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20261105 080000 UTC
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[00:00:31] Welcome, dear viewers. The
[00:00:34] talk about Iranian support for the Houthi militia is no longer limited to weapons,
[00:00:38] assembled in funding, and training. The information announced by the Ministry of Interior reveals
[00:00:42] another level of intervention, which is the participation of experts from
[00:00:46] stage that you say is currently the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah of Lebanon in planning
[00:00:49] military operations, supervising them,
[00:00:52] and managing them. The ministry revealed the presence of
[00:00:55] 21 foreign experts working with
[00:00:58] the Houthi militias, including 14 from the Revolutionary Guard
[00:01:01] and seven from Hezbollah, distributed in a number of
[00:01:05] governorates, and undertaking
[00:01:10] that you train, and they are elements from courses, they would say, "What are we doing in tasks that include command and control, missile development,
[00:01:11] the Houthi militias, especially those that have and drones, coordinating naval operations,
[00:01:14] clearly, without even needing ambiguity, and selecting targets for commercial ships. This
[00:01:17] information puts the nature of Iranian intervention in our country before
[00:01:21] questions that go beyond the size of military support to the reality of
[00:01:24] the entity that plans
[00:01:27] extremism based on operations, manages escalation
[00:01:32] the military arm in thought and violence on paths, and the extent of the link between the war waged by the Houthi militia
[00:01:33] and it also depends on and the agenda of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
[00:01:34] to control and Tehran's regional interests.
[00:01:37] you need experts in the So what is the nature of this role, and
[00:01:39] naval aspect, and in naval what do the details of the list of experts and their tasks reveal, and to
[00:01:42] what extent has this intervention become a threat to Yemen's sovereignty
[00:01:46] also many and the security of the region and international navigation? This is what
[00:01:50] we will discuss in this coverage, which comes as part of our coverage of Operation Dawn
[00:01:55] usually, it is not even usually, but always, trainers and return as trainers of Yemen. I am pleased and honored, dear viewers, to welcome my guest here in the studio, Major General Dr. Fayez
[00:01:59] Ghalab, Inspector General of the Ministry of Interior. I welcome you, Major
[00:02:02] General. Welcome.
[00:02:05] had been present before, would turn May God bless you. May God bless you, Doctor. Was it not expected that this Before we start the discussion, let us and the dear
[00:02:08] viewers watch this report. Viewers, we will watch the report and then start the discussion.
[00:02:24] Iranian intervention in Yemen is no longer limited to financial and military
[00:02:28] support, maintenance, and training provided by Tehran to the terrorist
[00:02:31] Houthi militia. Rather, it has moved to a more dangerous stage,
[00:02:35] represented by the direct presence of Iranian Revolutionary Guard
[00:02:38] experts and their participation in planning,
[00:02:41] supervising, and managing the militia's
[00:02:43] situation because of this military operations, which
[00:02:46] and control at the beginning
[00:02:47] war. What does this transition reveals the extent of the Houthi's reliance on the Iranian project and the transformation of Yemen into an advanced
[00:02:52] and training to direct participation in arena for implementing Tehran's expansionist agendas. The Minister of Interior, Major General Ibrahim
[00:02:56] Haydan, confirmed the presence of 21 foreigners
[00:02:59] working with the terrorist Houthi militia, supported by
[00:03:02] the Iranian regime, including 14 experts from the Iranian
[00:03:06] coast and was directly guided by
[00:03:07] Axes in the end, Revolutionary Guard and seven experts from Lebanese Hezbollah.
[00:03:09] He said that the nature of their tasks reveals the development
[00:03:13] of foreign intervention from funding, maintenance, and training to
[00:03:16] direct supervision and participation in planning and managing
[00:03:20] beginning, this problem operations and building the military it. But in capabilities of the Houthi the end, even in the
[00:03:23] militia, in parallel
[00:03:23] with this magnitude by with political,
[00:03:27] on Iran's proxies in organizational, social, and media
[00:03:30] activities aimed at consolidating long-term influence
[00:03:32] international corridors or navigation. But in and building structures and networks of loyalty
[00:03:36] to remove Yemen from its Arab environment.
[00:03:39] This increasing Iranian military presence reflects a clear
[00:03:42] trend by Tehran to compensate
[00:03:46] and military directions, are locations, so this aspect for the decline in the influence of its proxies in a number of countries in the region by
[00:03:49] and the goal is to control intensifying its investment in
[00:03:51] The latter, whether they are in the Houthi militia, exploiting Yemen's strategic location
[00:03:54] and its oversight of one of the most important maritime passages in
[00:03:58] themselves. Yes. Okay, the continuation of this the world, which gives it additional leverage for pressure, blackmail,
[00:04:02] and threatening regional and international interests. The continued
[00:04:06] flow of Iranian experts, weapons, and technology to the Houthi
[00:04:10] militia and allowing it to transform from an armed group
[00:04:13] to an advanced
[00:04:16] ports. This is a type of platform for managing Iranian influence will double the cost
[00:04:20] ships of confronting this threat and prolong the suffering
[00:04:22] of Yemenis. This
[00:04:26] opening another front to relieve makes confronting Iranian intervention and exposing its direct roles a necessity
[00:04:30] to protect Yemen's sovereignty and the security of the region and international navigation.
[00:04:36] and many
[00:04:44] experts, and as I mentioned at
[00:04:47] Welcome back, dear viewers, and welcome
[00:04:50] in the calculations of the Iranian to my guest here in the studio, Major General Dr. Fayez
[00:04:52] exceptional circumstances, as happened at Ghalab, Inspector General of the Ministry of Interior. scale. Another type I welcome you again, Major General.
[00:04:55] May God bless you. May God bless you, Major General. Let's start with the statement
[00:04:59] that was issued by the Ministry of Interior
[00:05:02] and talked about the presence of 21 foreign experts in the ranks
[00:05:06] of the terrorist Houthi militia, including 14 experts from the Revolutionary Guard
[00:05:10] and seven from Lebanese Hezbollah. How do you interpret
[00:05:13] that? Yes, this statement
[00:05:17] issued by the Ministry of Interior and by the Minister
[00:05:20] of Interior is a statement
[00:05:24] that clarifies or indicates the extent of the presence
[00:05:28] of the Revolutionary Guard and the extent of the presence of Hezbollah
[00:05:32] and Iranian militias inside Yemen, and it does not mean
[00:05:35] that those present are
[00:05:38] 21 in number. These 21 are the ones who manage
[00:05:41] operations in the joint staff and internal operations
[00:05:44] in the serious aspect.
[00:05:47] As for the reality of the presence, this presence will
[00:05:51] be much more than these numbers, and it is also
[00:05:53] not an immediate
[00:05:58] happening. It has developed from time to time, so you notice
[00:06:02] that the intervention began perhaps in the eighties,
[00:06:06] not even now, and it began to intervene during the visit of the Iranian
[00:06:09] ambassador to Saada governorate and his attendance
[00:06:13] of training courses and their special summer
[00:06:17] courses for more than one meeting and more than one visit. So the intervention
[00:06:20] was an early intervention, but it changed and developed
[00:06:24] with the development of the stage. In the formation stage, perhaps
[00:06:27] the ideological aspect was dominant, and the training aspect was to transform
[00:06:31] it into an armed group. Therefore,
[00:06:33] the emergence in Saada emerged as intellectual
[00:06:37] extremism or
[00:06:41] both sides from the first moment. So this
[00:06:44] development was not based on the presence of experts
[00:06:48] from day one, and it was also based
[00:06:51] on trips and scholarships
[00:06:54] that were available in Iran for huge numbers, and there were
[00:06:58] Houthi leaders who trained inside Iran and took courses, and some of
[00:07:02] them were also trained to be
[00:07:06] internally. So this recent appearance or statement symbolically expresses
[00:07:10] the numbers that operations find, and it may even be
[00:07:13] that the personalities who lead operations
[00:07:17] or the numbers are much more than this. This
[00:07:21] is only what the information has reached, but its management
[00:07:24] of operations is a state of its size and weight managing
[00:07:27] battles inside Yemen. We cannot even if we say that
[00:07:31] the Revolutionary Guard or Hezbollah, I think that the expression
[00:07:34] itself is at its minimum, but when
[00:07:37] we talk about it at its maximum, we say that it is a state
[00:07:41] with all its weight and all its capabilities managing
[00:07:44] a battle inside Yemen that is parallel to the battle
[00:07:47] they have in Iran. Yes.
[00:07:51] Okay, from support to managing operations, the Revolutionary Guard
[00:07:55] has now become leading the Houthi
[00:07:59] mean? The transition of the Iranian role from funding, arming,
[00:08:04] operations and military escalation by the Houthi militia.
[00:08:08] Yes, sometimes we talk as if
[00:08:11] we are talking about multiple axes. And when we get to the truth,
[00:08:14] we are talking about one axis. Umm.
[00:08:19] in the end, they mean they are brought together by a unified leadership.
[00:08:23] All axes, the Iranian axis, the militias in Iraq,
[00:08:26] the Houthis in Yemen, all of them are militias that directly
[00:08:29] follow the Revolutionary Guard, including Hezbollah.
[00:08:33] The Revolutionary Guard is considered to be primarily followed by everyone. They are just
[00:08:36] different divisions, and in the end, each of them has its tasks
[00:08:40] related to
[00:08:42] the land and also the existing environment. For example,
[00:08:46] in Yemen, they have
[00:08:49] the Bab al-Mandab Strait, they have the strategic water
[00:08:52] passages, they have other things, or we can say
[00:08:55] that they are strategic
[00:08:58] is managed through them. In Iraq, they manage the war in another
[00:09:02] way. In Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is managed in another way. So I say that
[00:09:06] it is not an entry based on us saying that it has become managing the battle
[00:09:09] or that it is one axis or one leadership
[00:09:12] that is distributed into axes, but in the end, it is subject to one
[00:09:16] leadership and cannot be deviated from. And proof
[00:09:19] of that is the recent battle that took place,
[00:09:23] and the battle, the battle that has just started in Bab
[00:09:26] al-Mandab and the control of the coast is
[00:09:29] nothing but a battle related to the battle of the Strait of
[00:09:33] Hormuz and the battle in Iran, meaning
[00:09:38] the front in Iran. Yes, and we will address
[00:09:42] the issue in the context of this coverage, Doctor. Okay, what is the nature
[00:09:46] of the tasks undertaken
[00:09:49] by these experts that the Ministry of Interior
[00:09:51] revealed?
[00:09:53] Of course, the tasks undertaken by these
[00:09:57] the beginning, the tasks are not limited to the tasks of the existing
[00:10:00] experts that the statement referred to. The statement referred to these
[00:10:04] experts as they were identified by their names
[00:10:07] and locations, and it is considered a part of perhaps
[00:10:10] unavailable information, but
[00:10:13] we mentioned that the battle is a big battle,
[00:10:15] and Iran, with all its weight, all its capabilities, and all
[00:10:19] its energy, is carrying out the process of waging war inside
[00:10:23] Yemen. So they are playing various roles. These roles,
[00:10:27] these people's roles may be leadership roles in managing
[00:10:31] the battle, in electronic warfare,
[00:10:33] given that they also specialize
[00:10:37] in this field and in manufacturing drones, in operating them, and in programming
[00:10:40] them. So they play a leadership
[00:10:44] role in this guidance process and play an operational
[00:10:48] role in carrying out military operations
[00:10:50] in their various forms, whether land, sea,
[00:10:54] or air, given that they have Iranian
[00:10:58] drones that are smuggled from time to time and are also
[00:11:03] Yemen. So they also play different roles. This is considered
[00:11:07] the primary role. There are other roles, such as the training
[00:11:10] process and so on. These are carried out by elements less experienced than them.
[00:11:14] As we mentioned, the process of creating trainers, the process of training
[00:11:17] the existing leaders inside Iran itself. And these
[00:11:20] returned in early periods, to the extent that there
[00:11:23] were some individuals who were proud
[00:11:27] that they trained in Iran. When they came to take military
[00:11:32] the military course? I'm taking an internal course in Iran." This
[00:11:36] is how,
[00:11:39] in the previous period, let alone now, in the recent periods
[00:11:42] that Yemen has gone through,
[00:11:45] and it entered into intermittent
[00:11:48] wars, starting first with these six wars, these were
[00:11:52] a preliminary process and a training process, and it was like a rehearsal for them
[00:11:55] to move to the bigger war or the comprehensive
[00:11:59] war. Of course, we also must not forget, in this regard, that the Revolutionary Guard and others
[00:12:02] and these existing problems were first and foremost due to
[00:12:06] our division as Yemenis, and we are the ones who allowed others
[00:12:09] to intervene in Yemen because of these divisions. But the
[00:12:13] intervention was present and has been present for a previous period, but
[00:12:16] we can say that it was able to get
[00:12:19] an accelerated development that was not also expected to be in this
[00:12:23] form and at this speed.
[00:12:27] intervention, which
[00:12:30] into this action? It was not expected. It was
[00:12:34] planned and designed that it would reach this stage
[00:12:38] by them, by them, but it was not expected to reach it at this
[00:12:41] rapid stage. You reminded us that it came
[00:12:44] at certain times, and the political division that
[00:12:47] was present was a winning card for the Houthis,
[00:12:51] and they were able to invest and exploit it. The Houthis also
[00:12:55] benefited from Iranian political expertise and the Iranian
[00:12:58] experience. Therefore, they did not let them rush and moved through
[00:13:02] large stages, starting from the eighties, then they moved in 2004 to
[00:13:06] more than one war, some of which were as I mentioned, rehearsals
[00:13:11] of Saada. They did not expect it. They did not have
[00:13:15] expectations. Their expectations were that they would start by controlling certain governorates
[00:13:18] and nearby ones. They did not expect that they would control
[00:13:22] Yemen in this rapid and short time. They entered Aden and entered
[00:13:26] the southern governorate. All of this was due to divisions that occurred
[00:13:29] at a certain time and retaliations, each party retaliating against the other, and all
[00:13:33] Yemenis paid the price.
[00:13:36] Therefore, the original thing is for people to return to their origin
[00:13:39] and return to their unity. If they return to their unity,
[00:13:43] they will confront the Houthi tide and the Iranian tide, and they will have no
[00:13:47] time to overcome them. Yes. Okay, you also touched
[00:13:52] the region in general. To what extent
[00:13:56] is the escalation of Iranian intervention or its escalation in
[00:14:00] our country related to Tehran's
[00:14:03] attempt to compensate for the decline in its influence and proxies in countries
[00:14:06] of the region? Yes. Yemen is
[00:14:09] considered a more suitable environment than neighboring countries
[00:14:12] for Iran, more than Iraq, and more than Hezbollah in
[00:14:16] Lebanon, considering that it is in conflict zones
[00:14:20] and also collision zones and also zones where
[00:14:23] aircraft can move in a short time. Yemen, by its geographical
[00:14:26] nature, its passages,
[00:14:29] the water passages in it, the Bab
[00:14:32] al-Mandab Strait, we said also this is
[00:14:35] the difficult and rugged geographical environment in it. This
[00:14:39] represents a fertile environment for Iran to work from
[00:14:42] a distant place and at the same time
[00:14:46] be able to achieve more results than it achieves from militias
[00:14:49] and formations close to it, considering that it controls
[00:14:53] two passages. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, and Yemen controls the Strait of
[00:14:57] Bab al-Mandab, and thus it closes two important water
[00:15:00] passages to international trade, not for Iran or
[00:15:04] yes, for the whole world. Yes. Okay, what
[00:15:07] makes Yemen, with its geographical
[00:15:11] and strategic location, important
[00:15:15] expansionist project in the region?
[00:15:17] Iran seeks expansion. Umm.
[00:15:21] And this is a big dream it has, and also
[00:15:24] from a long time ago, they have been seeking
[00:15:27] it, even in their perspective and in the perspective of Imamate
[00:15:31] or Vilayat-e Faqih, it is control and it has transformed from the environment
[00:15:34] they called the peaceful environment to what is called the Deputy of the Imam
[00:15:38] or with the Khomeini Revolution. When the Khomeini
[00:15:41] Revolution triumphed, it became an armed revolution, so
[00:15:44] it is concerned with controlling more than one country, and it is not just that
[00:15:48] It is in
[00:15:52] its ambition to control the whole region and control more. Therefore,
[00:15:55] even when at certain times Iranian officials
[00:15:59] come and declare that we now have four Arab capitals
[00:16:03] and more, and more such statements come that he is betting on
[00:16:07] Taiz, he is betting on entering Marib or he is betting on entering certain
[00:16:10] places, he is not betting on entering these places
[00:16:14] because he loves to enter them or because they represent a strategic aspect
[00:16:17] for him. The strategic aspect for him is the water passages,
[00:16:21] but controlling them represents controlling the water
[00:16:25] passages. Yes. Okay, Doctor,
[00:16:29] does Iran really seek to transform
[00:16:32] the Houthi militia into
[00:16:35] an advanced military arm? There are also observers who say that
[00:16:39] it wants to transform these
[00:16:42] militias into a second Iran. What is
[00:16:45] it? It's no longer "does it seek," it has already transformed it.
[00:16:49] The question was relevant in the past, but now it
[00:16:52] has transformed. It has transformed into an Iranian military arm. So it is now
[00:16:56] an Iranian military arm that comes at certain times when people are at
[00:17:00] peace, not at war, and it comes
[00:17:03] in light of the existing Iranian distress and the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:17:06] Iranian directives come to move
[00:17:09] Yemen
[00:17:12] the coast, and the goal is the Strait of Bab
[00:17:15] al-Mandab. So the arms were built in the previous period
[00:17:19] and the arms are now present. Of course, there
[00:17:22] were, you could say, other factors
[00:17:26] that helped this building, that Yemen was originally a state
[00:17:29] and also had
[00:17:32] military forces and capabilities and mechanisms.
[00:17:36] Therefore, even some of these capabilities in the field of missiles
[00:17:39] you find that they have been developed
[00:17:43] and the smart aspect has been introduced to them and they have been used. So there was
[00:17:47] also a quantity of military arsenal that was previously present and was controlled
[00:17:50] by the Houthi militias. Iranian interventions in the development
[00:17:54] of such weapons also, you find that they benefited from them
[00:17:57] and it was also a suitable
[00:18:00] environment for using them. Yes. Okay, what
[00:18:03] are the risks resulting from this military intervention by Tehran in our country,
[00:18:07] locally, regionally, and internationally as well?
[00:18:11] Uh, locally, Yemen
[00:18:14] is in a tragic situation. We no longer talk about it.
[00:18:17] Yemen has become in a tragic
[00:18:21] intervention. Yemen has transformed into
[00:18:25] being ruled by militias. It has transformed into having its economic
[00:18:28] situations in a tragic situation. The situations
[00:18:32] of citizens and their livelihoods have become in a situation
[00:18:36] that is sometimes difficult to mention or even
[00:18:39] we hesitate to mention what exists
[00:18:42] within Yemeni or popular circles. So this
[00:18:46] was a result of the interventions, and Yemen paid a very heavy price
[00:18:49] and is still paying
[00:18:57] was not looked at
[00:19:01] the international community, and it was seen as a problem that
[00:19:04] might be internal and that it would not affect
[00:19:10] the end, the region and the world became convinced
[00:19:13] that these militias are nothing but a proxy
[00:19:17] of Iran and that they were not created only to cause
[00:19:21] problems within Yemen, but the goal is much bigger than Yemen,
[00:19:26] the water passages, and the goal
[00:19:29] is to destabilize regional
[00:19:32] security and international peace and security
[00:19:36] Iranian intervention and the flow of Iranian experts into
[00:19:39] our country, does it double the cost of confrontation
[00:19:42] and, you know,
[00:19:45] increase the suffering of Yemenis? The continued flow of expertise,
[00:19:49] I mentioned that this expertise is part of a whole,
[00:19:52] there are large numbers of them present.
[00:19:55] This expertise present in its current numbers, we said
[00:19:59] there are those who fight, you even find those who fight at the platoon level, and
[00:20:03] at the battalion level, and at the brigade level, and at the level of forming
[00:20:06] groups. When the fighting militias
[00:20:10] were formed at the beginning, they were formed
[00:20:12] in formations similar to the Iranian model or the Hezbollah
[00:20:16] model at the beginning. So their formation was not an arbitrary formation, it was
[00:20:20] a formation according to these experts who carried out this
[00:20:23] formation. The experts are distributed according to the specialization
[00:20:27] that is needed. When you are
[00:20:30] even in a state in a situation of stability
[00:20:33] and you sometimes need experts in a certain field, you sometimes need
[00:20:37] to cooperate with certain countries to bring you the relevant experts,
[00:20:41] let alone when a state is managing a battle, and the battle is considered
[00:20:45] its main battle, and it considers the other party in the country
[00:20:48] to be a party used by it. So when it notices
[00:20:52] that it needs to be supplied with the relevant experts
[00:20:56] according to the development of the stage, in certain previous stages,
[00:21:00] we said they did not need electronic warfare or drones,
[00:21:03] they were confined within Saada, but in the next stage, they became
[00:21:07] in need of entering the field of war, so they became in need of
[00:21:11] electronic warfare, they became in need of developing missiles.
[00:21:14] Therefore, capabilities were built that were not expected to be built
[00:21:17] at this time or in these short
[00:21:20] periods. Sometimes, technological building
[00:21:23] by advanced countries, when
[00:21:27] you offer them to export their technology, all countries refuse
[00:21:30] to export technology, especially military technology, let alone civilian
[00:21:33] technology. And when this rapid and continuous
[00:21:37] development comes in short periods in the process of launching
[00:21:40] missiles and hypersonic and aircraft and all
[00:21:43] this is a result of bringing in experts and also a result of smuggling
[00:21:46] these, smuggling these weapons and also smuggling
[00:21:50] the tools and materials for this technology. So technology requires
[00:21:54] expertise, and expertise is of two types: there is expertise
[00:22:00] within and are trained abroad, and this is what you find from time to time,
[00:22:04] going back and forth, and there are experts you need, and the internal expert
[00:22:07] who was trained cannot do the work himself, so
[00:22:11] the required expert comes to use
[00:22:15] a type of weapon or to develop it. Yes.
[00:22:18] So the stage depends, and with the difference of each stage,
[00:22:23] the specialization itself. When you need experts in electronic warfare,
[00:22:29] weapons, and in submarines, you need experts and programmers in the field
[00:22:33] of drones. Each field needs a type of expert. You also
[00:22:36] need leaders to manage the battle according to modern
[00:22:40] methods, means, and technology. All of these
[00:22:43] have been relied upon, and you find that, as
[00:22:46] I mentioned, this number in the statement may be a number
[00:22:50] that represents only a symbolic aspect and represents the
[00:22:52] leadership aspect that manages the battle. Yes. In return,
[00:22:56] Doctor, does the Ministry of Interior,
[00:23:00] does the Ministry of Interior
[00:23:03] have experts trained in what you mentioned, these skills
[00:23:06] and technological development?
[00:23:09] These skills are originally military skills more than they are security
[00:23:13] skills. They do, of course, fall within the scope of security skills,
[00:23:16] but when we have a process of security stability
[00:23:19] and we need to operate these different aspects, because in our security
[00:23:22] work, our security work uses technology related to
[00:23:25] the security work and achieving security and stability.
[00:23:29] It is even used at the drone level, but in the security
[00:23:32] specialization and field. But what we are talking about today is originally in the military
[00:23:36] aspect, and it is even originally for specialists in the military
[00:23:40] aspect to talk about it. Okay, Doctor, let me
[00:23:43] refer to a report published by Reuters on September
[00:23:47] 11, 2026. It talked
[00:23:51] about the escalation that occurred on the western
[00:23:56] the Revolutionary Guard. They said that they traveled to Yemen
[00:23:59] to supervise and support the Houthi militia's attacks on the western
[00:24:03] coast. And the Minister of Interior also said that the decision is made in Tehran
[00:24:06] and announced in Sana'a. What does this development
[00:24:09] mean militarily and politically? Uh,
[00:24:13] as we have already mentioned,
[00:24:16] it
[00:24:18] is about multiple axes. And the multiple formations of the militias are
[00:24:22] a copy. We said it was a copy, it is not a copy, it is
[00:24:26] a follower. And therefore, all decisions,
[00:24:29] all leadership directives, and all
[00:24:32] general directions, even political
[00:24:36] mostly from Iran.
[00:24:41] Yemen or even in Iraq, or even they are nothing but tools.
[00:24:44] Yes. Okay, Doctor, from
[00:24:48] where do these
[00:24:50] experts enter?
[00:24:53] The means of entry are multiple, but in recent
[00:24:56] periods or periods when the official
[00:24:59] crossings are closed, you find that this
[00:25:03] smuggling is a problem in
[00:25:06] itself. Experts usually come through smuggling.
[00:25:09] At times, the port of Hodeidah was open, and this
[00:25:13] smuggling is one of the problems
[00:25:15] that obstructs even international aspects and the countries that
[00:25:22] smuggling occurs in various forms, and we also have a large
[00:25:26] water area and long coastlines
[00:25:29] extending for thousands of kilometers. Therefore,
[00:25:32] their entry is mostly through smuggling. It may also occur through
[00:25:36] through you could say
[00:25:42] the beginning, when they had planned for seven Iranian
[00:25:46] flights to Sana'a, and this started
[00:25:49] at the beginning, before the beginning of the crisis or the problem. There are also
[00:25:53] flights that come from time to time, they may come as, but I
[00:25:57] don't know, this needs confirmation from an information
[00:26:01] point of view. They come
[00:26:04] as state aspects, or they come as assistants or
[00:26:07] doctors or in this form of infiltrators
[00:26:11] who work in UN or international organizations,
[00:26:14] so they come in different forms. The last plane that landed in Hodeidah may also
[00:26:18] have had experts on it, and it was said that there were
[00:26:21] experts among the employees present. When we say how
[00:26:25] they are smuggled, if the ambassador was smuggled,
[00:26:28] how can we talk about smuggling others? The ambassador
[00:26:31] and the embassy staff of the Iranian embassy. The ambassador
[00:26:35] does not represent the diplomatic side; he is an ambassador
[00:26:39] representing only the military side. He is the one who leads military operations
[00:26:43] and is considered the first official in charge of leading military operations. Yes.
[00:26:46] Okay, Doctor, are there, for example, friendly
[00:26:50] countries and sisterly
[00:26:53] countries, for example, cooperating with the Revolutionary Guard,
[00:26:57] cooperating with Iran, despite the fact that there are
[00:27:00] countries that have classified the Houthi militia as a terrorist
[00:27:03] organization and are still in this context, other
[00:27:06] countries are seeking to classify them as terrorist organizations, but these
[00:27:10] countries are still cooperating with
[00:27:14] contact with these militias on flights,
[00:27:16] and have you presented these evidences to the Ministry of
[00:27:20] The Ministry of Interior or the Yemeni government not to cooperate with
[00:27:24] the Houthi militias in smuggling these experts
[00:27:27] who belong to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard after
[00:27:30] this information that you obtained.
[00:27:34] Yes, for me as a person who represents a security
[00:27:36] entity, I may not address
[00:27:39] such
[00:27:42] a discussion because such a discussion is now decided by a political
[00:27:45] leadership. So, according to the available information provided
[00:27:49] by the Ministry of Interior and provided by the State Security Service,
[00:27:52] the original is done, and it is
[00:27:57] the political leadership reviews it.
[00:28:01] Therefore, in such matters, if information appears
[00:28:05] about cooperation between some countries or operations,
[00:28:08] then this originally has a political
[00:28:11] direction and a state direction. Yes, okay, let's
[00:28:15] go to this break and then we will complete the rest of the topics of this episode.
[00:28:18] Doctor, dear viewers, a break and we will continue.
[00:29:49] We are back, dear viewers, and we welcome you again. I also welcome my guest here in the studio,
[00:29:53] Dr. Faiez Ghalab. Dr. Faiez,
[00:29:56] we talked about smuggling, smuggling of experts
[00:30:00] and weapons into our country. How can this smuggling be curbed?
[00:30:04] Yes, first, the methods of smuggling and how smuggling is carried out,
[00:30:08] this is a problem in itself. Of course, we also mentioned that
[00:30:12] smuggling is carried out in the usual way of smuggling, not
[00:30:16] through official
[00:30:18] smuggling, and it is considered the most common type of smuggling, and many
[00:30:22] and boats were also seized, including the ship
[00:30:26] that was seized on the coast and was carrying what you call strategic
[00:30:29] weapons and long-range missiles and smart
[00:30:33] technical weapons, and this was one
[00:30:36] of them, one of the seized items,
[00:30:38] ships and boats were seized in the open sea. This is smuggled,
[00:30:42] and it is now smuggled through large ships and then unloaded into
[00:30:46] small boats and then smuggled into
[00:30:49] the interior. So, smuggling by sea is done on a large
[00:30:54] of smuggling is also done through official ports
[00:30:57] and sometimes through ports.