Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a quotation record.
00:00:00have actually been the Houthis are making, people's money. That missiles. funded by the Iranian manufacturers of weapons, is, these claims that that they are the biggest that they have submarines,
00:00:23Control of strategic waterways is considered
00:00:25to be Iran's most important deterrent these
00:00:29days. And the importance of the Houthis in such
00:00:32a strategy has become a question that has many people engaged
00:00:36as to how far their control is possible for Tehran,
00:00:39with Keyvan.
00:01:11In a tweet, he wrote that they targeted a Saudi oil tanker by launching ballistic missiles. The Houthi
00:01:14group, officially known as Ansar Allah, has
00:01:18controlled a large part of northern and western Yemen,
00:01:21including the city of Sana'a, for more than a decade. They
00:01:25now control about one-third of Yemen's territory, which
00:01:29accounts for 70% of the country's population, in that
00:01:32blue region. And of course, the geographical
00:01:35location of this country next to the Bab al-Mandeb
00:01:39Strait allows the Houthis to influence a route that
00:01:43is one of the most important strategic waterways of
00:01:47the world economy. But how did the Houthis gain
00:01:50such power? The roots of the Houthi movement go
00:01:54back to the Zaydi Shiite community in northern Yemen,
00:01:58a community that ruled
00:02:00there for centuries. The first support for the Zaydi
00:02:04forces in Yemen by Iran also occurred during the
00:02:07reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, during one of the civil
00:02:10wars in Yemen in the 1960s. Where the Shah's government,
00:02:14along with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Israel,
00:02:17supported the Zaydi Shiite monarchy in Yemen against
00:02:20the secular republicans.
00:02:23However, the Zaydi Shiites were defeated in this war,
00:02:26and their imamate government fell, and a country called
00:02:30North Yemen was formed alongside South Yemen. After
00:02:33the collapse of the Soviet Union, these two countries
00:02:37united. In the south, Sunnis were the majority, and in
00:02:41the unified country of Yemen, Shiites became a 35%
00:02:44minority demographically.
00:02:47It was in this atmosphere that a movement for the
00:02:50revival of the political and religious identity of
00:02:53Yemen's Zaydis took shape, with the Houthi family
00:02:57at its center. Badreddin al-Houthi, a prominent
00:03:01Zaydi cleric, and his sons Hussein and Abdul-Malik
00:03:05immigrated to Qom a few years after the establishment
00:03:08of the Islamic Republic and spent years
00:03:11in Iran. This is one of the images that was published
00:03:15by the Holy Defense News Agency and is said to have
00:03:19been taken in the city of Qom. In this picture, Badreddin
00:03:23al-Houthi is seen next to his son Hussein al-Houthi
00:03:26in the mid-1980s. They were influenced by the literature
00:03:30and model of the Islamic Revolution. Slogans like
00:03:34"Death to America," "Death to Israel," the discourse
00:03:37of the oppressed against the oppressors, and even
00:03:40the name of the Ansar Allah group were among the things
00:03:44that the discourse of the Islamic Revolution inspired
00:03:48them. In 2004, after the killing of Hussein al-Houthi,
00:03:51his brother Abdul-Malik took over the leadership
00:03:54of the group. They grew stronger in six wars
00:03:58with the central government of Yemen, and finally, in
00:04:012014 and 2015, they captured Sana'a and important parts
00:04:05of the country. The Islamic Republic also became the
00:04:09only country that practically recognized the sovereignty
00:04:12of the Houthis and treated them as a legitimate government.
00:04:16But how exactly is the relationship between Iran and the Houthis
00:04:19defined? Abdul Jalil Shaif, a Yemeni researcher and
00:04:23political activist, author of the book "Southern Yemen:
00:04:26A Gateway to the World," and former head of the
00:04:30Aden Free Zone, is with us on this program. Mr.
00:04:34Shaif currently heads the Friends of Southern Yemen
00:04:38group and is the representative of the Southern Transitional
00:04:41Council to the United Nations in Geneva. Mr. Shaif,
00:04:45welcome to the program, Page 2. I know the question I'm about
00:04:49to ask is very difficult due to the ambiguities
00:04:51in the relationship between
00:04:58the Houthis and the Islamic Republic, and the secrecy
00:05:01they maintain. Nevertheless, you have been closely
00:05:04involved in the political developments in Yemen and
00:05:08are very familiar with this group. How do you assess
00:05:11the relationship between
00:05:18Iran and the Houthi group? I think they have very
00:05:22important relations. It's a very important relationship.
00:05:25But if I want to simplify it and explain it simply,
00:05:28this relationship is complete control
00:05:32of the Houthis by Tehran, while some others say
00:05:36that there is a strategic alliance and partnership
00:05:40between the two. And in my opinion, it's somewhere
00:05:44in between these two. There's a distance between the
00:05:47two, where they are very loyal to Iran, but they
00:05:51also have their own identity. However, it cannot be
00:05:55ignored or denied that in terms of intelligence,
00:05:58political support, and military support, its
00:06:02heart beats in Iran, and Iran has helped them. But
00:06:06it is also true that they have their own interests
00:06:10and consider their own concerns when they want to take
00:06:14action. Now, given what's happening in the Persian
00:06:17Gulf and the war between Iran, as well as the issue
00:06:21of the Strait of Hormuz and the Islamic Republic's
00:06:23attempt to control the Strait
00:06:31of Hormuz, do you see a similar situation for
00:06:34the Houthis in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, or not?
00:06:37Can they also close Bab al-Mandeb, like the Islamic
00:06:41Republic? Yes, definitely. I think
00:06:44there is a possibility of this happening, and it
00:06:48might even happen. There's both a chance and a possibility
00:06:51of it, and this relationship, in my opinion, the relationship
00:06:55between the Houthis and Tehran, is based on influence,
00:06:58not control and obedience. They try, the Iranians
00:07:01tried to bring the Houthis into the equations and
00:07:05have them close Bab al-Mandeb. However,
00:07:07at the same time, the Houthis
00:07:10have their own concerns and
00:07:13in the issue of foreign hostilities, they were very
00:07:17involved with, for example, Saudi Arabia, and they
00:07:21used that to gain support for themselves within Yemen,
00:07:25for example, in northern Yemen, they told the people
00:07:28of northern Yemen, "Look, foreign powers are attacking
00:07:32you, we are not," and for that reason, they were
00:07:35able to gain support.
00:07:39Their base of supporters
00:08:12is from the people,
00:08:15not from economic and political
00:08:19issues. They want to find
00:08:22a common
00:08:26ground, a common area between their
00:08:30own interests, Iranian interests, and Houthi
00:08:34interests. But we know that Houthi interests
00:08:37are also domestic interests that they want
00:08:41to make sure people in the country
00:08:43support them. You mentioned Saudi Arabia.
00:08:47What is its role now, given the events happening
00:08:50in the region, and the issue of Saudi Arabia
00:08:54and the Houthis, and the war that is still ongoing?
00:08:58How do you see Saudi Arabia's role in this
00:09:01new regional power balance, and what do you think
00:09:05its position will be regarding the Houthis,
00:09:09especially now that they might affect this vital
00:09:21waterway? The Saudi Arabian monarchy made
00:09:25two strategic mistakes in the past 10 years
00:09:28and in the war with the Houthis. The first
00:09:31was to continue bombing the Houthis, even though
00:09:35it could have, instead of doing
00:09:38that, focused its efforts
00:09:42on southern Yemen and increased its
00:09:46political control there, and even
00:09:50given the people in southern Yemen
00:09:53more political power, and even could have done
00:09:57the same economically in southern Yemen,
00:10:00giving them economic power. Now they are
00:10:04economically deprived, their salaries have
00:10:08not been paid, there is a terrible,
00:10:10astronomical inflation there. Prices
00:10:13are extremely high. These
00:10:16have been the mistakes that Saudi Arabia
00:10:19has made in the past
00:10:2210 years. For example, in the
00:10:25south or in the north, they looked at each other
00:10:29and compared each other. The north said, "Well,
00:10:33the situation in the south, which is not controlled
00:10:36by the Houthis,
00:10:39is not better than ours." And for that reason,
00:10:43they continued their support. On the other hand,
00:10:46another mistake
00:10:50they made was their interference in January
00:10:532006 in support
00:10:56of the Emiratis. This coalition
00:10:59that was formed at that time
00:11:02was composed of the UAE
00:11:05and Saudi Arabia. But now,
00:11:08even they have disputes
00:11:12between them. And in
00:11:15Hadhramaut, the consequences
00:11:18are that the Emiratis
00:11:22have left. There is no
00:11:25Arab coalition anymore. The Emiratis
00:11:29left, Saudi Arabia remained,
00:11:33and those powers that had
00:11:36military force and capability
00:11:40were themselves disbanded, of course, by Saudi Arabia. And these
00:11:44two strategic
00:11:46mistakes have caused the Houthis to be able
00:11:50to consolidate themselves, increase their power,
00:11:53and even their
00:11:55power has become more than imagined. And now
00:11:59Saudi Arabia is also left wondering what it can even do
00:12:02in this situation,
00:12:05given these two mistakes they made.
00:12:08They lost their support in the south,
00:12:12popular support, and
00:12:16of course,
00:12:19it is true that maybe they won a battle,
00:12:23but they did not win the war overall.
00:12:27And in my opinion,
00:12:31an explosive action
00:12:34will happen soon by the Houthis.
00:12:38Thank
00:12:42you, Mr. Abdul Jalil Shaif, Yemeni researcher
00:12:45and political activist. In the continuation of this
00:12:49program, we will discuss these developments in Yemen
00:12:52with Mehrdad Khansari,
00:12:56a diplomat during the Pahlavi era and an analyst of
00:13:00Iranian foreign policy, who is joining us from Madrid,
00:13:03and also Alam Saleh, honorary professor of Iranian
00:13:07studies at the Australian National University, who
00:13:10has joined us from the beautiful city of Ramsar,
00:13:13and Farzin Karbasi, international relations analyst from
00:13:17Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. I welcome all three guests
00:13:21to this program and thank you for participating. Mr.
00:13:25Khansari, let's start with you. You were in the Ministry
00:13:29of Foreign Affairs during the Pahlavi era and are somewhat
00:13:33familiar with the foreign policy of that era. What
00:13:36is in northern Yemen that we see this happening,
00:13:39and a connection being formed between the Iranian
00:13:43government and this group of Zaydi Shiites in northern
00:13:47Yemen, both during the Pahlavi era and during the Islamic
00:13:50Republic? Thank you and greetings
00:13:54to your dear guests and dear viewers of this program.
00:13:58Well, first of all, during
00:14:01the Pahlavi era, Iran's intervention in Yemen,
00:14:05especially in the 1960s, which marked the beginning
00:14:08of a period of unrest in Yemen with the overthrow
00:14:11of their then Imam, which was mostly
00:14:14due to the provocations of Egypt and Nasser and
00:14:18such things, the motivation of the Imperial Iranian
00:14:21government at that time was to confront the policies
00:14:26pursued by Cairo and Nasser, and to assist
00:14:30the forces that were against them. That was
00:14:34the main motivation. It wasn't that they wanted
00:14:37to help the Zaydi Shiites and such things, but that
00:14:41strategic importance in the Shah's grand calculations,
00:14:45who was engaged with Nasser on various fronts, was
00:14:49more important at that time. In the
00:14:521970s, this scene changed after
00:14:56Nasser's death and after relations between Iran
00:14:59and Egypt were re-established and were good relations.
00:15:03I myself, as a diplomat at that time, traveled
00:15:07to North Yemen, and at that time, one of the
00:15:10motivations of our government was to support North
00:15:13Yemen against South Yemen, which was being
00:15:16infiltrated by the Soviet Union and China and
00:15:20other communist countries, both there
00:15:23and in places
00:15:26like Oman, where the Dhofar
00:15:30War was being fed through
00:15:33South Yemen. And the motivation was
00:15:37completely different from the issues that subsequently
00:15:40arose. Of course,
00:15:44at that time,
00:15:47Saudi Arabia played
00:15:50a very effective role in North
00:15:53Yemen. In fact, it could be said
00:15:57that the Saudi ambassador there
00:16:00was the most important person in Sana'a
00:16:03due to the enormous financial aid he
00:16:07provided to the then government. But these
00:16:10relations also came under pressure over
00:16:14time, and we saw that the situation
00:16:17eventually led to what happened
00:16:19after the Arab
00:16:23Spring. I understand. Thank you very much,
00:16:27Mr. Khansari. Mr. Saleh, we heard about
00:16:30the Shah's government's motivations, and Mr.
00:16:33Khansari believes that the current motivations
00:16:37are completely different.
00:16:38How do you assess the
00:16:41motivations of the Islamic Republic, its role, influence,
00:16:45and extent of influence over the Houthis?
00:16:48It has always been important how the equations
00:16:52of power and the balance of power in the region
00:16:55are formed. Security regions from the time
00:16:59of the Sassanids, who supported the Lakhmids
00:17:02against Rome, and also the Ghassanids, who
00:17:05were supported by the Romans, show that geopolitical
00:17:09equations determine the type and form of alliances
00:17:12between countries. In the 1960s, the Shah
00:17:15of Iran supported only the Houthis in Yemen
00:17:18and against the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser's
00:17:22Arab nationalism in the region, but also
00:17:25supported the Shiites of Lebanon directly
00:17:28through the mediation of Imam Musa Sadr
00:17:31to prevent the rise of Arab nationalism
00:17:35and Gamal Abdel Nasser and his policies. We
00:17:41also witnessed this in the case of the Dhofar revolutionaries in Oman
00:17:45in the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, we
00:17:48saw military coups in the Arab world
00:17:52that led to the overthrow of monarchies in Iraq,
00:17:55Syria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and even Yemen,
00:17:59which changed the new form and behavior
00:18:02of governments in the region. So, for the Shah
00:18:06of Iran, as it is
00:18:15important for the Islamic Republic today, what
00:18:18happens is not ideology,
00:18:22but geopolitical reality of the region that changes
00:18:25the shape and type of alliances, just as we saw in
00:18:28the case of the Kurds and Iran and Iraq.
00:18:32That is why Iran's relationship with the Houthis,
00:18:36who ruled Yemen for over a thousand years,
00:18:39is not necessarily based on ideology and identity,
00:18:42but on the reality of the equation and balance of
00:18:45power, and the Houthis enjoy a large degree
00:18:49of political, identity, and intellectual independence.
00:18:52However, the alignment of the Houthis' geopolitical
00:18:56and strategic goals with Iran has led to
00:18:59these two countries cooperating
00:19:02and coordinating their thoughts regarding
00:19:05their common enemies and adversaries
00:19:07in the region. Now, we will definitely talk
00:19:11more about their ideological independence, because
00:19:15the discourse of the Islamic Revolution is very evident
00:19:18in what the Ansar Allah group promotes. Mr. Karbasi,
00:19:22how do you see this situation? Mr. Khansari believes that
00:19:26the conditions before the revolution and after the
00:19:30revolution were completely different, and this happened
00:19:34in two different contexts. However, Mr. Saleh believes
00:19:37that part of this cooperation and perhaps unwritten
00:19:41alliance that has formed between the Zaydi Shiites
00:19:45and the Islamic Republic is a result of a geopolitical
00:19:48situation that has developed in this region since the
00:19:52beginning of the 20th century, and such relations will
00:19:55continue whether it is the Shah's government or
00:19:59the Islamic Republic or the next government. Do
00:20:02you agree with either of these two guests, or
00:20:06do you have a third opinion?
00:20:09Look, in fact, this discussion
00:20:13complements each other, meaning that both during
00:20:17the time of the former Shah and today,
00:20:20all these equations are related. That is,
00:20:24what Mr. Alam Saleh says, that these are
00:20:28geopolitical issues, alignment of interests,
00:20:31all of this is correct, but in my opinion, the
00:20:35glue between these two factors that binds
00:20:38them together and strengthens them
00:20:42is the ideological issue. That is, when
00:20:45you gave an introduction at the beginning of the
00:20:48program, this past that the Houthi leaders
00:20:51had in Iran, and in fact, the Islamic
00:20:55Republic has not been stingy, neither
00:20:58with the Houthis nor with Hezbollah of Lebanon
00:21:01nor with the Shiites of Iraq,
00:21:04which I myself witnessed at the time I lived
00:21:07in Tehran, what a place and position
00:21:11they had, what facilities they had, the Badr
00:21:15Corps and the issues that we are seeing now,
00:21:18meaning the fruit of these events that have
00:21:22happened. In fact, today we see that the
00:21:26Houthis are actually a strong proxy for the
00:21:29Islamic Republic, and the people of that region
00:21:33also support the Islamic Republic. This is not
00:21:37just one part of the power holders in that
00:21:40region, they are not rulers, but the people
00:21:44also support them,
00:21:46and this has its roots in that ideological
00:21:50issue that the Islamic Republic has worked on,
00:21:53and the Houthis, apart from their own interests, apart from the demands
00:21:57they have for the future, actually see themselves
00:22:00as partners with the Islamic Republic. Just
00:22:03today, the Hashd al-Shaabi and Islamic Resistance
00:22:07groups in Iraq threatened that they would attack
00:22:10Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.
00:22:14Well, this is in line with those interests
00:22:18that they actually see themselves as partners
00:22:21with the Islamic Republic and are willing to defend
00:22:25it for its sake. Yes, Mr. Saleh, what is
00:22:29your answer? This is actually a very fundamental
00:22:32question that often causes disagreement. Is this
00:22:36foreign policy a realistic foreign policy
00:22:39based on the inherent national interests of
00:22:43Iran due to its location, or is it because of the
00:22:46Shiite Islamist ideology that the Islamic Republic
00:22:50is currently present in Yemen?
00:22:53States and governments are usually rational
00:22:56actors. Rational in the sense that they calculate
00:23:00costs and benefits and determine their behavior
00:23:03based on that. And usually there is no difference
00:23:05between these countries in the form and type of
00:23:09strategic policy behavior. It's the structures,
00:23:12regional structures, military structures, and sometimes
00:23:16identity structures that can determine such behaviors. But the issue
00:23:23is the balance of power and the struggle
00:23:27to gain power. In such cases, countries
00:23:30will have and create ideological and identity
00:23:33coverings to achieve their goals. Whether
00:23:36they are Western countries or what.
00:23:40The important thing is that when you strive
00:23:43for a power struggle, you must create
00:23:46an identity and ideological covering, and this is
00:23:50during the Shah's time, done in the name of
00:23:52Shiism,
00:23:55which certainly the Houthis are not Shiites. Even
00:23:58the Alawites,
00:24:02when Imam Musa Sadr called the Alawites
00:24:05Shiites, it was completely for political
00:24:09reasons. Excuse me, regarding
00:24:13whether these are Shiites or not, because none
00:24:16of the guests and I myself probably don't
00:24:20have much knowledge of Shiite theology,
00:24:24they themselves might consider themselves Shiites,
00:24:27and they do have differences with Twelver Shiites,
00:24:30as you said. I want to ask Mr. Khansari
00:24:34what his response is to your explanations,
00:24:37and whether he also has the same assessment
00:24:40regarding the effects of ideology on the relationship
00:24:43between the Islamic Republic and the Houthis.
00:24:47Look, what Mr. Alam Saleh
00:24:50said, in my opinion, did not contradict
00:24:54what I said at all. Iran's motivation during
00:24:57the Shah's time is different from Iran's
00:25:00motivation now, and that's because of the
00:25:04conditions and situation of the time. For example,
00:25:08at that time, during the Shah's time, we
00:25:11didn't have clear disputes with Saudi Arabia.
00:25:15During the Islamic Republic, when Saudi
00:25:18Arabia fully intensified the war against the Houthis,
00:25:22and the current Crown Prince made the same
00:25:25mistakes that Mr. Trump made in the war with
00:25:29Iran, by starting a war that he couldn't end,
00:25:33or thought would end after a week. This
00:25:36was at a time when the Saudi Arabian government
00:25:40was in complete opposition to the Islamic Republic
00:25:44of Iran. So it was natural for the Islamic
00:25:47Republic to want to develop and find a relationship
00:25:53with the forces in Yemen, and these so-called Houthis,
00:25:57and expand it beyond what, for example,
00:26:00the conditions were during the Shah's time,
00:26:04which were completely different. It was about
00:26:07the war of pride, it was about the imamate,
00:26:10it was about other issues that were mentioned,
00:26:13and of course, the Shah also supported
00:26:17Shiite governments in a way, but Musa
00:26:21Sadr never had a close relationship with the Shah,
00:26:24and the aid we provided... But that's not the point.
00:26:27The point is not that today, in the current
00:26:31situation, the Houthis, who look to Iran,
00:26:35are trying to ensure that Iran does not lose,
00:26:39does not get harmed, and can stand on its
00:26:42own two feet, because if it stands, their position
00:26:46will be stronger. Regardless of whether they obey
00:26:49Iran in that sense, they are not, as your
00:26:52previous guest said. But they have common
00:26:56interests. The situation that is developing
00:26:59or has developed in Bab al-Mandeb helps these
00:27:02negotiations that Iran is pursuing with America,
00:27:06because it gives Iran an additional leverage
00:27:10to reach a better outcome,
00:27:13or a faster one. So I'm saying
00:27:16the motivations are different, and
00:27:20this part of your speech, I think, is
00:27:23very important, because if we consider the interests
00:27:26of the Iranian nation and the interests
00:27:30of the Islamic Republic as two parallel concepts,
00:27:34do you think that the relationship with the Houthis
00:27:37is not necessarily in the interest of the
00:27:40nation, and only in the interest of the
00:27:44Islamic Republic? Look,
00:27:47in these circumstances, when the
00:27:51country is being bombed by
00:27:53foreign countries, I think these
00:27:57differences between the nation and the regime
00:28:01become less pronounced than when there is no
00:28:04war, and the issues are primarily
00:28:07differences among ourselves. No Iranian
00:28:11wants their country to be attacked by foreigners.
00:28:15In these circumstances, in these circumstances
00:28:18where the Iranian government is trying
00:28:22to somehow keep itself
00:28:24on its feet, it can make
00:28:28the maximum use of the only
00:28:32leverage it has, the Strait of Hormuz.
00:28:35In a situation where it has been
00:28:39proven that Trump, despite all
00:28:43his forces and power
00:28:46and resources, is not willing
00:28:50to pay extra costs, it is obvious
00:28:53that the presence of this relationship
00:28:56between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic
00:29:00that has developed and expanded
00:29:04in the last 10-20 years brings a benefit,
00:29:08a share, for the fact that, let's say,
00:29:11there is no attack on Iran right now.
00:29:15An attack on Iran would not only harm
00:29:18the Islamic Republic. In that war, 56,000
00:29:21innocent Iranians were killed. So
00:29:24I'm saying, the issue should be
00:29:28looked at differently, in my opinion.
00:29:31But if one wants
00:29:34Many claim that undoubtedly, undoubtedly,
00:29:38the Islamic Republic has supported them, and
00:29:41in fact, has not left their pockets empty. These things are done with money.
00:29:45Where does this money come from? Yemen, that
00:29:48part where the Houthis are, is not
00:29:51very wealthy. So, this money has been taken from the pockets of the Iranian people.
00:29:55The fact that we are currently in this time and in this
00:29:58situation does
00:30:01not allow us to disregard the rights of the Iranian people,
00:30:05who today are living in poverty
00:30:08and misery. In fact, the word "misery" must be used.
00:30:12They are living this way as a result of these policies. The impoverishment
00:30:15of the Iranian people and the enrichment
00:30:19and preparation for a war in which the Iranian people
00:30:22actually have no stake is the result of these
00:30:26policies. Now, no matter how we try to
00:30:29justify it,