Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a quotation record.
00:00:44The clocks show 5:12, so now
00:00:46we will tell you what Poland and the world are living for.
00:00:50I warmly invite Dominika Komarnicka.
00:00:52Let's begin.
00:01:03Today, the Pegasus investigative committee is to present a report
00:01:07on its work. The document was created for over two years. Donald Tusk
00:01:10published a recording on this matter on the X platform. The Prime Minister shared
00:01:14findings that, according to the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the contract signed by the PiS government
00:01:18for over 30 million zlotys focused on
00:01:21a system over which control remained in
00:01:24Israel.
00:01:27They paid Israel, meaning the company.
00:02:00This data went to the Israeli side, and the Polish
00:02:03side effectively had no control over it, and what's
00:02:07more interesting, this agreement clearly
00:02:09stipulated that Poland could not use this surveillance
00:02:13tool against phone numbers from
00:02:17Russia, Belarus, North Korea,
00:02:20countries where there is a serious terrorist threat. They
00:02:24could not, and they readily used this tool against
00:02:27Polish citizens, Polish opposition, and also against
00:02:31citizens of European countries such as France or
00:02:33Germany. You can see the parallel
00:02:37image from the Pegasus committee; members have already
00:02:40gathered. Any moment now, they should begin presenting
00:02:44the public part of the report concerning the purchase, legality, and method
00:02:47of using the Pegasus system. So, as soon as
00:02:51the committee begins, we will go there, and we
00:02:55continue this topic. The Israeli company that produced the Pegasus
00:02:58system had control over the operational data. Former heads of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), Internal Security Agency (ABW), and Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW)
00:03:02have already been charged,
00:03:05concerned with time than it's time for full accountability in court, informed Justice Minister Waldemar
00:03:09Żurek on the X portal. In his post on the X portal, we read:
00:03:12According to ABW expert opinions,
00:03:14the CBA bought a tool over which it did not have full control. Data
00:03:18left Poland, the infecting module was controlled by
00:03:22the manufacturer, and a foreign company had technical insight into
00:03:25operational materials. the beginning, well, everything indicates such
00:03:29a summarizing
00:04:04final meeting of the Pegasus committee,
00:04:07money, the situation at the borders, these which, let's remind you, has been investigating for over
00:04:10two years what
00:04:13motives underpinned
00:04:16the then Law and Justice government's decision to
00:04:20buy, let's remember, for nearly 60 million
00:04:23zlotys, a tool for, well, basically such total
00:04:26surveillance.
00:04:29over the past months,
00:04:31when also members of parliament
00:04:35sitting on this committee interrogated a total
00:04:38of several dozen witnesses from the world
00:04:42of politics, but also people not directly
00:04:45involved in this partisan
00:04:48struggle, there were specific requests to the prosecutor's office, and in
00:04:52the case of seven people, specific charges were brought. But as, among
00:04:55others, the chairwoman of the Pegasus committee, Magdalena Stroka, says,
00:04:59it doesn't end there, because today we are to
00:05:02learn new facts, today we are to learn new names when
00:05:06it comes to people who influenced
00:05:10the purchase of this system, but also
00:05:13illegal use of this Pegasus
00:05:17system, however, in recent hours,
00:05:21information has emerged
00:05:23that
00:05:26November 16, 2016 to
00:05:29November 20,
00:05:302023.
00:05:33Ladies and gentlemen, based on the attendance list, I declare
00:05:36a quorum. The agenda of today's meeting is
00:05:40the submission of the draft position of the
00:05:44investigative committee after over 2 and a half
00:05:47years of work. The second item is current affairs.
00:05:51Is there a motion to expand the agenda?
00:05:54I don't see one. We will therefore proceed to
00:05:57the implementation of item one. In accordance with Article 19a
00:06:01of the Sejm Act on investigative committees. Today we will present
00:06:04to you the report of the
00:06:07investigative committee concerning the Pegasus
00:06:10system. Ladies
00:06:13and gentlemen, after over
00:06:162.5 years of work, we will present
00:06:19today a position. This is not
00:06:22a document about computer software; it is
00:06:26a document about how public authority in Poland
00:06:30reached for a tool, an interfering
00:06:33tool in our civic rights,
00:06:37a tool that for the first time ever fell into
00:06:40the hands of Polish services, how it
00:06:44was bought with money
00:06:46taken from victims of crimes, how
00:06:50it was launched without the legally required
00:06:53accreditation, how it misled
00:06:56courts, and how it was directed not
00:06:59against spies or terrorists, but
00:07:02against judges, prosecutors,
00:07:05local government officials, politicians, opposition
00:07:08politicians during the election campaign. I say this
00:07:30at the beginning so that there are no doubts as to the committee's conclusions. The committee does not question the need to equip Polish services with the most modern operational tools. The committee does question, however, that the state was treated in this matter
00:07:34like a private demesne, and
00:07:37the law as an obstacle that must be
00:07:39circumvented.
00:07:42established by the Sejm in January 2024,
00:07:46432 MPs voted for its
00:07:49establishment, no one
00:07:51was against it. I remind all
00:07:55those who today say that the committee is
00:07:58illegal, that politicians of Law
00:08:01and Justice also voted for this law.
00:08:05The scope of the investigation covered the period from November 16,
00:08:092015 to November 20,
00:08:122023, which means it covered
00:08:158 years of Law and Justice rule.
00:08:19During this time, the committee held 130 meetings,
00:08:23public and classified. It heard 77
00:08:26witnesses in public and classified committee
00:08:30sessions. It heard former ministers, heads of
00:08:34services, service officers, special
00:08:38services, prosecutors, judges, officials
00:08:41of the Supreme Audit Office, a representative
00:08:45of a commercial intermediary, and surveilled
00:08:48individuals. It heard experts, including
00:08:51specialists in ICT security.
00:08:55It gathered thousands of documents, including
00:08:58documents that until their
00:09:02declassification for public opinion were deeply
00:09:06hidden. The committee also
00:09:09prepared notifications of the commission of a crime
00:09:12against 11 people, among whom
00:09:16are former Minister
00:09:20of Justice and Prosecutor General Zbigniew
00:09:23Ziobro, former coordinator of special
00:09:27services Mariusz Kamiński and his deputy
00:09:31Maciej Wąsik, former Minister of Justice,
00:09:34Deputy Minister of Justice Michał Woś,
00:09:38former head of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau Ernest
00:09:41Beida. and his deputy Grzegorz
00:09:44Ocieczek. Former Head of the Internal Security
00:09:47Agency Piotr Pogonowski. Former
00:09:50Head of the Military Counterintelligence Service Maciej
00:09:53Materka. Former Regional Prosecutor in
00:09:56Gdańsk, Teresa Rudkowska
00:09:59Szmydyńska.
00:10:01Former Director of the Department at the Ministry of Justice
00:10:05Mikołaj Pawlak. And former
00:10:06deputy
00:10:09of the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) Maciej Szpanowski.
00:10:12The primary charge that connects almost all these
00:10:15notifications is abuse of power and dereliction
00:10:19of duty by the aforementioned individuals. In
00:10:23some cases, however, it concerns much
00:10:26more, enabling
00:10:29the disclosure of classified information to foreign
00:10:33entities,
00:10:35causing significant financial damage,
00:10:39aiding in the acquisition of a tool for committing
00:10:42computer crimes. The committee
00:10:46also had to fight for the very possibility of working.
00:10:49For the first time in history, we encountered
00:10:53an unprecedented situation.
00:10:56We had to submit to the court 41
00:10:59motions to punish witnesses with a disciplinary
00:11:01penalty,
00:11:0411 motions for arrest and compulsory
00:11:07escort, three motions for lifting
00:11:10immunity, two motions concerning
00:11:13the immunities of MEPs Mariusz Kamiński
00:11:16and Maciej Wąsik.
00:11:19The courts imposed a total penalty on witnesses who did not
00:11:22appear at committee meetings.
00:11:56there are letters from the head of the Internal Security
00:11:59Agency, these are technical reports
00:12:03and a draft agreement for the purchase
00:12:05of Pegasus. Correspondence between
00:12:09the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and
00:12:12the disposer of this tool and its producer, the Israeli
00:12:16company NSO. Pegasus is
00:12:19spyware from an Israeli
00:12:23company belonging to...
00:12:34often without any activity from the
00:12:38victim, such access, breached
00:12:42access, gave the ability to look
00:12:45into messages, photos, contacts,
00:12:48location, to activate the microphone and
00:12:51camera, as well as to data from.
00:13:04The committee established something that the previous government
00:13:08hid for years: the Polish state never
00:13:11had full control over
00:13:14the system. Pegasus did not operate
00:13:16locally in the CBA's
00:13:19server room; it operated through the software
00:13:23manufacturer's anonymizing network, located in various
00:13:26places around the world, through which data downloaded from
00:13:30Polish citizens' phones
00:13:33passed.
00:13:36The expert appointed by the committee said directly,
00:13:39"Whoever has power over the anonymizing network, has
00:13:43power over the data?" The committee in
00:13:462024, specifically
00:13:49May 24, requested the prosecutor,
00:13:52the national prosecutor's office, the investigative
00:13:55team, to perform an inspection of the system
00:13:58located in the Central Anti-Corruption
00:14:01Bureau.
00:14:04at the last stretch, we received
00:14:06documents after the opinion
00:14:09was prepared by the Forensic
00:14:12Research Bureau of the Internal Security Agency.
00:14:16The experts were appointed at the request of the National Prosecutor's Office by Team
00:14:20Three. part of this opinion, because
00:14:24it was performed
00:14:33and submitted to the committee, today we will tell you what is in the declassified
00:14:37part of this opinion.
00:14:41Ladies and gentlemen,
00:14:44some elements of the Pegasus system,
00:14:48part of the anonymizing infrastructure, were
00:14:51under the control of
00:14:55NSO Group, an Israeli company, which
00:14:58means that the Polish side had no control
00:15:01over elements located outside
00:15:04the CBA headquarters. The CBA did not possess,
00:15:08among other things, access passwords to some accounts with administrative
00:15:12privileges, which meant that it could
00:15:15not exercise full control over elements
00:15:18of the system located within the CBA
00:15:22headquarters. Control.
00:15:50Pegasus had the ability
00:15:53to access materials from operational control
00:15:56carried out by Polish services, when the system
00:16:00needed technical support from
00:16:03the manufacturer by fixing
00:16:06errors.
00:16:57And in 2019, already using the system, it wrote to
00:17:01its subordinate units that it could not
00:17:03rule out access to transmitted
00:17:37from Warsaw, only from
00:17:40Israel, there was another proof of who
00:17:44was really the host of the system,
00:17:48the manufacturer had the technical ability
00:17:51to cut off services from the system.
00:17:55According to the committee's findings, the license was revoked,
00:17:58and
00:18:02renewed information that
00:18:05discredits politicians today. Well,
00:18:15in 2022,
00:18:17this license was
00:18:20revoked, the Polish special service was
00:18:24deprived of an operational tool by the decision
00:18:28of a foreign corporation. This is the definition
00:18:32of loss of operational
00:18:34sovereignty during the PiS government.
00:18:44Pegasus, who led to its purchase? The committee's
00:18:47answer is unequivocal: the political decision was made at
00:18:50the intersection of the Ministry of Justice,
00:18:53where Zbigniew Ziobro was then minister,
00:18:57and the special services sector supervised by
00:19:01Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik. Zbigniew Ziobro
00:19:04himself presented himself here at the meeting. September
00:19:152017, he asked the Minister
00:19:19of Justice for money for the purchase of special
00:19:22equipment. Jarosław
00:19:24Kaczyński testified that he had discussed the purchase,
00:19:28though he did not remember
00:19:29the details.
00:19:35Ladies and gentlemen.
00:19:50How much did Pegasus cost? This is a question that
00:19:53all of us have been asking ourselves
00:19:56since the very beginning of our work. Until now,
00:19:59we spoke of 25 million that was transferred
00:20:02from the Justice Fund to the Central Anti-Corruption
00:20:06Bureau. However, this is not the total cost
00:20:10incurred by the Polish state.
00:20:1333.4 million, that's how much
00:20:17was paid for the purchase of the Pegasus
00:20:20system. Over 8 million
00:20:24was the percentage that went to
00:20:27the intermediary company in the purchase. That was
00:20:31the intermediary's fee. However, this is not the total cost
00:20:34that we incurred as a state.
00:20:38for this system, we also
00:20:40paid.
00:20:42The total cost is presented in the classified part
00:20:46of the report, it is what
00:20:50the system was used by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, as well as
00:21:12simultaneously, and this package must be renewed,
00:21:18the Internal Security Agency.
00:21:52I can clearly state that the total cost of purchase and
00:21:55maintenance, administration, and license extension, which
00:21:59in the end, which was finally deactivated in 2020,
00:22:02the second year, is significantly
00:22:05higher. The National Prosecutor's Office, led
00:22:08by Bogdan Święczkowski, purchased
00:22:12the Pegasus system, the Hermes
00:22:15system. This system cost our
00:22:19state a total of 15 million zlotys without
00:22:22a tender, without a needs analysis, without tests. We will
00:22:25talk about this in the further part, presenting individual
00:22:29chapters. This system worked without
00:22:32accreditation, we also mentioned
00:22:34this to you during our committee's
00:22:37work.
00:22:40There is one fact in this matter that in itself determines
00:22:43the illegality of this system from the very
00:22:46beginning of its existence.
00:22:50A system that was supposed to process classified
00:22:53information must have ICT security
00:22:56accreditation,
00:22:59issued by the appropriate service. In this case,
00:23:03that service was the Internal Security Agency.
00:23:06Pegasus never obtained such accreditation.
00:23:10The CBA never applied to the Internal Security
00:23:13Agency for such accreditation
00:23:15to be carried out.
00:23:21The competent authority in this matter stated it directly
00:23:25in the post-audit report of March 19,
00:23:282025, declassified at the request
00:23:32of the committee. The system organized and
00:23:35used for obtaining information from operational
00:23:38control required prior
00:23:40accreditation. The purpose
00:23:43of the system,
00:23:45any potential system, was located in
00:23:49the protected zones of the CBA, so no
00:23:52exception to the law applied.
00:23:55The use of the system without accreditation was
00:23:59a violation of Article 48 of the Act on
00:24:02the Protection of Classified Information. The Senate committee formulated
00:24:06the same conclusion. This means that throughout
00:24:09its entire operational period from 2017,
00:24:13Pegasus operated outside the established
00:24:16state security system. Every head of service
00:24:20who allowed its use and every minister who knew
00:24:24about it failed to fulfill their duties, for which
00:24:28the law provides for criminal liability. The amendment of these
00:24:32provisions in 2020,
00:24:35introduced incidentally with the adoption of the act
00:24:39on the defense of the Homeland, did
00:24:41not legalize actions taken before
00:24:45its adoption. The law is judged according to the state at the time
00:24:49of the act. The next issue I wanted
00:24:52to raise is the issue of courts and
00:24:55the implementation of consents for operational control.
00:24:58The courts were misled. Pegasus defenders repeat one
00:25:01sentence: there was court
00:25:03consent for every operational control.
00:25:06The committee examined what this court
00:25:09consent was worth.
00:25:12of the District Court in
00:25:15Warsaw and the Court of Appeal.
00:25:18will present, the services did not
00:25:51inform about what tool
00:25:54they would use to carry out operational control. In
00:25:58September 2017, exactly when Pegasus
00:26:02was bought, the management of the district
00:26:06court in Warsaw was dismissed before the
00:26:09end of their term. Courts
00:26:13that consider requests
00:26:16for operational control were replaced by judges
00:26:19nominated by Zbigniew Ziobro. From that moment, the
00:26:23president and vice-president, nominated by
00:26:26the minister, decreed the requests arriving
00:26:29at the courts' secret chancery.
00:26:37We were told, ladies and gentlemen, that Pegasus was to be used
00:26:40to fight spies and terrorists.
00:26:43The committee found that this was a myth, a myth repeated
00:26:47by politicians of the then government. First
00:26:50of all, the system could not operate against
00:26:53numbers registered in
00:26:56Russia, China, North Korea,
00:26:59Israel, or Belarus.
00:27:34is such a case that we analyzed during
00:27:37committee meetings. We will discuss this further in the details
00:27:41of today's
00:27:43meeting.
00:27:49Ladies and gentlemen, the Pegasus case is not about technology,
00:27:53it is about whether in Poland the government can
00:27:57reach for the most powerful surveillance
00:28:00tool, pay with
00:28:04money that should go to victims of crimes, launch it
00:28:07illegally, deceive the court, use it against
00:28:11its own citizens just because they dared
00:28:14to criticize them. For 8 years, the answer was
00:28:18yes. The committee's position
00:28:22is an expression of the conviction that the answer
00:28:25must be never again. At
00:28:29this point, before we move on to discussing
00:28:32specific chapters of our report, which in
00:28:35its public part numbers
00:28:38370 pages, I will give the floor
00:28:42to the Vice-Chairwoman, please, Joanna Kluśkowska. Thank you very much,
00:28:45Madam Chairwoman. Ladies and gentlemen, one of the questions we asked
00:28:49ourselves during these two and a half years of work was
00:28:52whether the system was secure, whether it was entirely
00:28:56in Polish hands. Both witness testimonies and
00:29:00documents cast a very
00:29:03big question mark over this
00:29:06question, including the fact that the agents themselves, both from the Internal Security
00:29:10Agency and the Military Counterintelligence Service,
00:29:13in their internal correspondence, wrote that it should be
00:29:17kept in mind that the software manufacturer might have
00:29:21access to data. The Forensic Research Bureau of the Internal
00:29:24Security Agency dotted the i's and crossed the t's.
00:29:28We have these documents; they
00:29:31arrived on
00:29:33October 9th,
00:29:36that is, last Friday,
00:29:39however, the documents themselves, although they are public, are not
00:29:43publicly available, so we cannot quote
00:29:47this document to you, we can
00:29:50tell you what is written in this
00:29:54document, because these documents
00:29:57are public, but not... they are part
00:30:00of prosecutor's proceedings,
00:30:04so briefly, so that you understand
00:30:07what we are talking about, what the functionality
00:30:11of the Pegasus system was, among
00:30:14other things, access to SMS messages,
00:30:18MMS messages, and the content of messages from internet
00:30:21communicators, email content, including the content
00:30:24of messages sent and received before the start
00:30:27date of operational
00:30:30control, call
00:30:32history, content of phone calls conducted in real-time by
00:30:36the user of the end device,
00:30:39location data, including information from
00:30:42GPS, contact lists, and calendar entries, history of visited
00:30:46websites, content of conversations from the surroundings in real-time, in
00:30:49which the end device was located through the built-in microphone,
00:30:53images captured in real-time through
00:30:56the built-in cameras
00:30:59in the end device, and ladies
00:31:03and gentlemen, from the
00:31:06ABW analysis, it appears that
00:31:09the server module responsible for infecting devices of persons who are
00:31:13to be
00:31:24This means that the victim's phone, from which all that I just read could be downloaded, was fully
00:31:28under the control of the Israeli company
00:31:31NSO Group, more when I talk about
00:31:35accreditation, or rather its lack. Thank you very
00:31:38much.
00:31:43Please. Now, the next point will be
00:31:46addressed by Vice-Chairman Tomasz
00:31:49Trela. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, ladies and gentlemen,
00:31:53today I have the opportunity to present Chapter
00:31:56one of the final report of the investigative committee, which answers one
00:32:00of the most important questions: how did it happen
00:32:03that the Polish state bought cyberweapons and used them against
00:32:06its own citizens? Chapter one proves that the purchase
00:32:10of Pegasus from the very beginning was based on a triple
00:32:13violation of the law: illegal financing, misleading
00:32:17state bodies, and ignoring warnings from its own
00:32:21services and lawyers. First
00:32:23of all, who was behind it? From the committee's findings and testimonies
00:32:27given by witnesses invited, summoned before
00:32:30the committee under penalty of criminal liability, it is
00:32:33clear: first, Zbigniew Ziobro, himself
00:32:36before the investigative committee, as you remember, did not voluntarily
00:32:40appear; it was necessary to apply coercive
00:32:44measures, to have him brought to
00:32:47the committee meeting. He himself before the committee declared: I was
00:32:50the initiator of this purchase. system, he
00:32:53declared that money would be disbursed from the justice fund, the commission
00:32:56identified him as the main initiator and political
00:33:00manager of the entire undertaking, he made
00:33:03the key decision to involve justice fund resources
00:33:06for a purpose inconsistent with its statutory allocation, creating conditions for
00:33:10the transaction to be carried out despite awareness of legal
00:33:14doubts raised by officials, as you all know,
00:33:17Zbigniew Ziobro after this interrogation in the
00:33:20near future fled Poland, first to Budapest, and
00:33:24now he has settled in the United States. Secondly,
00:33:27Mariusz Kamiński, was the political organizer of the purchase
00:33:31of Pegasus. Key backstage agreements between Ziobro and
00:33:35Kamiński were reached at the turn of 2016 and
00:33:382017 in the Prime Minister's Chancellery on
00:33:41the mezzanine of the building of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.
00:33:45It was there that it was decided that the software would go
00:33:47to the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, he served
00:33:51as the integrator of the process at the operational and
00:33:55political level, he combined the technical needs
00:33:58of the services with the actions of the Ministry of Justice,
00:34:01supervising the formal implementation of the system in the structures
00:34:04of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. Thirdly,
00:34:06Michał Woś, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry
00:34:10of Justice, was responsible for the technical and official side
00:34:13of transferring funds. He signed key documents and agreements
00:34:17with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau at the request of Zbigniew
00:34:20Ziobro, implementing the transfer of money from the Justice Fund
00:34:24to the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. Fourthly,
00:34:27Jarosław Kaczyński confirmed before the commission that he knew about
00:34:31the plans to purchase the device from Mariusz Kamiński and Zbigniew Ziobro
00:34:34even before the finalization of the transaction. In the public
00:34:38space, a narrative was created of the necessity to fight dangerous
00:34:41crime and terrorism. The report proves
00:34:44however, that this argument was only a pretext to acquire
00:34:48a tool for unlimited interference in
00:34:51the privacy of citizens, including opposition politicians
00:34:55against the United Right government, judges who opposed
00:34:59PiS lawlessness and the breaking of the rule of law
00:35:02and the deformation of the justice system, as well as other public
00:35:05figures who, through their actions,
00:35:08were a thorn in the side of the then
00:35:11government, resistance of the services, everyone.
00:35:21how the services would react to the purchase of the operating system and whether they would use it in their
00:35:25activities. The result: all key institutions raised
00:35:28objections or serious concerns: firstly,
00:35:31the legal office of the Police Headquarters in an opinion dated
00:35:35March 29, 2017,
00:35:38authored by legal counsel Dariusz
00:35:40Matejski, the appropriate signature, unambiguously
00:35:43indicated that, in the current legal state, the police cannot
00:35:47buy or use software that bypasses
00:35:50the security of end devices and
00:35:53sucks from the past, the police withdrew
00:35:57from the purchase. Secondly, the head of the Internal Security
00:36:00Agency, Professor Piotr Pogonowski, in a letter dated February 15,
00:36:042017, appropriate signature, deemed the offer
00:36:08to purchase Pegasus to be disqualifying
00:36:11due to the risk of de-conspiracy of operational
00:36:15interests and high costs. Thirdly,
00:36:17the Military Counterintelligence Service adamantly
00:36:21refused to participate in the purchase. An internal document of the Military Counterintelligence
00:36:24Service warned directly:
00:36:27the system used does not exclude the possibility for the manufacturer
00:36:31of the software, i.e., the Israeli company
00:36:34NSO Group, to access the transmitted data. About this,
00:36:38the Chairwoman Joanna Kluzik Rostkowska mentioned it subtly.
00:36:42Fourthly, doubts arose within
00:36:45the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau itself. Legal counsel
00:36:49of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Dr. Bartłomiej Karasiewicz,
00:36:53in an opinion dated April 10, 2017,
00:36:56warned that the legislation does not give
00:36:59the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau the basis to use such
00:37:02software without prior amendment
00:37:05of the act. Despite these warnings, decision-makers did not
00:37:08change the law in parliament but decided to circumvent the regulations
00:37:12by means of far-fetched legal interpretations.
00:37:15Prosecutor's Office, National Prosecutor's Office. Bogdan
00:37:19Święczkowski played a major role in this. On July 28,
00:37:222017, the National Prosecutor sent a letter to
00:37:26the police, response, signature, in which he issued
00:37:29an arbitrary interpretation that
00:37:32it is permissible for the police to conduct operational control
00:37:35of the content of correspondence sent via
00:37:39internet communicators, using software
00:37:43installed on the system platforms of the communicator
00:37:46user. Commission materials revealed
00:37:50the existence of strong top-down institutional pressure
00:37:53to implement a solution allowing services access to
00:37:57communication conducted via encrypted
00:38:01communicators despite the lack of accreditation and serious
00:38:05reservations of lawyers
00:38:09and legal financiers. Ultimately, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau
00:38:12bought Pegasus from the Israeli company NSO
00:38:16Group and made it available
00:38:18to other services contrary to the unambiguous opinions of the police,
00:38:22the Internal Security Agency, the Military
00:38:25Counterintelligence Service, and its own.
00:38:29Financial mechanism: the most outrageous
00:38:32is the mechanism for financing the purchase, financing a special
00:38:36service from a fund designated by law for
00:38:39victims of crimes required creating an appearance
00:38:43of legality, so that it would be correct on paper. Step one:
00:38:47an amendment to the Penal Executive Code was introduced,
00:38:50it came into force on August 12, 2017,
00:38:54the ruling party managed to pass an amendment to Article 43,
00:38:583 PEC, which expanded the statutory catalog of tasks of the Justice
00:39:02Fund. To the existing goals, assistance to victims
00:39:05and post-penitentiary bridge, a general
00:39:09sentence was added: crime prevention and
00:39:12detection. In addition, a provision was introduced allowing funds to be transferred
00:39:16from the fund to public finance sector units outside
00:39:19standard procedures and
00:39:22tenders. Step two: the regulation of the Minister
00:39:25of Justice, which came into force, was changed. On September
00:39:2820, 2017, the Minister of Justice issued a new
00:39:32executive regulation that gave him the right to entrust
00:39:35funds from the Justice Fund without announcing
00:39:39a program and without an open call for applications. Step three:
00:39:42the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau submitted a formal request on
00:39:46September 15, 2017,
00:39:49citing the newly introduced Article 43 paragraph
00:39:528 point 1c. PEC, the head of the Central Anti-Corruption
00:39:56Bureau, Ernest Bejda, sent a letter to the Minister of Justice
00:39:59requesting the transfer of 25 million
00:40:02zlotys for the purchase of special technical equipment for
00:40:06detecting and preventing crime, in accordance with
00:40:09Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Act on the Central Anti-Corruption
00:40:12Bureau and the regulations on public finances, the activities
00:40:16and purchase of operational technical means for special services can only be
00:40:20financed from the state budget, from
00:40:23the operational fund of a given service, financing the purchase
00:40:36of the Ministry of Justice committed deliberate
00:40:40misinformation. The Deputy Minister of Finance,
00:40:43Teresa Czerwińska,
00:40:46was misled by concealing from her the real purpose of shifting 25
00:40:50million zlotys in the financial plan of the Justice
00:40:53Fund. The parliamentary Public Finance Committee was also...
00:40:59Minister Woś sent a letter on September 14,
00:41:022017, and therefore the day before
00:41:05the letter from the head of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau to the Ministry
00:41:09of Justice, these are very important
00:41:12coincidences of these dates, a letter with the appropriate signature
00:41:16with a note, very urgent, to the Undersecretary
00:41:19of State in the Ministry of Finance, Teresa Czerwińska.
00:41:23The letter concerned a request to change the financial plan of the Justice
00:41:26Fund. Quoting, 25 million zlotys under
00:41:29the slogan "other activities serving to prevent
00:41:32crime", it was hidden that the money would go to
00:41:35the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau for Pegasus,
00:41:38it was done by...
00:41:41despite the fact that other formations, including the police and
00:41:44other special services, issued negative opinions on
00:41:50the danger of its use. Disclosure
00:41:53of the purchase: to conceal the transaction, a private
00:41:56intermediary, Matik company, was included in the purchase
00:42:00process as a commercial intermediary between the Central
00:42:03Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Luxembourg
00:42:06company (the commercial arm of NSO Group).
00:42:10To the Cyber company after receiving funds from the Central Anti-Corruption
00:42:13Bureau, which in turn came from a grant from the Justice
00:42:17Fund. We come to the moment when the whole
00:42:20intricately woven mechanism of hiding the purchase of Pegasus fell
00:42:24apart. If it weren't for the meticulousness of the controllers of the Supreme Audit
00:42:28Office in 2018, the public might
00:42:31never have learned about the purchase of this cyber weapon. It is worth
00:42:34emphasizing once again that in no financial document,
00:42:38report or fact.
00:42:47the description of the purchase of special technical equipment used for detecting
00:42:51and preventing crime, in
00:42:54further parts of the report, we will demonstrate what
00:42:58Pegasus was really used for, what this weapon was used for,
00:43:01however, they fell into their own trap, I am talking about
00:43:04the rulers of that time, as
00:43:07I mentioned, in accordance with Article four of the Act... on the Central Anti-Corruption
00:43:10Bureau, purchases of operational equipment by the bureau can be
00:43:14financed exclusively from the state budget and from the secret operational
00:43:18fund. Wishing to circumvent this requirement and reach for money from the Justice
00:43:22Fund, the Ministry of Justice transferred
00:43:2525 million zlotys from the special purpose
00:43:28fund, however, since the finances of the Justice Fund are by
00:43:31law public, the transfer documents to the Central Anti-Corruption
00:43:35Bureau were publicly available, every
00:43:39citizen could access them under the public information
00:43:42access regime. The Supreme Audit Office, under the leadership
00:43:46of Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, challenged this
00:43:49transfer as a violation of the Act on the Central Anti-Corruption
00:43:52Bureau and the Public Finance Act. The ludicrous legal
00:43:56construction was also pointed out. The Minister of Justice, head
00:43:59of the CBA, concluded an agreement representing the same
00:44:03State Treasury, it was an impermissible agreement of the State Treasury
00:44:06with itself. What happened after the detection of this?
00:44:10legal transaction on July 18,
00:44:132018, the Supreme Audit Office
00:44:16formally filed a notification of violation of public finance
00:44:19discipline against Deputy Minister Michał
00:44:22Woś for illegally transferred money and
00:44:25the head of the Central Anti-Corruption
00:44:27Bureau, Ernest Bejda, for accepting
00:44:31them. After the initial refusal to initiate explanatory proceedings by
00:44:34the lower-instance spokesman, the Supreme Audit Office
00:44:38filed an appeal to the head spokesman for public finance
00:44:41discipline, ultimately, by decisions of September
00:44:4414, 2020, the then spokesman for public
00:44:48finance discipline, Piotr Patkowski, it is not without significance that
00:44:52he was one of the closest collaborators of the then Prime Minister
00:44:56Mateusz Morawiecki, and later Deputy Minister
00:44:59to refuse to initiate
00:45:03proceedings. In his justification, Mr.
00:45:05Patkowski stated that the regulations were on us, we are now moving
00:45:09to...
00:45:59we just signed a declaration
00:46:01deklarację
00:46:04on strategic partnership between the Kingdom of Norway and
00:46:08the Republic of Poland.
00:46:11This declaration is a confirmation of our hard work
00:46:14for years, work for the building of Polish-Norwegian
00:46:18relations, today better than ever in
00:46:21history, they were never
00:46:24bad, but today
00:46:26they are a testament to how
00:46:30true friendship can be built between nations and
00:46:34states and governments on the basis of both
00:46:36common interests and common values.
00:46:41In the modern world, where international order
00:46:45is violated daily,
00:46:49where law, principles.
00:47:02relations based on both business,
00:47:05moral, geopolitical, in
00:47:08the context of security, all of this is truly invaluable, and
00:47:12I am glad that my interlocutor, our guest
00:47:16today, has an identical view on Polish-Norwegian
00:47:19relations, and
00:47:24I was pleased to hear you say
00:47:27that Polish-Norwegian relations are
00:47:30the most promising process in Norwegian
00:47:33foreign policy in many years and that it has not been possible
00:47:37to intensify cooperation and relations
00:47:39with anyone else as much as with Norway and Poland,
00:47:43these are important words. As a resident
00:47:47of Gdańsk, I will always remember it.
00:47:50it goes to various places in Poland, but in
00:48:00the Pomeranian Voivodeship and in Gdańsk, the effects
00:48:03of your help, your support are
00:48:06particularly visible. Poland has been
00:48:10the largest beneficiary
00:48:12of the Norwegian Fund for years,
00:48:15and I am very proud of this,
00:48:18I am glad that both you and your predecessors.
00:48:23also assessed with great satisfaction how well we are able to
00:48:27utilize these funds in Poland and how visible
00:48:29this success is.
00:48:32We have a common view,
00:48:35and that also seems very important today,
00:48:38we confirmed it today during our speeches at
00:48:42the Warsaw Security Forum.
00:48:45We have a common view on
00:48:48the geopolitical situation, regarding solidarity.
00:49:24fire, on the other hand, by no means, as of
00:49:27today we are the only representative of NSO for the Polish
00:49:30market, and he also testified something important.
00:49:33Tomatik, on its own initiative, went to the CBA with an offer
00:49:37of the NSO tool from Israel.
00:49:41We are more concerned with time. Now
00:49:44let's move on to the correspondence: September 13, 2016,
00:49:47CBA officer Krystian Dobrzyński writes to the Vice President
00:49:51of Matik. Literally, I will not hide
00:49:54that we are more
00:49:57with iOS10, especially since it will be
00:50:01a while before the system catches on, and these types
00:50:04of purchases are not made on the spot. Ladies and gentlemen,
00:50:07let's translate this into the language of an ordinary citizen. A state
00:50:10service buys a tool worth tens of millions of zlotys and tells
00:50:14the supplier, time is more important than whether the system works on
00:50:18the latest phones, more important than quality, and asks for a list
00:50:22of 50 phones on which the system will be tested in Polish mobile
00:50:26networks. Here appears an attack
00:50:30without a click. 10 days later,
00:50:32September 23, 2016, the same
00:50:36officer writes to Matik: you must admit that the Q
00:50:39went a bit easy by filling
00:50:42part of the list with iPhones, there is also no
00:50:45information on which models we can perform a zero
00:50:48click attack, we would at least like to know.
00:51:37but to be honest, I actually
00:51:40don't notice this fact,
00:51:43we think alike, we work alike,
00:51:47the Europeanness of Norway in many fields
00:51:49seems more visible than in
00:51:53some member states,
00:51:55that's why our closeness, our cooperation is from
00:51:58the Polish point of view so important, I don't hide
00:52:02that our cooperation...
00:52:05mainly in the sphere of security, combining our efforts regarding
00:52:09the northern and eastern flank, Norway
00:52:12borders Russia. Poland is the only country in the world that
00:52:16borders both Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine,
00:52:18so we know well how important
00:52:22the security of the northern and eastern flank is,
00:52:25therefore I sincerely thank you, Jonas,
00:52:29for also helping me in building such deep
00:52:32trust throughout this northern bloc.
00:52:48often accompanies us in conversations and preparations, Germany, that the importance
00:52:51of this part of the world is already recognized by
00:52:54all our partners, but this is largely due to your
00:52:58personal merit and Norway as a state, for which I thank
00:53:02you very much, Poland.
00:53:05For us in Poland, for all of us, security is a priority
00:53:08and it is visible at every step,
00:53:12Poland and Europe and Norway are
00:53:15more secure than they could be without
00:53:18your work, our cooperation, and
00:53:22for that I thank you once again.
00:53:25Thank you very much, I would like to ask the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway,
00:53:28Jonas
00:53:29Gahr Støre, to speak.
00:53:33Thank you very much, thank you very much.
00:53:40Prime Minister, thank you, dear Donald, thank you very much for having me here once again, we are proud to be a partner country of the World Security
00:53:44Forum. I am very glad that I was able
00:53:47to see all these Norwegian flags today at the conference, we were there
00:53:51together with representatives of my government, with representatives
00:53:55of business, people dealing with security
00:53:57and defense issues. It is true, Prime
00:54:01Minister, that... According
00:54:04to my calculations, there is no other country with which
00:54:07Norway has become more closely aligned in the last
00:54:1030 years than Poland. The world
00:54:13has changed in the last 30, 40 years, but if we consider
00:54:171990 and 2026,
00:54:21we see integration, interpersonal contacts and, as
00:54:25you said, 400 Norwegian companies are active in
00:54:28Poland.
00:54:31At a high level, we conduct political exchange, we are.
00:54:39that we work with you also partly in the
00:54:46south, yes, we were there at the
00:54:50place where Ukrainian soldiers are being
00:54:52trained, besides that we observed
00:54:56together F-35s and we only work with countries with whom
00:55:00there is trust, if anything is lacking in the world today, it
00:55:03is definitely trust. But we are able to show how much
00:55:07we can do when that trust exists, that is what exists between our
00:55:11countries. The declaration we signed today regarding
00:55:14strategic partnership is
00:55:16an excellent presentation
00:55:20of the wonderful level of relations between our countries, over 20 points
00:55:24of various actions were introduced there in various areas,
00:55:27cooperation regarding security, economic
00:55:30cooperation and contacts between our society.
00:55:33This concerns issues of security, defense, military
00:55:36mobility, preparation, readiness, resilience,
00:55:40protection of critical infrastructure, energy security, support for
00:55:43Ukraine and greater support between our defense industry
00:55:47companies, but what is very important here is that
00:55:51there is a general strong will for us to work together within these
00:55:54frameworks, within NATO, also on the broader European
00:55:58scene, you are right that Norway is not a member of the European
00:56:01Union, but we are integrated with the common economic
00:56:05market, there are
00:56:08certain points of conflict, where
00:56:11Poland always listened carefully to the Norwegian view,
00:56:14for which we are always grateful, within the framework
00:56:17of Norwegian grants we implement unique cooperation,
00:56:21it differs from other types of similar programs, as it is based
00:56:25on ideas emanating from civil society in Poland.
00:56:28Poland is the main recipient,
00:56:31receiving approximately 25% of all Norwegian grants.
00:56:35I have seen examples of this, which include cultural
00:56:38heritage, transformation towards a green economy,
00:56:42medical equipment, I think all of this
00:56:45is a method of building institutional resilience in a way
00:56:49that also strengthens cooperation between our countries, and once again
00:56:53400 Norwegian companies present,
00:56:56active on the Polish market, and more are coming, large
00:56:59investments are appearing, more jobs will be created, that is
00:57:03good. In addition,
00:57:05we also have another common feature, namely
00:57:09the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border in the
00:57:12Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
00:57:15Poland three. difficult
00:57:18borders,
00:57:21in addition, we also have another common feature,
00:57:25namely the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border in the
00:57:28Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
00:57:31Poland three difficult
00:57:34borders.
00:57:37In addition, we also have another common feature,
00:57:41namely the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border
00:57:44in the Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300. And
00:57:48Poland three difficult
00:57:50borders, in addition
00:57:53we have another common feature, namely
00:57:57the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border in the Arctic,
00:58:01in the north, Finland 1300, and
00:58:04Poland three difficult
00:58:06borders.
00:58:09In addition, we also have another common feature,
00:58:13namely the border with Russia, we have a 200 km
00:58:16border.
00:58:57In addition, we also have another common feature, namely
00:59:01the border with Russia, we have a 200 kilometer border in the
00:59:04Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
00:59:07Poland three difficult
00:59:10borders.
00:59:13In addition, we also have another common feature
00:59:17namely.
00:59:21Finland 1300 and Poland
00:59:25three difficult
00:59:26borders.
00:59:29In addition, we also have another common feature,
00:59:33namely the border with Russia. We have a 200 km border in the
00:59:36Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
00:59:40Poland three difficult
00:59:42borders. In
00:59:45addition.
00:59:56and Poland three difficult
00:59:58borders.
01:00:01In addition, we also have another common feature,
01:00:05namely the border with Russia. We have a 200 km border in the
01:00:08Arctic, in the north. Finland 1300 and
01:00:12Poland three difficult
01:00:14borders.
01:00:17In addition we also have another common feature,
01:00:21namely the border with Russia, we have 200 km border
01:00:24in the Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
01:00:28Poland three difficult
01:00:30borders.
01:00:33In addition, we also have another common feature,
01:00:37namely the border with Russia, we have 200 km border in
01:00:41the Arctic, in the north Finland 1300, and
01:00:44Poland three difficult borders.
01:00:49In addition we also have another common feature,
01:00:53namely the border with Russia. We have 200 km border in
01:00:57the Arctic in the north Finland 1300, and
01:01:00Poland three difficult
01:01:02borders.
01:01:05In addition, we also have another common feature,
01:01:09namely the border with Russia. We have 200 km border in
01:01:13the Arctic, in the north Finland 1300, and
01:01:16Poland. three difficult
01:01:18borders, meaning refugees,
01:01:21migration, war,
01:01:25alarms, I was simply
01:01:28afraid that this would much
01:01:32more intensely destroy our mental attitude.