Markets Desk
Daily markets brief, drawn from a twelve-persona AI analyst roster, spanning tactical, credit, macro, valuation, volatility, trend, private-credit and on-chain lenses.
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Today’s Snapshot
Iran war stalemate keeps energy premium elevated; Asia rotation accelerates
A US-Iran conflict now entering its second month has driven sustained spikes in oil and gas prices with no ceasefire in sight — Trump called Tehran's latest response 'totally unacceptable' while Netanyahu signaled the war is 'not over.' Separately, investor flows are visibly rotating toward Asia, per Taipei Times business coverage, even as Taiwan Strait military tensions intensify with HIMARS deployments and new US legislative deterrence bills. The Bank of Estonia flagged that rising fuel costs are filtering into broader consumer prices across Europe, confirming the war's inflationary transmission channel is live. Nepal's adoption of a two-day weekend amid fuel supply disruption from the Iran conflict underscores how the energy shock is reordering economic behavior well beyond the immediate theater of conflict. Markets face a rare simultaneous stress: an active shooting war affecting the Strait of Hormuz, a Qatari tanker testing those waters, and a Taiwan Strait in a discrete but escalating military standoff — two chokepoints, two potential supply disruptions, one overstretched global investor base.
Synthesis
Points of Agreement
Thicket reads the dual-chokepoint stress (Hormuz + Taiwan Strait) as a single structural story about dollar-order fragility; Kensington independently arrives at the same conclusion through the fiscal dominance lens — both agree the Iran war is an accelerant, not a catalyst, for a pre-existing regime shift. Coiner's agrees with both that credit markets are underpricing the duration risk. Alder Grove concurs that investor psychology has re-complacenced faster than the underlying risk warrants. Sightline agrees on the Asia rotation signal and adds the picks-and-shovels EV supply chain as a tactical expression of the same theme. Probabilistic Reasoning supports the duration-underestimation thesis with a reference class argument.
Points of Disagreement
Sightline is the most tactically sanguine — treating the Taiwan Strait escalation as 'background' until a second source confirms kinetic change, while Thicket treats it as already material to any Hormuz-concurrent analysis. Kensington frames the Asia rotation as a multi-year structural shift (Group A vs Group B assets) playing out in slow motion; Sightline frames it as a tactical mid-cycle rebalancing with a geopolitical accelerant — similar direction, very different duration and conviction. Coiner's is explicitly skeptical that spread markets have caught up; Sightline implies the rotation trade is already active and smart money is moving. The core tension: is this a tradeable geopolitical event (Sightline's frame) or a regime-defining inflection (Kensington/Thicket's frame)?
Pivotal Question
What evidence would move Sightline toward the Kensington/Thicket regime-change view? A sustained 10-year Treasury yield breakout above recent cycle highs while oil remains elevated — signaling that the bond market is no longer treating this as a temporary supply shock but as a structural fiscal repricing — would be the single most important data point. Conversely, what would move Kensington toward Sightline's tradeable-event view? A credible ceasefire framework with Iranian acceptance within 30 days, followed by oil reverting to pre-war levels without a subsequent CPI re-acceleration.
Bias Flags
- Thicket Strategic Research: Directionally early for years on gold repricing and petrodollar stress; tendency to see every geopolitical event through the lens of the thesis already held. When wrong, persistent. The dual-chokepoint framing is compelling but may overweight tail outcomes.
- Kensington Macro Letter: Hard-asset constructive; fiscal-dominance lens can over-index to inflationary tails during disinflation windows. May be reading the Iran war as more structurally transformative than a contained conflict would warrant.
- Coiner's Credit Review: Structurally skeptical of monetary expansion; right on major breaks but early and wrong through long bull phases. The 1973 parallel is evocative but not dispositive — credit markets may be correctly pricing a faster resolution than Coiner's expects.
- Alder Grove Memos: Framework-oriented, not predictive — explicitly admits the two-possibilities split without probability-weighting either side. Useful for calibration, not for positioning.
- Sightline Markets Daily: Tactical frame may be systematically underweighting the regime-change possibility; the 'second source required' heuristic for Taiwan Strait is appropriate discipline but could cause tactical investors to lag a fast-moving escalation.
- Probabilistic Reasoning Notes: Reference class selection (prior US-adversary maritime conflicts) is defensible but not certain to apply — Iran's specific domestic political dynamics and Trump's negotiating style may make this conflict unlike prior Hormuz-adjacent episodes.
Routing
Voices seated: Thicket Strategic Research, Kensington Macro Letter, Coiner's Credit Review, Alder Grove Memos, Sightline Markets Daily, Probabilistic Reasoning Notes
The corpus's dominant financially material signals are: (1) an active US-Iran war spiking energy prices globally, with ceasefire talks stalled; (2) investors rotating toward Asia; (3) fuel-price-driven EV adoption in emerging markets; (4) Baltic fuel inflation feeding into broader price levels; and (5) Taiwan Strait military escalation (HIMARS deployment, 'Hellscape' plan) with direct US legislative response. These stories span geo-commodity plumbing (Thicket), fiscal/monetary regime stress (Kensington), credit market implications (Coiner's), cycle psychology (Alder Grove), tactical rotation (Sightline), and decision-quality under geopolitical uncertainty (Probabilistic Reasoning). Brandenburg Valuation is not routed — no specific security pricing data is available in the corpus.
Analyst Voices AI analysis
Thicket Strategic Research Hollis Drake
Connect the dots: two of the world's three most critical maritime energy chokepoints are simultaneously under active military stress. The Strait of Hormuz — with a Qatari tanker literally testing it as I write — is the passage for roughly 20% of global petroleum. The Taiwan Strait is the passage for roughly 40% of global container trade and the world's most concentrated semiconductor supply chain. These are not unrelated stories. They are a single story about what happens when the dollar-denominated energy and trade order fractures at multiple joints at once.
The punch line is this: energy is the base layer of money, and when the base layer destabilizes, everything priced on top of it reprices — usually with a lag the market consistently underestimates. We are now in the lag. Oil prices have spiked. Gas prices in the US are elevated. But sovereign credit markets, equity multiples, and corporate spreads have not yet fully absorbed what a sustained Hormuz disruption at even 15% throughput reduction would mean for an already-fiscally-stressed US federal budget.
I've written before about the Gold-to-Oil Ratio as a petrodollar pressure gauge. When oil spikes due to war risk rather than demand expansion, gold tends to follow — not immediately, but with conviction. The Qatari tanker story is the canary. If that tanker transits without incident, the risk premium partially unwinds. If it doesn't — or if Iran responds kinetically — we are in a different price regime. I am confident on direction here; I remain humble on whether the catalyst arrives this week or this quarter. Inflate or default — and default is not politically possible. This war, if it drags, accelerates the fiscal dominance thesis by compressing the window in which normal monetary policy remains credible.
Simultaneous military stress on Hormuz and Taiwan Strait represents a dual-chokepoint shock that energy prices have begun pricing but credit markets and equity multiples have not yet fully discounted.
Bias flag — Directionally early for years on gold repricing and petrodollar stress; tendency to see every geopolitical event through the lens of the thesis already held. When wrong, persistent. The dual-chokepoint framing is compelling but may overweight tail outcomes.
Kensington Macro Letter Nora Kensington
I want to be direct about what the Iran war means structurally, because the day-to-day ceasefire noise obscures the longer-duration signal. An active US military engagement — even one framed as limited — is a fiscal event. Defense spending surges. Energy import costs rise for consumers and for the government's own procurement and logistics. The revenue base, already stretched by prior deficit commitments, does not expand commensurately. This is the Drip Print becoming more visible: not a single helicopter-money moment, but an accumulation of fiscal obligations that the nominal GDP trajectory must eventually ratify.
I've been writing about fiscal dominance as a structural condition, not a policy choice, for several years now. The Iran war is not the cause — it's an accelerant. When I look at the 'investors look longingly to Asia' headline alongside the stalled Iran ceasefire, I see the Three-Axis Allocation thesis playing out in real time: investors are reducing exposure to the US-centric order (Group B assets: dollar-denominated paper) and increasing exposure to assets that sit outside that order (Group A: hard assets, Asian productive capacity, commodities). This is slower than people think — it's been underway for years — and then faster than people think when a catalyst arrives.
The Baltic fuel inflation story is instructive for a different reason: it confirms that energy price transmission is symmetric and global. The Bank of Estonia's observation that fuel costs are filtering into broader prices is, in miniature, the same dynamic threatening to re-accelerate US CPI. If oil stays elevated through summer — and stalled peace talks suggest it will — the Fed faces a deeply uncomfortable choice between re-tightening into a war-stressed economy or tolerating a second inflation wave. That is not a comfortable perch for Treasury holders. Nothing stops this train.
The Iran war is a fiscal accelerant layered onto an already fiscally-dominant US backdrop, pressuring the Fed's credibility and reinforcing long-duration rotation out of dollar paper into hard and Asian assets.
Bias flag — Hard-asset constructive; fiscal-dominance lens can over-index to inflationary tails during disinflation windows. May be reading the Iran war as more structurally transformative than a contained conflict would warrant.
Coiner's Credit Review August Farris & Ezra Farris
The credit market has not yet marveled, as it should, at the peculiar serenity with which it is greeting an active shooting war on the Strait of Hormuz. Spreads, as best we can read from the qualitative corpus available today, have not blown out. The twitchy end of high-yield — energy issuers with Hormuz exposure, shipping names, anything touching Middle East logistics — should be repricing. If it isn't, that is its own signal: either liquidity is still sloshing, or the market has decided this war resolves quickly. Given that Trump called Iran's latest ceasefire offer 'totally unacceptable,' the second interpretation looks increasingly fragile.
We've seen this before, and the historical parallel worth reaching for is not 1990 Gulf War but 1973 — a conflict that markets initially groused about as temporary and then were forced to reassess as structural. The 1973 oil shock didn't announce itself as a credit event; it arrived as a geopolitical inconvenience and then became the defining macro force of a decade. We are not predicting that replay. We are noting that the conditions for a credit repricing are present: elevated and rising energy costs, a federal fiscal position with no slack for a war premium, and a monetary authority that has already exhausted much of its credibility buffer fighting the first inflation wave.
Where we are watching most closely: the long end of the Treasury curve. If the Iran war drags and fiscal estimates are revised upward, the 10-year and 30-year will have to do the adjustment work that the Fed cannot do politically. The coupon matters here. Investors who assured themselves that the long end was safe because 'the Fed will cut' are now in a more complicated position. Credit is the dog; equity is the tail. The dog has not yet barked.
Credit markets appear insufficiently repriced for an active Hormuz disruption entering its second month — historical parallels from 1973 suggest the adjustment, when it comes, will be disorderly.
Bias flag — Structurally skeptical of monetary expansion; right on major breaks but early and wrong through long bull phases. The 1973 parallel is evocative but not dispositive — credit markets may be correctly pricing a faster resolution than Coiner's expects.
Alder Grove Memos Victor Halprin
I've been thinking about the pendulum this weekend. Not the pendulum of oil prices, which swings on obvious supply-demand mechanics, but the pendulum of investor psychology — specifically, how quickly sophisticated allocators oscillate between 'this is a contained, tradeable event' and 'this is a regime change that requires portfolio restructuring.' The Iran war is now in its second month. The initial shock has been absorbed. Investors are starting to feel comfortable again, rotating toward Asia as if geopolitical risk is something that can simply be geographically diversified away.
Here's my actual bottom line: two possibilities confront anyone running a serious portfolio right now. Possibility one: the Iran war resolves in the next 30-60 days, oil retreats, the Fed stays on hold, and the Asia rotation proves to have been premature. Possibility two: the war extends, Hormuz throughput deteriorates further, and what looks like a tactical energy spike becomes a structural inflation re-acceleration — forcing a portfolio rethink at the worst possible moment, when everyone has already re-risked. I genuinely do not know which possibility is more likely. I suspect most investors are behaving as if Possibility One is 80% probable, which is exactly the kind of muscle memory that gets punished in regime-change environments.
Galbraith used to note that the conventional wisdom is most dangerous precisely when it feels most comfortable. The conventional wisdom right now is that wars like this get priced in, ceasefire talks always eventually succeed, and the Fed will manage through. That's probably right most of the time. But frameworks — not predictions — are what I'm paid to provide. And my framework says: when two chokepoints are simultaneously stressed, and central bank credibility is already impaired, the pendulum of risk sentiment has less room to swing toward complacency than usual.
The pendulum of investor complacency is swinging back toward risk-on — rotation toward Asia, energy spike already 'priced in' — at a moment when the underlying war conditions that drove the spike have not resolved.
Bias flag — Framework-oriented, not predictive — explicitly admits the two-possibilities split without probability-weighting either side. Useful for calibration, not for positioning.
Sightline Markets Daily Miles Cardell & Jenna Vega
Our usual cross-check on rotation signals flags something worth noting: the 'investors look longingly to Asia' headline from Taipei Times is consistent with what smart money has been telegraphing for several weeks — a weight-shift away from US large-cap, particularly anything with Middle East energy exposure, toward Asia ex-Japan and selective emerging market industrial. This is not panic rotation; it looks more like mid-cycle rebalancing with a geopolitical accelerant. The twitchiest tranche here is probably US energy equities — which have benefited from the oil price spike but face a binary resolution scenario that makes them hard to hold with conviction.
The Nepal EV adoption story is the picks-and-shovels signal worth anchoring properly. Soaring fuel prices driving EV adoption in a price-sensitive emerging market like Nepal — where two-wheelers and buses are the primary transportation layer — is the same dynamic we see in more developed markets, just with the transmission lag compressed by necessity rather than preference. When fuel costs rise enough, the EV adoption curve steepens faster than the baseline growth rate. This matters for the copper supply chain, for battery materials, and for Asia-based EV manufacturers who supply these markets. That's a structural picks-and-shovels rotation: away from petroleum infrastructure, toward electrification supply chain.
On the Taiwan Strait stories: HIMARS deployment and new US deterrence legislation are not, in our tactical frame, immediate equity events. They are background escalation that widens the tail risk on any position with significant Taiwan semiconductor exposure — and given that TSMC and its ecosystem are embedded in virtually every global technology equity, the twitchiest tranche in tech is carrying more geopolitical beta than most factor models are pricing. We'd want to see a second source confirm any actual escalation before updating that read.
Rotation toward Asia accelerates on geopolitical energy stress, while the picks-and-shovels EV supply chain trade steepens; Taiwan Strait escalation adds unmodeled geopolitical beta to tech equity exposure.
Bias flag — Tactical frame may be systematically underweighting the regime-change possibility; the 'second source required' heuristic for Taiwan Strait is appropriate discipline but could cause tactical investors to lag a fast-moving escalation.
Probabilistic Reasoning Notes Dr. Evelyn Frost
The question being implicitly asked across today's corpus is: 'Will the Iran war resolve quickly, and how should I position?' This is not the right question. The right question is: 'What is my decision process robust to across the realistic range of war-duration outcomes, and what evidence would cause me to update?' These are different questions. The first invites a point forecast. The second invites a process.
Reference class: Military conflicts involving the United States, an adversary with asymmetric naval capabilities (Iran's mine and small-boat doctrine), and a contested maritime chokepoint have a median duration significantly longer than the market's initial pricing suggests. The Gulf War (1990-91) resolved quickly. The subsequent Iran-related tanker wars, the various Hormuz closure threats of 2018-2019, and the Yemen-Houthi Red Sea disruption of 2024-2025 all lasted longer than consensus expected and required multiple rounds of expectation revision. This is the relevant reference class — not the optimistic tail.
What would have to be true for the fast-resolution scenario? Iran would need to conclude that continued conflict is costlier than accepting Trump's ceasefire terms. Given that Trump called their latest offer 'totally unacceptable,' this requires a significant shift in Iranian domestic political calculus. The failure mode of the fast-resolution bet is that each side's domestic political constraints make concession harder, not easier, as the conflict extends. The premortem for any portfolio positioned for quick resolution: the war drags six more months, oil remains elevated, the Fed cannot cut, and the Asia rotation you made in anticipation of US normalization turns out to be premature. I am not opining on likelihood. I am noting that the downside scenario requires no extraordinary assumptions — it is simply the extrapolation of current revealed behavior from both parties.
The reference class for US-adversary maritime conflicts skews toward longer duration than initial market pricing; the fast-resolution scenario requires behavioral changes from both parties that current evidence does not support.
Bias flag — Reference class selection (prior US-adversary maritime conflicts) is defensible but not certain to apply — Iran's specific domestic political dynamics and Trump's negotiating style may make this conflict unlike prior Hormuz-adjacent episodes.
Simulated Opinion
If you had to form a single opinion having heard the roundtable, weighted for known biases, it would be: the Iran war is more durable than current market pricing implies, the Hormuz risk premium is real but not yet fully transmitted into credit spreads and equity multiples, and the Asia rotation trade — while directionally correct — is being adopted by mid-cycle investors who believe geopolitical risk is tradeable when the evidence increasingly suggests it is structural. Discount Kensington and Thicket somewhat for their known hard-asset constructive biases and structural tendency toward maximum-darkness readings. Discount Sightline slightly for its tactical frame's tendency to underprice tail duration. What remains after those discounts: the probabilistic case for a war lasting longer than 60 additional days is substantially higher than the market's current behavior implies; the 10-year Treasury is the instrument most likely to signal when the market is catching up to this view; and any portfolio carrying heavy US tech with unmodeled Taiwan Strait beta deserves a second look before the next round of Taipei escalation headlines hits.
Data Points
- US-Iran War / Oil Price Impact: War in second month; oil and gas prices spiked in US and globally; no ceasefire imminent — Trump called Iran's latest offer 'totally unacceptable' (no specific WTI price in corpus; directional signal only)
- Strait of Hormuz / Qatari Tanker Transit: Qatari tanker sailing toward Strait of Hormuz as US-Iran ceasefire talks remain stalled; fresh clashes around Strait raising fears over global energy security
- Investor Flows / Asia Rotation: Investors described as 'looking longingly to Asia' — directional flow signal toward Asia ex-US equities
- Baltic States / Fuel Inflation Transmission: Bank of Estonia economist Lauri Matsulevitš: rising fuel costs identified as 'one of the main drivers of inflation'; broader price transmission confirmed
- Nepal / EV Adoption Signal: Soaring fuel prices driving shift from petroleum to electric vehicles across two-wheelers to buses in Nepal; supply crunch traced to Iran war
- Taiwan Strait / HIMARS Deployment: HIMARS missile systems to be deployed to Taiwan islands; new US bill introduced to deter Chinese aggression; 'Hellscape' deterrence plan reported to concern PLA
- Ukraine War / Putin Signal: Putin says Russia-Ukraine war 'heading to an end'; Kremlin confirms peace talks brokered by Trump administration are on pause
- Nepal / Energy Supply Disruption (Two-Day Weekend): Nepal implemented two-day weekend following fuel supply crunch traced to Iran war; fourth such crisis measure since 1990
- Bank of Canada / Interest Rate Decision: Bank of Canada interest rate announcement December 9, 2026 scheduled (forward-looking calendar entry; no rate change confirmed in corpus)
- Oil Trade / Energy Supply: 'Oil loss will slow restart of energy trade' — directional signal on energy trade disruption from conflict
- Hantavirus Cruise Ship / Health Risk Premium: WHO recommends 42-day quarantine for all passengers of hantavirus-hit ship; evacuation underway in Tenerife — minor tail risk for travel/leisure sector
Watch Next
- Iran's response to revised US ceasefire proposal — any formal acceptance or rejection will move oil immediately; watch for State Department and Netanyahu statements in next 24 hours
- Qatari tanker transit through Strait of Hormuz — a successful transit partially unwinds risk premium; an Iranian interdiction attempt would escalate sharply
- US 10-year Treasury yield behavior — a sustained move above recent cycle highs while oil remains elevated would signal credit market catching up to fiscal risk premium
- Taiwan Strait: formal legislative status of the US deterrence bill introduced this week — committee assignment and cosponsorship count will signal how seriously Congress is treating Taiwan escalation
- Bank of Canada next rate decision (December 9, 2026) — watch for how BoC characterizes energy-driven inflation in deliberations summary; relevant for CAD and commodity currency dynamics
- Asian equity flow data for the week ending May 10 — confirmation or denial of the 'investors looking longingly to Asia' rotation signal
Historical Power Lenses AI analysis
J.P. Morgan 1837-1913
In the Panic of 1907, Morgan physically gathered the heads of New York's largest banks in his library and refused to let them leave until they had collectively pledged enough capital to stop the cascade. He understood that controlling the choke points — the clearinghouses, the trust companies, the call money market — was the entire game. Today's Strait of Hormuz is the 1907 call money market: whoever controls throughput dictates terms to the entire downstream economy. Morgan would have immediately asked: who is the lender of last resort for global energy supply when the chokepoint is contested? The answer — the US Navy — is now itself a belligerent, which is precisely what makes this situation structurally different from prior Hormuz tension episodes where Washington was the honest broker.
Andrew Carnegie 1835-1919
Carnegie's supreme insight during the Panic of 1873 — which devastated his competitors — was that cost discipline in downturns is how empires are built. He kept building, kept cutting costs, and emerged with dominant market share. The EV adoption acceleration in Nepal and other fuel-price-stressed markets is precisely this dynamic: energy disruption is forcing adoption curves that subsidy programs had failed to steepen. The picks-and-shovels beneficiaries — copper, lithium processing, Asian EV manufacturers — are accumulating the Carnegie advantage right now, in the downturn phase of the old petroleum order. Carnegie would recognize this immediately as vertical integration opportunity: own the supply chain from battery materials to assembly before the incumbents realize the transition is structural rather than cyclical.
Sun Tzu 544-496 BC
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting — but the corollary, which Sun Tzu emphasized equally, is that if you must fight, do not fight at a chokepoint you do not control. Iran's strategic position in this conflict is precisely Sun Tzu's ideal: it does not need to win the war to impose unbearable costs. It merely needs to sustain enough uncertainty around Hormuz throughput to keep the oil risk premium elevated, which drains the US fiscal position, strains the Fed's credibility, and fractures the Western coalition. The HIMARS deployment to Taiwan and the new US deterrence bill are Washington signaling on two fronts simultaneously — which Sun Tzu would have recognized as a dangerous overextension of strategic attention. Shaping conditions on one front while fighting on another is the textbook path to being outmaneuvered on both.
Machiavelli 1469-1527
Machiavelli's most underappreciated observation in The Prince was that it is better to be feared than loved, but most dangerous to be neither. Trump's Iran negotiation now risks the third category: having called Iran's offer 'totally unacceptable' without the subsequent military escalation that would give the threat teeth, Washington is projecting a posture of firmness without the demonstrated follow-through that makes adversaries recalibrate. Machiavelli would have recognized this as the classic error of the leader who makes bold declarations and then pauses — it encourages the adversary to probe further rather than concede. The ceasefire talks being 'on pause' is not a neutral status; in Machiavellian terms, it is an invitation to Iran to test whether the pause is strategic or indicative of limited will.
Genghis Khan 1206-1227
The Mongol empire's most underappreciated weapon was its intelligence network — yam relay stations that could transmit battlefield information across thousands of miles in days, giving Genghis decision-cycle superiority over any adversary. Today's Taiwan Strait escalation — HIMARS deployment, 'Hellscape' plan, US deterrence legislation — is visible to all parties simultaneously, which means the information advantage belongs to whoever processes it fastest and acts most decisively. The PLA's reported unease with the 'Hellscape' plan suggests the psychological dimension of information warfare is already operating. Genghis would have noted that the battle is already being won or lost in the intelligence and signaling layer, before a single kinetic engagement. The investor implication: Taiwan Strait tail risk is being shaped by this information competition right now, not at the moment of potential kinetic escalation.
Sources Cited
16 sources — show
- CNBC — cnbc.com/2026/05/10/netanyahu-says-iran-war-is-not-over-as-… News / analysis CNBC profile
- BBC — bbc.com/news/articles/clypgz9e5pmo News / analysis BBC News profile
- Kathmandu Post — kathmandupost.com/world/2026/05/10/us-iran-no-closer-to-end…
- Kathmandu Post — kathmandupost.com/money/2026/05/10/soaring-fuel-prices-driv…
- Kathmandu Post — kathmandupost.com/world/2026/05/10/putin-says-he-thinks-rus…
- Kathmandu Post — kathmandupost.com/national/2026/05/09/two-day-weekend-follo…
- Kathmandu Post — kathmandupost.com/health/2026/05/10/passengers-begin-evacua…
- Taipei Times — taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2026/05/11/2003857090 News / analysis
- Taipei Times — taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2026/05/11/2003857091 News / analysis
- Taipei Times — taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/05/11/2003857105 News / analysis
- Taipei Times — taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/05/11/2003857106 News / analysis
- Taipei Times — taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/05/11/2003857121 News / analysis
- The Baltic Times — baltictimes.com/central_bank__rising_fuel_costs_expected_to…
- Bank of Canada — bankofcanada.ca/2026/12/interest-rate-announcement-december…
- Bank of Canada — bankofcanada.ca/2026/11/publication-summary-of-deliberation…
- Kathmandu Post — kathmandupost.com/money/2026/05/10/weak-private-investment-…
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