Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a quotation record.
00:00:00which had previously launched Twitter, is available for both Apple devices and
00:00:03Android. It is built on blockchain, and its security is high. Its code is
00:00:07available open source to technical people, which makes it more reliable.
00:00:18years, the term
00:00:20"Axis of Resistance" has been used to refer to
00:00:23the proxy forces of the Islamic Republic. These are groups
00:00:26that Tehran finances and arms,
00:00:30and uses them to serve its regional objectives.
00:00:33But is this picture fundamentally
00:00:37correct? Hamid Reza Azizi, a researcher on Iranian affairs and
00:00:40Middle East security, in his new book "The Axis
00:00:44of Resistance," focuses on this image and presents a different perspective.
00:00:47According to this view, the forces known as the
00:00:51"Axis of Resistance" are not a collection of forces under Iran's command,
00:00:55but rather a network of actors who make decisions together,
00:00:58influence each other, and each
00:01:02has their own interests and priorities. This network,
00:01:05facing the Gaza war, the weakening of Hezbollah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government,
00:01:09and direct war between Iran, America, and Israel, is confronted with
00:01:13the biggest crisis in its history. Now that many of the
00:01:16foundations of this network have been weakened, how does the Axis of Resistance
00:01:20function? Can it rebuild itself, and to what extent has its
00:01:23function been positive for Iran? I am Farnaz Ghazizadeh,
00:01:27and this is a special interview with Hamid Reza Azizi.
00:01:47Welcome. After a long time, we are pleased to have you here in the studio. You have written a new book
00:01:50titled "The Axis of Resistance," which, as
00:01:54you heard, I described what the main subject
00:01:57of this book is. Now I want to hear more details from you. You
00:02:01say that it wasn't the case that these were only
00:02:04Iran's proxy forces, but rather
00:02:08they have their own interests and sometimes act based on those interests. Could you elaborate on this for
00:02:11our audience? What exactly do you mean? Thank you very much for
00:02:15inviting me. I am very happy to be here.
00:02:18A key word that was in your introduction
00:02:22and somehow encompasses the main
00:02:25idea of this book is "network."
00:02:28That is, it
00:02:32views a linear relationship between Iran and the members
00:02:36of the Axis of Resistance, in which Iran,
00:02:39specifically the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force, is at the top, and all of them are at
00:02:43the bottom, and the relationships are such that a command
00:02:46comes from above, and all of them are obliged to implement it.
00:02:50When we talk about the concept of a network, we are actually talking about a series
00:02:53of reciprocal relationships
00:02:57in which, although Iran's role
00:03:01as the only state actor in this group,
00:03:04naturally, during the time that
00:03:06both Assad father and Bashar Assad were in power,
00:03:10Syria was also a member of this, but overall, as the main supporter
00:03:14of this network, when it is present, the type
00:03:17of relationship is naturally asymmetric. However,
00:03:21it is not the case that they
00:03:23simply obey Tehran. This is one aspect
00:03:27of the network. The other aspect of the network refers to
00:03:30the different nature of the relationships that
00:03:34exist between the various members of this
00:03:37network, the various members of this axis, and Iran. That is, the type of relationship that Iran has with Hezbollah, for example,
00:03:41is different from the type of relationship it has with Hamas.
00:03:44It is different from the type of relationship it has with some smaller Iraqi groups
00:03:48like Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah
00:03:52al-Nujaba. And this is a spectrum in which a
00:03:55group like Hezbollah can be seen as an ally of Iran,
00:03:59a group like Hamas can be seen as a partner of Iran, and
00:04:02groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah and others are in a proxy relationship,
00:04:06meaning a relationship in which two factors
00:04:10exist: one factor is material support,
00:04:14not just financial, meaning that whether in terms of military support,
00:04:17financial support, and so on, this is the main axis of the relationship.
00:04:21And coercion for intervention. These two
00:04:24factors do not exist in that form for a group like Hezbollah.
00:04:28For Hamas, it exists to a much lesser extent, but it does for these smaller groups. In
00:04:32Syria, at the height of the civil war, the groups that Iran
00:04:35had formed, whether from within the various
00:04:38segments within Syria, or the Fatemiyoun
00:04:42and Zainabiyoun that it had brought from outside, these were also proxies. Therefore,
00:04:45this is a complex relationship. The problem is
00:04:49that the perception and image we had until now was not this. How important
00:04:53is it that we see this in the way you
00:04:56presented it in the book? You see, the main aspect
00:04:59of this issue is that, for many
00:05:03years, the idea existed that
00:05:06weakening the Islamic Republic would mean the eradication
00:05:09of all these groups in the region. And
00:05:13basically, the main debate,
00:05:16the main discussion among various analysts
00:05:20and at the political level among politicians, specifically in Israel, has been whether we
00:05:23should first start with Iran's so-called "arms" and
00:05:27reach Iran by weakening them, or whether, as they say, we should
00:05:30"cut off the head of the octopus" and then this network will stop working. But
00:05:34when we look at what the nature of this network basically was
00:05:37and how it has evolved over time,
00:05:41well, this shows
00:05:44that this view is a bit simplistic. For example, if we look at
00:05:48the relationship between Iran and Hamas, Hamas, which has been the main focus
00:05:52of all developments in the last three years since October 7th, which ultimately
00:05:55affected Iran itself, October
00:05:587th was something that, at least in
00:06:02terms of timing and in terms of,
00:06:05as I mentioned, its details, that type of attack, that
00:06:09type of massacre that occurred, of Israeli settlers,
00:06:12was not coordinated with Iran and even with Hezbollah. But now, someone like Khamenei, someone
00:06:16like, well, anyone else in the Islamic Republic's system, looks
00:06:20at this in that broader ideological
00:06:24context. Well, what Hamas
00:06:26did was in line with shared interests.
00:06:30Did Khamenei take the right step
00:06:33by not distancing himself from that attack and claiming it as his own? You see, if we look at
00:06:37the course of developments that happen after October 7th,
00:06:41Esmail Haniyeh travels to Tehran twice. The first
00:06:45time is in November 2023, almost a month
00:06:49after October 7th, a little over a month. Nothing is reported then. After
00:06:52he leaves Tehran, Reuters mentions
00:06:56that Ismail Haniyeh was in Tehran. Khamenei even told him that
00:07:00the criticisms you are making in Hamas about us
00:07:03are not correct. You did this, and we will not enter the war for you,
00:07:07and so on. The second time is in the spring
00:07:10of 2024, when Ismail Haniyeh, along with
00:07:13Ziyad al-Nakhalah, the leader of Islamic Jihad, come to Tehran.
00:07:17They are welcomed like heads of state. What happens in this interim?
00:07:21What happens in this period of less
00:07:24than six, perhaps, is that
00:07:27this perception, or rather misconception, arises in the Islamic Republic
00:07:31that Hamas, on the one hand, and by then Hezbollah
00:07:35had intervened and opened the northern front, and the Houthis were firing missiles from the south
00:07:39and had made Bab al-Mandeb, the Red Sea, insecure. This
00:07:42effectively grounded Israel, and now is the time
00:07:46for us to come and claim credit for this. Exactly
00:07:50that was where a miscalculation happened. You see, in
00:07:53May 2024,
00:07:55Mr.
00:07:58Safavi, Rahim Safavi, who was Khamenei's advisor,
00:08:01I think he is still Mojtaba Khamenei's advisor, comes and
00:08:05says that we have reached the shores
00:08:09of the Mediterranean for the third time in Iran's history. The first time,
00:08:42Iran gives money, then waits to see what they do. How does this
00:08:46relationship form? You see, this is where
00:08:49I said we need to differentiate between the various groups
00:08:53that exist in this network. For example,
00:08:56when we talk about Palestinian groups, well, Hamas
00:08:59is fundamentally a newer organization compared to some
00:09:03other groups, like the Palestine Liberation Organization, which later formed the Palestinian
00:09:06Authority. Or Islamic Jihad
00:09:10is also relatively newer.
00:09:14The issue of Palestine has been, ever since the revolution, as I mentioned, at
00:09:17the heart of
00:09:19Iran's foreign policy and regional policy.
00:09:23And in line with that, it had ties with Palestinian
00:09:26groups, and also with Hezbollah.
00:09:30And now, what happens
00:09:34is that as a result of a few things, first
00:09:37the positions that Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization
00:09:41generally took during the Iraq war, being more inclined towards Saddam,
00:09:44and second, as a result of the Oslo Accords in the early
00:09:4890s, which were peace agreements, Iran concludes that the support
00:09:52it was giving them to fight Israel is useless.
00:09:56Then they turn to Hamas, which was an Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) in its approach.
00:09:59Well, what I want to say is that what Iran has done is to search
00:10:03for groups in the region that align with its
00:10:07ideological and strategic
00:10:10context, centered on confrontation with America
00:10:13and, consequently, confrontation with Israel.
00:10:16It has established contact with them and supported
00:10:20them under the banner that "we are all working towards a common goal."
00:10:24That common goal is actually
00:10:27confronting Israel and weakening the role of the United States. But there is a key
00:10:31element in all of this, and that is Qassem Soleimani. That is, from a certain
00:10:35point onwards, which perhaps, in my opinion, after
00:10:38the 2003 Iraq issue,
00:10:41Qassem Soleimani creates a new image.
00:10:44Could you elaborate a bit on this development
00:10:48and what effect the assassination of Qassem Soleimani had on this axis?
00:10:51You see, Qassem Soleimani,
00:10:55as an individual, was someone who played a pivotal
00:10:58role in this Axis of Resistance. That is, we
00:11:02are talking about a system called the Islamic Republic. Within this system, we are talking about an
00:11:06organization called the Quds Force. But the one who transformed the Quds Force
00:11:10into what we know it as today, or at least until 2023,
00:11:13was Qassem Soleimani. In this sense,
00:11:17well, the roots of the formation
00:11:20of the Quds Force, as the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard,
00:11:24actually, as a transnational force, go back to the time of the Iraq war,
00:11:28when the Ramadhan Base was formed. Iran supported Saddam's
00:11:31opponents, who were Shiites, which formed the main root of Iran's
00:11:35relationship with these groups. But
00:11:39until Soleimani's time, and from the time Soleimani came,
00:11:42again, until the Arab Spring, the Quds
00:11:46Force was not a very well-known entity. The Quds Force
00:11:49was something that even within Iran, it was not really allowed
00:11:53to talk about it, if you recall. Qassem Soleimani himself was not a figure
00:11:57that we knew very well and talked about.
00:12:00But what he had done until 2011 was to create
00:12:03a network
00:12:06that was largely hierarchical, as a way
00:12:09for Iran to communicate with them. That is, it's true that
00:12:13I emphasize that this proxy relationship
00:12:16cannot be used for all these groups.
00:12:20But the network he had formed was a hierarchical network,
00:12:23Qassem Soleimani himself. Soleimani had representatives
00:12:26in each of these countries. In Iraq, it was Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. In
00:12:30Lebanon, of course, it was Hassan Nasrallah himself. In Syria, when
00:12:33the civil war happened, it was Hamdani, and after him,
00:12:37two other commanders who came. This was a hierarchical
00:12:41network that Qassem Soleimani controlled here. Qassem Soleimani was very well
00:12:44known in the region, especially among
00:12:47Shiite factions in Iraq and
00:12:51Lebanon, for his personal connections. And this is something that,
00:12:56despite the survival of the organization as the Quds Force
00:12:59and the arrival of Qaani, and despite the changes
00:13:02that happened in the axis, which I explain in this book, that it moved towards decentralization
00:13:06as an approach to preserve itself, where a joint operations
00:13:10room was formed, despite all this,
00:13:13none of them could fill Soleimani's shoes,
00:13:17because this network was very personality-centric. After
00:13:20Soleimani, we reach a moment-by-moment
00:13:23picture, up to today, where in each picture, a figure
00:13:27from this axis has been removed.
00:13:30In one section, Assad is removed.
00:13:33In another section, Nasrallah is removed. What effect did each
00:13:37of these individuals who played a central
00:13:40role have? Well, the Quds Force itself
00:13:44was involved, now specifically Qaani, the commanders
00:13:47of the Palestinian and Lebanese branches of the Quds Force,
00:13:51who were also killed in the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus
00:13:55in April 2024. These were them. And then Hassan
00:13:58Nasrallah himself was the one who tried to fill
00:14:01Soleimani's shoes, because
00:14:05Qaani
00:14:07did not have that general acceptance among the Iranian-backed groups,
00:14:11especially in Iraq. He faced a crisis. Was there
00:14:14another figure among the Revolutionary Guard commanders
00:14:18who could fill Soleimani's position? A charismatic figure who could fill Soleimani's position?
00:14:22No. And that's why after Soleimani, in terms of
00:14:25an individual, it was Nasrallah himself. But in terms of developments,
00:14:29the most important geopolitical development was naturally the fall
00:14:33of Assad, because all the energy and
00:14:36capital that Iran invested, both financially and in terms of
00:14:40human resources, from 2011 until the year
00:14:442024, when Assad fell, was based
00:14:47on preserving this geographical connection
00:14:51between the two main pillars of the axis,
00:14:55the two Shiite pillars of the axis, which were Iraq and
00:14:58Lebanon. Well, Assad's fall destroyed this. The logistics
00:15:02of the axis suffered a crisis, and we are still
00:15:06seeing the results of this, of course,
00:15:09in the situation that Hezbollah in Lebanon is facing. Yes, and another
00:15:13part that I definitely want to talk about before we move to the future is the Houthis.
00:15:17The Houthis have a strategic position. In this whole
00:15:20scene, they seem to be the most isolated
00:15:23from Iran,
00:15:26in relation to Iran, I mean. But they can act more effectively.
00:15:29Could you elaborate a bit on their position and characteristics
00:15:33for us? In terms of strategy,
00:16:07Saudi Arabia, which is a serious rival for us in the region, there is a force here that is challenging
00:16:11it, and it's also in its neighborhood. It's not like there was no connection before.
00:16:14Of course there was. The Houthi leaders, well, they are Zaydis, although they are not
00:16:18Twelver Shiites. They used to come to Iran for education.
00:16:21Assad wasn't there either. However, what
00:16:24the Houthis did was to add a new geographical
00:16:28pillar to the axis, which now, after the fall of Assad,
00:16:31coincidentally, we are seeing signs that the overall
00:16:35approach of the Islamic Republic is shifting in that direction. Now, you
00:16:38remember that May 2024, when I mentioned Safavi's remarks.
00:16:42Then just
00:16:44recently, during the 40-day war, meaning
00:16:48immediately after that, during the ceasefire, Qaani, the commander
00:16:52of the Quds Force, speaks. This time he says that from the Strait
00:16:56of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandeb and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea,
00:16:59it is Iran's security belt. What does this tell us? This is saying that that geographical
00:17:03focus, as far as it concerns Iran, the geographical focus has now shifted.
00:17:27Given the Shiite-centric aspect that has become even more prominent after the killing of
00:17:31Khamenei, Hezbollah still plays
00:17:34a very important role in the approach, but in terms of developments,
00:18:02have an effect on the revival of the Axis of Resistance. As they say, the discussion
00:18:05of Khamenei's death should be viewed in a larger context,
00:18:09which I also wrote an article about shortly
00:18:12after the war started and was published in Foreign Affairs.
00:18:16There, I raised this issue that several
00:18:20developments are taking place that are redefining the Axis of Resistance based on its
00:18:23Shiite identity. One is the
00:18:27actions of Israel in Lebanon, where effectively
00:18:31the southern areas, which are the habitat of Shiites,
00:18:34are completely under occupation. More than one million Lebanese are displaced,
00:18:38regardless of whether they are Hezbollah or not. In fact,
00:18:41only the sectarian identity, what we know as sectarianism in the region,
00:18:45is very different from someone who, in Iran, even the most devoted
00:18:49person who considers himself a Shiite in Iran, still defines himself as
00:18:52a Shiite sect. In Lebanon, Shiite means the entire
00:18:56identity of an individual that distinguishes him from Druze, from
00:18:59as I mentioned, Sunni, and so on. Well, here Israel
00:19:03is exerting pressure. The Lebanese government, a government that after
00:19:06all, Mr. Nawaf Salam and Mr.
00:19:10They are exerting pressure, and this has created
00:19:14a perception of threat among Shiites. On the other hand,
00:19:17Iraqi Shiites see that the fall of Assad led
00:19:21to someone coming to power who, no matter how much change has occurred
00:19:24in his approach, was after all the commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mr.
00:19:27Ahmad al-Shahar. And this has actually
00:19:31increased the perception of threat among the Iraqi side
00:19:34as well. And now, in the midst of this, the killing of Khamenei, whom these groups, especially in Iraq and
00:19:38Lebanon, consider their religious authority, well, this
00:19:42is presented again as
00:19:45a major plan to strike all Shiites in
00:19:49the region, and in terms of
00:19:53public mobilization, it provides a ground that
00:19:56the Islamic Republic can potentially use better than before.
00:20:00Let's go back to what you just mentioned about Iran's strategic depth
00:20:04and what areas it covers, and Qaani's remarks. There are
00:20:08other discussions that are also very much heard within Iran that
00:20:11we should shift from
00:20:14this Axis of Resistance towards the Persian Gulf.
00:20:18Does Iran have the capability to actually
00:20:21make such a shift and make the Persian Gulf
00:20:25the place where its main power lies? We are now witnessing
00:20:28a distinction between strategic depth and the axis. These were two different
00:20:32concepts for many years, defined within
00:20:36a single framework. Why? Because
00:20:50the path to Israel would prevent Israel from even considering an attack on
00:20:54Iran, exactly as we fight in Syria instead of on our own soil.
00:20:57If you listen to the
00:20:59statements of analysts close to the government, they say that everything started with the fall of Assad.
00:21:03Until then, we had it, but now we are witnessing
00:21:07two things, as I mentioned
00:21:10to you. One issue relates to
00:21:14the identity of regional
00:21:18mobilization, and
00:21:22the ideological core of the Islamic Republic, which
00:21:25is still present in Iraq and Lebanon. This is one aspect.
00:21:28The other aspect is that strategic depth,
00:21:32in the sense of something that can create deterrence, is not just the presence of these groups.
00:21:36It's about straits. And where do we ourselves control a strait? In
00:21:39the Persian Gulf. And the second strait is controlled by
00:21:43the ally of the Islamic Republic, which are the Houthis. In this way, this shift has occurred. There is
00:21:46a decoupling between these two concepts. And another issue
00:21:49that has always been raised, again related to what
00:21:52we just talked about regarding the Persian Gulf,
00:21:56is strategic loneliness, what we hear a lot about, that Iran is a
00:21:59Persian
00:22:01country in the midst of Arab
00:22:05Sunnis in the region, or now in the case of Turkey,
00:22:08Turkic-speaking. Can we still look
00:22:11at the issue from this perspective, or has there been a shift in this regard too? I think
00:22:15this has even intensified compared to before, because Ali Khamenei
00:22:19considered himself the "Wali al-Amr" (Guardian of the Islamic Community)
00:22:22of the Muslim world. And essentially, the definition of Hamas
00:22:26within this network, and this is where another simplistic
00:22:29aspect that existed in describing the axis,
00:22:33especially in the West, was that it is a Shiite axis, which is not correct,
00:22:37because neither Hamas is Shiite, nor was Assad Shiite, nor are the Houthis Shiite
00:22:40in that sense. Well, now this has actually become more prominent.
00:22:44You see, the Islamic Republic sets a condition
00:22:48for
00:22:50signing an agreement with the United States. What is it? It is that Lebanon
00:22:54must be present in this. Why Lebanon? Why not Palestine?
00:22:58Why not even Yemen? Well, this has actually
00:23:01become more prominent because
00:23:04the belief has emerged that ultimately,
00:23:07if it wants to recreate
00:23:10its regional influence,
00:23:14especially in the Levant region,
00:23:18it needs
00:23:20to have the Shiites of Lebanon with it. And on the other hand, the same applies to Iraq.
00:23:24Therefore, the focus on the Shiite factor
00:23:27in the Islamic Republic's approach has even increased. But as I
00:23:31mentioned, these are concepts that were all lumped
00:23:34together and formed Iran's approach to the Axis of Resistance
00:23:37and Iran's regional policy in its general sense. Now they
00:23:41have been separated. Each of them is performing
00:23:44a different task. But we should not
00:23:47forget that we are currently, both within Iran, in terms of, naturally, domestic
00:23:51politics, and in foreign and regional policy, going through a transitional period.
00:23:55It is not clear whether, or rather, the fact that we say this has
00:23:58happened does not necessarily mean that it will be successful. This is a shift that is currently
00:24:02underway. And there is
00:24:05a slogan that is a very widely
00:24:08heard slogan: "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran."
00:24:11Can it be said that this Axis of Resistance,
00:24:15on the whole, acted in Iran's interest,
00:24:18not the Islamic Republic's?
00:24:20Or rather, has it been more detrimental to Iran?
00:24:24You see, it is very difficult to give a very straightforward
00:24:28answer to this, because it depends on
00:24:31what lens we look through. If we look through the same
00:24:35lens I mentioned earlier, for example, that the October 7th action by Hamas
00:24:38and its consequences affected Iran, then ultimately,
00:24:42this network not only did not create deterrence
00:24:45for Iran, but because it was in
00:24:48a
00:25:20Islamic Republic as a geographical entity, if we look at it this way, it has
00:25:23these characteristics you mentioned, and it had them before, at least since the Safavid era.
00:25:27Iran, a Persian-speaking Shiite country in a
00:25:30Sunni Arab-speaking region, or now in the case of Turkey, a Turkic-speaking country,
00:25:34did not have the option to go in this direction. That is, if we
00:25:37look at the Shah's era, the strategic
00:25:40connection between Iran
00:25:42and the Shiites of Lebanon,
00:25:45which later formed the Amal movement and after that Hezbollah,
00:25:48was
00:25:53guided by the Shah and SAVAK. In Iraq,
00:25:56Iran's connection with the Kurds was within the framework
00:26:00of containing Saddam. Therefore, the issue is that,
00:26:03as I mentioned, the two wings,
00:26:07or rather, the two pillars of Iran's regional approach, ideology and
00:26:10strategy, were not equally strong. The ideological pillar became so
00:26:14bloated that it effectively overshadowed strategic considerations.
00:26:18Iran's connection with non-state actors in the region could
00:26:22have been beneficial for Iran's regional influence if the approach
00:26:25hadn't been ideological,
00:26:28if the approach hadn't been anti-systemic, meaning that all its efforts
00:26:32were aimed at expelling America
00:26:34from the region, the destruction of Israel, and so on. Thank you, Hamid
00:26:38Reza Azizi, our guest on the special interview. Thank you very much.
00:26:58Jürgen Habermas was one of those philosophers who
00:27:02received a great reception in Iran. Why? What
00:27:06ideas in his political philosophy were paid attention
00:27:09to in Iran? Habermas is not a pacifist at any cost.
00:27:13In Eastern Europe in the late
00:27:1680s, when revolutions were taking place, he supported them. When
00:27:20we look at his opinion regarding Israel and Palestine,
00:27:23we see that he becomes a German
00:28:02The week's tech news from Click. AI shows
00:28:06a false image of women. UN Women
00:28:10states this based on a study. This organization, whose mission
00:28:13is to promote gender equality globally and
00:28:16support the rights of women and girls, states that some
00:28:20AI chatbots mostly associate women with concepts
00:28:23such as home, family, and children, and reproduce
00:28:26stereotypes and sexist attitudes.
00:28:30This means that instead of showing women with diverse abilities and roles,
00:28:34like men, they reiterate old societal
00:28:38patterns. This research, conducted at UC Berkeley
00:28:41on 133 AI systems or chatbots,
00:28:45shows that nearly half of these
00:28:49chatbots exhibit incorrect gender
00:28:52biases and classify women based on existing
00:28:56societal stereotypes. The findings of this
00:28:59research have gone so far as to conclude that 26%
00:29:03of these chatbots also have racial biases.
00:29:07in addition to gender. For example, when asked to create a story about
00:29:10a doctor and a nurse, AI
00:29:13always portrayed the doctor as a man and the nurse as a woman.
00:29:17And it associated male names more with work,
00:29:21income, occupation, and success.
00:29:24But why is this important? Because artificial intelligence
00:29:27is no longer just an entertainment tool. From recruitment and
00:29:31education to searching for information, content creation,
00:29:34and even decision-making in some public services, artificial
00:29:38intelligence is becoming more involved every day. If these
00:29:41systems portray women as less capable, less experienced,
00:29:45and limited to traditional roles, this image
00:29:49can influence real decisions about women.
00:29:52From job opportunities and visibility in
00:29:56the online space to the image that future generations will have of
00:30:00women's roles in society.
00:30:02If you work in the field of artificial intelligence or would like to know more about it,
00:30:06send me a message on Instagram and write your comments for me.
00:30:09Click
00:30:14every week on BBC
00:30:16Persian.
00:30:23And now on BBC Persian Television,
00:30:26a documentary.