Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a quotation record.
00:00:00target the Persian Gulf, and this has horrific
00:00:04consequences for the global economy. This is a mild interpretation.
00:00:07So, I think given the tariff policy that has been proposed,
00:00:11the motivation is more towards not starting a war
00:00:14with Iran.
00:00:17Well, these are Mearsheimer's statements for April
00:00:202025. That means Farvardin
00:00:241404, which is the beginning of last
00:00:27year.
00:00:30The discussion is that if Iran is attacked, Iranians will
00:00:33prevent oil transit from the Persian Gulf.
00:00:37They will even attack the oil facilities of other countries. Now,
00:00:40in reality, what we are in now, even though
00:00:44maybe it didn't happen in the 120-day war, but it happened in the war
00:00:47we are in now. So, practically, what Mearsheimer
00:00:51said about the war is coming true. Look, we said something in the previous program
00:00:55when we talked about Mearsheimer himself and when we talked about Seyyed
00:00:59Valirezaei. We said, "Look, they say
00:01:02this will happen, Iranians will stop oil transit."
00:01:06This is what I want to say about this interview that we are going to air
00:01:09in this program. And honorable viewers and
00:01:13listeners will now see that this is throughout the interview.
00:01:17What is it? He has a framework of thought. He says,
00:01:21"In a rational analysis, if you want to analyze it rationally, from his perspective,
00:01:24I'm not evaluating it yet." Well, you have to do this, right? So,
00:01:28they are rational, so they will do this.
00:01:31Therefore, when he looks, he says, "You, as an Iranian,
00:01:34have a position, the Strait of Hormuz. When you are attacked, a superpower comes, what do you do?
00:01:38Well, you close Hormuz." That is, you will do this. In fact,
00:01:42what should we translate his words to? I said,
00:01:45"We should probably put it aside and say, 'Iranians will probably
00:01:49close the Strait of Hormuz. Iranians should probably close
00:01:53the Strait of Hormuz.'" If this is said,
00:01:55then it will not be damaged, because you
00:01:59are stating a proposition that is conditional
00:02:03on acting according to the rule, but he says it definitively.
00:02:06Where else can you say this? That is, he understood the point correctly,
00:02:10he completely understood the framework correctly, because he talked about other things about Islamabad before,
00:02:14and he talks about them in this interview as well. The issue is that, well, Iranians will
00:02:18do this. Americans will do this, which is an example in this interview,
00:02:22where you ask him about Trump, and he says, "Well, Trump, I say he will
00:02:26not do this." That is, if he wants to act rationally, but after all, he is Trump,
00:02:29right? He also had another prediction with BBC Persian. Mearsheimer spoke
00:02:33before the 12-day war, and
00:02:37in that video, he said that America will attack
00:02:40Iran. That is, he said that these two have reached a point where the issue can only
00:02:43be resolved with a military confrontation. And this prediction
00:02:47came true. Before the 40-day war, what did
00:02:51he say? He said that the Americans will not attack. That is, what exactly
00:02:55did he say? He said, "I don't see any reason why he would want to attack. Why would he attack?
00:02:58What would be the purpose?" Because the experience of the 12-day war, the
00:03:0112-day war,
00:03:04he had also said that they would attack. Of course, at the same time, he had said a
00:03:08more precise point, because maybe some others also predicted the 12-day war.
00:03:11His more precise point was that the Israelis would attack Iran,
00:03:14but they would not succeed. They would not be able to create change in Iran.
00:03:18Yes, this is based on the fact that one of them came true, and one did not.
00:03:22What is it based on? He says, "It should logically be like this," and we will see this in tonight's interview.
00:03:26So, he has a framework of thought, the framework of thought of Iranians.
00:03:30They will do this. Americans will do this. All of this is based on what
00:03:33he is saying. In fact, it's such that we can say that if
00:03:37he were an advisor, his prescription would be, "I say you should do this." With
00:03:41this view, if we now watch his statements, in fact,
00:03:44we can extract Mearsheimer's prescriptions for Iran
00:03:47and Mearsheimer's prescriptions for America, which are being expressed
00:03:51in a descriptive tone, not a prescriptive tone.
00:03:54I think this is important. Now, let me say another point.
00:03:58If, for example, an analyst's statements were incorrect
00:04:02in one or two places, does this
00:04:04affect his analytical credibility or not?
00:04:08Yes, to some extent it does. Why?
00:04:11Because it stemmed from his framework and his presentation.
00:04:15That is, either his framework had flaws, or the facts
00:04:18he put into this framework, the data he put into this framework, were
00:04:22incorrect, or ultimately, he couldn't
00:04:25properly formulate it scientifically, and he said something would happen and it didn't.
00:04:29We can't say that there's no flaw in any of his points.
00:04:33Well, he said we either achieved a glorious victory,
00:04:37or it was a draw where we deserved to win, or it was a defeat that
00:04:40doesn't diminish our values. This can't be like that. Sometimes, the person also
00:04:44suffered a defeat. It's not that there's a flaw, but
00:04:48it must be judged in the overall process. That is, you have to sum up how many of a person's predictions
00:04:51were correct and how many were wrong. And again, more importantly, I say, even
00:04:55more important than a person's predictions is his framework of thought.
00:04:59Description. That is, can he explain events well
00:05:02or not? This is the most important interpretive data that
00:05:06we want from political science analysts. This is it. An event can happen
00:05:09in the world now, and his words interpret this event well.
00:05:13In other sciences, in physics, in chemistry, when
00:05:17theories and hypotheses come, it's based on this. He says, "I think
00:05:21this event can be explained in this way." Then,
00:05:25the path is reversed. Then, data is found for it, and to some extent,
00:05:28evidentiary data is found. You are talking about
00:05:31this story. The complete statements, the discussion is about
00:05:34different estimations. Look, Mearsheimer, for example, before the 40-day war,
00:05:38had a correct estimation. He said the Americans
00:05:41would not attack. Based on his own estimation, because he said it wouldn't
00:05:44work. On the other side, in Trump's team, with that
00:05:48speech we had in Mar-a-Lago, the stances Hekmat took in the early days,
00:05:52they had an estimation that Iran would collapse in
00:05:55100 hours. Look, when there is a difference
00:05:59in estimation, naturally, the other side's decisions and this side's
00:06:02prescriptions don't align. This shouldn't be attributed
00:06:05to him being wrong, because this is exactly the point that Mr. Vali said, "He's not a fortune-teller,
00:06:09for example, predicting the future from strange things." He is analyzing
00:06:13from his own perspective. Well, one more point before we start
00:06:17broadcasting the interview itself.
00:06:20I was finally following up to be able to
00:06:24conduct an interview with Mr. Mearsheimer. Before we conducted this interview,
00:06:28we had a short chat for a few minutes before the interview started,
00:06:31and
00:06:34I said, "I expect this to be your first interview with an Iranian media outlet," and he confirmed
00:06:37that. And he said something
00:06:41about me having conversations with Iranian media
00:06:45and Russian media. Recently, Mearsheimer had a trip to Russia,
00:06:48and he also had extensive interviews with Russian media.
00:06:52I was following his own YouTube channel,
00:06:55and I knew it. He said, "But my conclusion was that we should
00:06:59talk to the media," and considering
00:07:02the atmosphere that exists within the United States of America. I'm saying this because we previously
00:07:06mentioned that the US government is imposing a very heavy
00:07:10atmosphere in the US
00:07:13media space, especially regarding those who are somehow involved with our official media,
00:07:17which is the Islamic Republic of Iran News Network. We are the official network of the country.
00:07:21Surely, if someone other than Mearsheimer were there, the margins
00:07:25would be more intolerable, but anyway, I said this to say that
00:07:29he himself clarified and said, "My conclusion was that we should
00:07:32also have a conversation," because I used to email before, and I didn't get
00:07:36a response, but apparently, the situation has certainly
00:07:40changed as a result of an analysis of the political atmosphere of the United States
00:07:43that they have. We
00:07:46truly hope that we can have this opportunity more often and also talk to other thinkers
00:07:50around the world, God willing. Let's start the interview. Let's watch the first part of the interview.
00:07:54We will be with Mr. Nima and Mr. Vahid for the analysis. Thank you
00:07:58for accepting the invitation
00:08:03of Iran News Network and being with us
00:08:06in this program. It's a pleasure.
00:08:09I think at least three of those
00:09:12seven conditions were new and
00:09:16were not included in the previous memorandum of understanding.
00:09:19بودن.
00:09:22Do you think Iran can realistically expect to get more
00:09:25concessions than what it achieved in Islamabad
00:09:29in the Islamabad agreement?
00:09:30بگیره
00:09:34Or is this not possible, and Iran should settle
00:09:37for that? What's your analysis?
00:09:40Well, I think the US will ultimately
00:09:44be forced to accept almost all the terms
00:09:47of the memorandum of understanding. It's impossible to say now
00:09:50what the final agreement will look like, if there even is
00:09:54an agreement and it is reached.
00:09:57That is, will the US agree to pay
00:10:00compensation? It's impossible to say.
00:10:03But if you look at the memorandum of understanding, it asked for
00:10:07the US to pay compensation. So, firstly, it's impossible
00:10:10to say exactly what the final agreement will look like, and
00:10:14it's impossible to say whether a final agreement will even
00:10:18be reached or not. But in my opinion,
00:10:22it's highly likely that the US will eventually be forced to accept that
00:10:25Iran has won this war, and the US will be forced
00:10:28to accept almost all the main demands raised
00:10:31in the June 17 memorandum of understanding.
00:10:33بپذیره
00:10:37From Iran's perspective, what is your suggestion?
00:10:39Do you think Iran
00:10:42is in a position to put more conditions on the table,
00:10:46or not? Or if Iran wants this aggression
00:10:49and war to end, it should return to that memorandum
00:10:52of understanding.
00:11:09The only thing that I think really changed was that Iranians
00:11:13insisted that many of the demands raised in the June 17
00:11:17memorandum of understanding be met before the start of negotiations.
00:11:20So, what changed was the timing,
00:11:23not the demands themselves.
00:11:27That is, if you look at the June 17 memorandum of understanding,
00:11:30it's practically a document of surrender for the US. It's truly
00:11:34a significant document because President Trump
00:11:37signed a memorandum of understanding that practically gives very
00:11:40big concessions to the Iranians. President Trump,
00:11:44by signing that document, was practically saying that the US had lost this war.
00:11:48That's why I'm not surprised that he eventually backed away
00:11:51from that document and genuinely believes.
00:12:25It wants to reach a final agreement that is very similar to that
00:12:29memorandum of understanding. As I said before,
00:12:32maybe Iran won't get all its demands,
00:12:35but if it's going
00:12:38to sign an agreement, it must ensure that almost all its demands
00:12:41are met.
00:12:43میشه
00:12:46Well, the first part is about the memorandum of understanding.
00:12:50Returning to the memorandum of understanding or the Islamabad Plus
00:12:53agreement. Something beyond that. Look, there were two points. One
00:12:57is that he refers to this important issue here, which is that the text of the memorandum of understanding
00:13:01in the US, pay attention again, from the perspective of an American who is also in the US and sees the statements,
00:13:05this was considered a document of Trump's surrender. This is the same thing that
00:13:08was said, that the text of the memorandum of understanding is good. That is, it benefits Iran.
00:13:12The proponents of the memorandum of understanding, both those who only defended the text
00:13:16and those who believed that the text was good and other things were also good,
00:13:20referred to the fact that this text was a document of surrender
00:13:23for the US. He confirms
00:13:27this. Of course, he mentions this point about compensation. Pay attention, in the text
00:13:30of the Islamabad agreement, there is no compensation. There is
00:13:34a mechanism of 300 billion that
00:13:37Iran wants to consider as compensation, but it is not compensation.
00:13:41In fact, the US did not agree to pay compensation. So, this is one point. Now,
00:13:44maybe he meant that, but Mr. Mearsheimer's interpretation
00:13:48was this. That is, again, I say, what they won, but after all, since I was
00:13:52talking about the word compensation, it was a discussion that the US should.
00:14:29Does that clause also contain concessions for Iran, or not?
00:14:33Yes, there are concessions for Iran, but it's something that, from its appearance, it's clear
00:14:37it won't be implemented. It's like saying, "Look, it's obvious you're not going to be implemented."
00:14:40This is different from saying this clause is not a concession.
00:14:44He even, the fact that he considered this compensation, again,
00:14:47this could be correct from an American perspective. What was said on this side?
00:14:50As you said, there were several clauses there that were weak, including the nuclear
00:14:54clause. And including this clause, which, if you remember, we talked
00:14:57about extensively for several programs.
00:15:01This had two flaws. That is, it was really something that was obvious would not
00:15:04be realized, apart from the fact that the frozen funds clause was also another clause that Iran had.
00:15:08For example, frozen funds are to Iran's benefit, right? We should give them to Iran,
00:15:12but since there is no mechanism, because it's contingent on something outside
00:15:16the agreement, etc., etc., it was not implemented, and it really was not
00:15:19implemented. Therefore, from Mearsheimer's perspective, from the American
00:15:23perspective, this was a document of surrender, and
00:15:25it really was. One day, Trump was pressured. Pay attention,
00:15:28Trump defended his victory in the war,
00:15:31and still defends it. He says, "I won." But he never
00:15:35defended the text of the memorandum,
00:15:38saying, "Look what I did to the Iranians in this memorandum." He neither defended it nor still defends it.
00:15:42He has completely removed it. It's not there at all. It's not there at all.
00:15:45Such a thing doesn't exist. Even when it was being implemented, around
00:15:4922 days, if I'm not mistaken, those few days when
00:15:52the memorandum of understanding was being implemented, this means that there was no US naval blockade.
00:15:56What we mean by the implementation of the memorandum of understanding is that the US
00:15:59withdrew it until the day it brought it back.
00:16:02In this period, he also didn't defend the text. Why? Because according to him,
00:16:05the concessions were clear.
00:16:09More strategic and broader, the way Mearsheimer looks at it,
00:16:13which I think, now, with the knowledge I had
00:16:16before, having read books
00:16:18by him, I was following him, he is a person with a very
00:16:22broad and strategic view. That is, I don't think the details of the text
00:16:25are important to him. Basically, the fact that a
00:16:29superpower came and issued a statement, saying, "Everyone surrender, lay down your weapons,
00:16:33raise white flags, Iran's work will be done in four days."
00:16:36The plan must change, and
00:16:39and what was the conclusion? The country that was supposed to surrender,
00:16:43let's put aside love and hate. Country A, Country B. A
00:16:47attacked B, and also issued such a statement. In the end, B
00:16:50occupied something it didn't have, and A came and said,
00:16:54"I want to sign a contract with the same government." This means defeat.
00:16:58Now, we used to say this at that time, and some
00:17:01people laughed and said, "No one believes this." Well, now
00:17:05it's an example, right? That claim that the Islamic Republic of Iran
00:17:08makes, that "I won this war." The formulation
00:17:12you see from outside is this: the US was supposed
00:17:15to destroy us, and in the end, it signed a contract with the same government. Now, regardless of what
00:17:19the content of that contract is, whatever
00:17:22it is, the fact that that government was not supposed to exist anymore,
00:17:26in the end, you sat down with the same one, right? So far,
00:17:29he also says something about the memorandum of understanding,
00:17:33saying that, "In my opinion, there hasn't been a significant
00:17:35difference. Only the timings have changed."
00:17:39Do you agree with this? Yes, look, we don't have the text of the memorandum of understanding.
00:17:43That is, exactly, because regarding Islamabad, you remember
00:17:46those days when we didn't have the text yet, you remember how many drafts,
00:17:49not drafts, but alleged texts reached us, and then
00:17:53when we saw the final text, we saw that many of them were very different. Now,
00:17:57it could have changed in the process, it could have been completely false. Now, we can't
00:18:01understand that anymore. Therefore, until there is a text,
00:18:04it's really not credible. But to the extent that we understand, yes,
00:18:08to the extent that those who are supposed to prepare it, for example, the President
00:18:12and the Foreign Minister, almost say nothing specific. That is,
00:18:15they say what we wanted was in Islamabad, but they quickly ask, "What exactly
00:18:19do you mean? You want something that wasn't in Islamabad? For example, you want
00:18:23to get more?" Now, the President, in his interview with that Indian media,
00:18:27clearly talked about returning to Islamabad.
00:18:30Therefore, it's natural that in the framework, there won't be much
00:18:34more than timing, but until we have it.
00:19:37agreement. What is your analysis? This is important because
00:19:41if Iran is going to sign something with the Americans
00:19:44next round, what scenarios might
00:19:47unfold again?
00:19:51I want to know this. I
00:19:53think both arguments you just made are largely
00:19:57correct. Let me explain. I don't think
00:20:00President Trump was eager to sign the memorandum of understanding.
00:20:04I don't think when he signed it, he intended
00:20:07not to adhere to it. And I think
00:20:10he signed it because he had no choice. It's important here to know that
00:20:14the US has no way to defeat Iran.
00:20:17The US has no viable military option
00:20:20to force Iran to raise its hands
00:20:24and surrender. Even economic tools
00:20:27like blockade and the Scott Bessent strategy
00:20:31for suffocating Iran's economy also
00:20:34don't work.
00:20:37Let me first finish answering the first question, then I can talk about the Bessent strategy.
00:20:41But the main point is that Trump
00:20:44signed the memorandum of understanding on June 17
00:20:47because he concluded that he really had no choice. It wasn't
00:20:51that he had a strategy to win the war and could use it.
00:20:55He was in a situation where it was rational to agree to prevent further US losses and
00:20:58try to end the conflict. That's why he signed it, but with great
00:21:02hesitation. That's the main point. He signed it with great hesitation.
00:21:06Then, as you mentioned, I think what happened
00:21:09was that as soon as he signed it, various groups within the Trump administration and
00:21:13in the public sphere criticized him for signing the memorandum of understanding.
00:21:17That's why Trump backed down. The pressure became undoubtedly
00:21:20too much. Again, I say, from the very beginning, for obvious reasons, he was not eager
00:21:24for this memorandum of understanding. So, when he found an opportunity to
00:21:27withdraw from the agreement and take action regarding
00:21:31transit in the Strait of Hormuz, he violated the agreement.
00:21:34And when it became clear that the agreement was falling apart, he made
00:21:38no effort to save it. It's very important to understand this.
00:21:41There was clear evidence that the memorandum of understanding was falling apart due to the events in the Strait of Hormuz,
00:21:45where the US was trying to escort ships through the Sea of Oman.
00:21:49But did Trump
00:21:53make any effort to reach an agreement with the Iranians and resolve that issue
00:21:56so they could return to the memorandum of understanding? Obviously not.
00:22:00And that's why the agreement fell
00:22:02apart.
00:22:06Well, regarding how Islamabad
00:22:09ended. One point again in the previous section, let me ask this too.
00:22:12Under the memorandum of understanding of Islamabad, those 13
00:22:16or 14 clauses. After all, we had
00:22:19given commitments regarding the issue of diluting
00:22:23our commitments. Now, it's true that these
00:22:26had an order, and this went back to that timing
00:22:29after that 60-day period and the Jamu negotiations.
00:22:33After all, nuclear issues were also
00:22:36raised under the memorandum of understanding, which seemed to suggest
00:22:40that nuclear issues were not supposed to be raised at all.
00:22:43I think one of the fundamental differences between this current
00:22:46situation of Iran's seven conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz
00:22:50while preserving Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz
00:22:53is that there is basically no mention of nuclear issues. I think this can be considered
00:22:57one of the distinguishing points between that and this. It's not just a matter of
00:23:01sooner or later, precedence and temporal order for the realization of some
00:23:04matters. Look, again, if I don't have the text, I don't
00:23:08know. One narrative is that no, there is no nuclear discussion, and these seven
00:23:11points are only for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Yes, I am saying this based on this narrative.
00:23:15Now, the issue is whether the Americans will accept it only on the condition that it's just about the Strait
00:23:18of Hormuz. The issue for the Americans now is
00:23:22that they say, "Even if it's nuclear, I won't accept anything from you about the Strait of Hormuz.
00:23:26The Strait of Hormuz is open." These recent days, that Iran is acting much better
00:23:29in the Strait of Hormuz, is based on making the Americans understand that the Strait of Hormuz is not
00:23:33open. So, let's talk about the Strait of Hormuz.
00:23:37There are two different perspectives. Now, the Iranian side's narrative
00:23:41for reopening the Strait of Hormuz is those seven conditions.
00:23:44Does this mean no other agreement? Look, I really don't
00:23:48In the past two months, the Americans approached
00:24:01us through three different channels, namely Pakistan, Qatar, and even
00:24:05Iraq, and asked us to present our proposals to them.
00:24:08About two weeks ago, we announced seven conditions
00:24:11to the Americans and explicitly stated that until these
00:24:15conditions are met, the Strait of Hormuz will not
00:24:18be open to them, and no negotiations will take place.
00:24:22The Americans have replied to us so far. In their response, they accepted
00:24:26some of our conditions, while others remain unclear. We are
00:24:29no longer in the process of responding to the Americans. They have
00:24:33responded to us, and we consider their response insufficient. They must
00:24:37clarify the issues that remain unclear to us.
00:24:40In my opinion, they also said in another part of their interview
00:24:44that we will not return to our previous diplomatic
00:24:48process. If these are
00:24:50has passed that stage and is now setting more conditions.
00:24:59But the way it looks, it seems
00:25:02that the Islamic Republic of Iran
00:25:06This is also natural. Look, Islamabad
00:25:09was the product of a war we had won.
00:25:13Besides us, the media of the Islamic Republic of Iran, people like Jeffrey
00:25:16Sachs and Mearsheimer and these also accept this rule.
00:25:21Well, and I would say that you reached Islamabad,
00:25:24and then, as Mearsheimer said, they never intended
00:25:28to implement it. I think in this very program,
00:25:32the day after we read the text, our guest was Mr. Samadzadeh,
00:25:35and Mr. Samadzadeh came and sat where you were sitting and said, "This text
00:25:39is a good text, it only has one flaw: it doesn't
00:25:41work."
00:25:43Well, his opinion is also the same. He says it doesn't work. And after
00:25:47that, they imposed another war on us. For 13 days, they attacked
00:25:50our southern borders, committed crimes, attacked
00:25:54weddings, and were defeated in that too.
00:25:58This is very natural, as a rational actor, that
00:26:01the Islamic Republic has also taken a step forward.
00:26:05Apparently, it seems that these seven conditions are for the Strait of Hormuz,
00:26:08and we have no diplomatic discussion
00:26:12about nuclear issues. Very well.
00:26:15Well, friends, let's put the next section. I think it's the scenario for the end of the war.
00:26:19I'll tell you that question and Mr. N here standing.
00:26:22One moment, friends. Look, we don't have diplomacy on nuclear issues,
00:26:26because I have a concern. Then, if something comes out tomorrow, we'll see if there's nuclear stuff in it,
00:26:30and people will feel like something was hidden from them.
00:27:07Looking from outside, the Americans now say, "I accepted your seven
00:27:10conditions for Hormuz
00:27:13to be open." After that, we'll see what we do. Last night I said
00:27:17if the Americans' commitments are firm, ours are objective, meaning
00:27:20unfortunately.
00:27:22Let's not even enter the next question. I want to say something else. They accepted
00:27:26our seven conditions, and Iran also said it would open the Strait of Hormuz.
00:27:30What happened to the nuclear issue?
00:27:38What happened to this? In my opinion, the absence of the nuclear issue completely is not feasible.
00:27:42It will be there. Now, sometimes we say our
00:27:45negotiating approach is this, because pay attention, from the news,
00:27:49he is currently unwilling to negotiate with the Americans,
00:27:53not that the nuclear issue should not be in any agreement with the Americans.
00:27:56My point is that we are in the middle of a war. Our issue is ending the war.
00:28:00This is it, this is it. And regarding
00:28:03ending the war, we don't have a nuclear discussion. We don't. Excellent. Now, I want to
00:28:06say that we are not making an ad hoc argument. We are talking about
00:28:10wartime conditions at any period and at any time. I think all our statements are related to the wartime
00:28:14situation. Regarding ending the war, according to my
00:28:17understanding of the system's overall decision-making, we do not have a nuclear discussion
00:28:21regarding ending the war. Let the war end.
00:28:25Then we'll decide what we want to do, which is to our detriment. That is, again, what Nima
00:28:28is saying, we must make tangible concessions.
00:29:50start involving
00:29:53the Russians and Chinese
00:29:55in this equation
00:29:57more seriously. Iran should move towards a kind of
00:30:01controlled escalation of tension
00:30:05to put more pressure on the Americans
00:30:08and force them
00:30:10to either leave the region
00:30:14and return to their country.
00:30:18Please clarify this issue for us. In your view, what is the most probable scenario
00:30:21سناریوی
00:30:25ahead of us for ending this aggression against Iran?
00:30:29What should we expect?
00:30:34Well, in my opinion, this is basically a war between the US
00:30:37and Iran. One could say this is a war between the US and Israel
00:30:41and Iran. And I think the key to Iran's
00:30:44success is to put a lot of pressure on the US.
00:30:47Pressure that is mostly economic
00:30:50and forces the US to agree to a deal that
00:30:54is favorable to Iran. I don't think Iran can solve this problem by getting
00:30:58help from Russia, China, Pakistan, or any.