormuz or now the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. I mean, when
[00:23:54] these two straits are closed
[00:23:57] or security and stability
[00:24:00] in these two areas are disrupted,
[00:24:04] the global economy significantly.
[00:24:07] And we saw today that
[00:24:10] the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil reached
[00:24:13] 103 and a few days ago it reached
[00:24:17] 105 dollars. I mean, I mean, before,
[00:24:21] there was almost
[00:24:24] I mean, 21 million
[00:24:27] barrels passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Today,
[00:24:30] 4
[00:24:33] thousand also pass through this strait.
[00:24:36] Today, Bab al-Mandab is crossed by
[00:24:40] 7 million barrels in
[00:24:43] an attempt to reduce the pressure
[00:24:47] produced by the Strait of Hormuz. But when
[00:24:50] Bab al-Mandab is closed by military operations carried out by
[00:24:54] the Houthis, it will certainly plunge the world into a terrible
[00:24:58] economic crisis due to the decrease in fuels.
[00:25:02] And here I want to emphasize that
[00:25:05] even the Houthis, or the Houthi
[00:25:08] terrorist militias, said that they would not target
[00:25:12] maritime navigation
[00:25:15] and would not target American or
[00:25:19] Zionist ships, but they excluded one
[00:25:22] country, which is Saudi Arabia. And we know
[00:25:25] the importance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
[00:25:27] in
[00:25:30] the global fuel situation and how it really
[00:25:34] affects the global energy market. And we saw
[00:25:37] how when the East-West
[00:25:40] oil pipeline, which transports approximately
[00:25:43] 5 million barrels
[00:25:46] to the Yanbu
[00:25:49] port, was targeted, how
[00:25:51] supplies were affected,
[00:25:55] oil will not reach it. Also, all these
[00:25:58] events affected the Suez Canal,
[00:26:01] and we saw the Egyptian
[00:26:04] Foreign Minister say that we
[00:26:07] were affected by or our losses reached
[00:26:11] 11 billion dollars, and this
[00:26:14] is a disaster. So the continued
[00:26:17] presence of the Houthi militia in Bab
[00:26:20] al-Mandab and its continued expansion will not be
[00:26:24] only, but also to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
[00:26:27] and to the Gulf and to international peace and security
[00:26:31] in general. Yes. Well, let me go back to Professor Hassan
[00:26:35] Maghles. Professor Hassan, you probably heard Dr. Ali
[00:26:38] Al-Khawlani talking about the importance of Bab al-Mandab and how
[00:26:41] Iran uses it as a pressure card.
[00:26:44] And as it is said, if Iran
[00:26:47] controlled Bab al-Mandab, it would not need nuclear
[00:26:50] weapons. Doctor, what makes Bab
[00:26:53] al-Mandab specifically a valuable card in Iranian
[00:26:57] calculations compared to the rest of the calculations that
[00:27:01] Tehran is moving in? Greetings to Dr. Ali Al-Khawlani
[00:27:04] first. First of all,
[00:27:08] I want to ask a question: Is
[00:27:13] Yemen, an army in the name of Iran?
[00:27:15] I mean, Iranian citizens owning an army
[00:27:19] that is present so that Iran can take over Bab al-Mandab?
[00:27:22] These are big names. Iran
[00:27:25] is morally Iran. If it sends
[00:27:29] 10 experts, what does that mean for 40 million Yemenis? I mean, it is
[00:27:33] a gang. This gang is said to be taking over Bab al-Mandab.
[00:27:36] It is enough for it. It has no legal or international
[00:27:40] right, and it is not qualified to take over in the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:27:43] It has this right. This is the expansionist policy of Iran, Professor
[00:27:47] Hassan. I will clarify so that we do not
[00:27:50] scare ourselves that Iran is the only one who wants Bab al-Mandab. No,
[00:27:54] Iran is the name. There are others who want to disrupt
[00:27:57] other than Iran as well.
[00:28:00] Iran is interfering in all four Arab
[00:28:04] capitals and others as well, but interference in other countries is different
[00:28:07] from our interference in our country. For us as Yemen, there are no
[00:28:11] direct borders with it, like Iraq
[00:28:14] and even what was in Syria and Lebanon, a direct line.
[00:28:17] But we are across the sea, or there are
[00:28:21] some who help it in some land areas.
[00:28:24] But let us not scare ourselves too much that Iran will not
[00:28:27] be able to control Bab al-Mandab unless there is international
[00:28:31] assistance. This is the truth from international assistance.
[00:28:35] What are you referring to, Professor Hassan? I am referring to
[00:28:37] the international and UN
[00:28:40] laxity towards the Houthis, which
[00:28:44] qualifies the Houthis for Bab al-Mandab, not
[00:28:48] Iran. Iran is the scapegoat. But does Iran
[00:28:51] have frigates to send to Yemen? It cannot. Does it have
[00:28:55] an army that can invade Yemen? It cannot. 10 experts, 20 experts, what does this
[00:28:58] mean? But the truth is that
[00:29:01] there is the name Iran, but there are
[00:29:06] said one day that from Mokha to other countries outside
[00:29:09] the country, global Zionism probably wants this Bab al-Mandab. Who
[00:29:13] said that Israel does not have its eyes on
[00:29:16] Mayun and on Bab al-Mandab? Who said that
[00:29:21] look at this strait since long ago? Does it want to say, Professor
[00:29:24] Hassan, with apologies for the
[00:29:27] do you want to say that there are
[00:29:30] behind-the-scenes agreements between Iran
[00:29:36] it doesn't have foresight.
[00:29:40] Israel wants
[00:29:43] Bab al-Mandab serves Israel primarily.
[00:29:47] What does Israel want? First, to destabilize the Red Sea,
[00:29:50] destabilize global trade. It receives everything it wants from the Mediterranean Sea.
[00:29:54] The Red Sea doesn't mean much to it, for your information.
[00:29:58] Commercially, it has the narrow Gulf of Aqaba,
[00:30:01] the port of Aqaba. It's a small thing, but its trade is there.
[00:30:05] That's why we always say Iran
[00:30:08] wants to close Bab al-Mandab. Can it? We ask the
[00:30:12] question. These militias serve the Iranian
[00:30:14] agenda
[00:30:18] but Iran does not have an army in the Strait of Hormuz, and it
[00:30:22] still uses
[00:30:25] long-range bazookas to target ships. It doesn't even have military
[00:30:28] power to control ships. It doesn't have it after America dealt it the final
[00:30:31] blow. It said we hit the navy and air force. So how
[00:30:35] does Iran enter Yemen and take over Bab al-Mandab?
[00:30:38] The issue is the Iranian designation. Iranian experts
[00:30:41] can provide this to you normally, and through UN planes, through so-and-so,
[00:30:45] because one day no one asked how the late Hassan Eyrlou entered
[00:30:48] Sana'a and was an ambassador. Who brought him in? By what plane
[00:30:52] did he enter? This question is always unanswered, and so do experts now,
[00:30:55] and so does aid enter the hands of Houthi
[00:30:59] gangs.