Original Broadcaster Captioning (Enhanced). Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a quotation record.
00:00:01I FORGIVE EVERYBODY, YOU KNOW,
00:00:03BECAUSE WHEN IT COMES TO
00:00:05FORGIVING, YOU ARE NOT FORGIVING.
00:00:08THEN YOU ARE FORGIVING YOURSELF
00:00:12OF THE PAIN AND TORTURE THAT YOU ARE SUFFERING.
00:00:14THINKING ABOUT THEM. AMERICA SALUTES YOU.
00:00:18I HAVE FIVE GRANDKIDS AND SELMA,
00:00:23MY FIRST GRANDDAUGHTER, SHE'S
00:00:25NAMED AFTER SELMA AND WE DROVE
00:00:28THE END AND SHE IS HIS NAMESAKE, SELMA.
00:00:31HE IS A SHAHEED, A MARTYR, THE
00:00:35SHAHEED FOREVER.
00:00:37WE'RE ALIVE IN OUR FAITH.
00:00:39MARTYRDOM IS ALSO A FACTOR IN
00:00:42ALL THE DIFFERENT FAITHS.
00:00:44AND SO THAT'S WHY I FEEL THAT
00:00:46HIS SOUL HAS REUNITED WITH MY
00:00:54SOUL.
00:00:59UP NEXT, MORE AMERICAN HISTORY TV.
00:01:05SO LET ME INTRODUCE YOU TO OUR GUESTS TODAY.
00:01:08THIS IS WE CALL THIS AN AUTHORITY BRIEFING, A PUBLIC AUTHORITY BRIEFING.
00:01:12IT'S AN EXPANSION OF OUR PODCAST SERIES HERE AT THE SPY MUSEUM CALLED SPY CASTE.
00:01:16WE TEND TO DO THESE CONVERSATIONS IN PRIVATE, IN A
00:01:20STUDIO A COUPLE OF FEET FROM HERE. BUT EVERY CORNER WE CHOOSE, ONE
00:01:23THAT REALLY STANDS OUT. AND WE DO IT AS A PUBLIC
00:01:27DEBRIEFING SO THAT THE, YOU KNOW, THE COMMUNITY CAN GET A
00:01:30CHANCE TO HEAR THE AUTHOR TALK DIRECTLY TO YOU.
00:01:34AND WE'RE EXCITED, ESPECIALLY ON TODAY, WHICH WE'LL TALK ABOUT IN
00:01:38A SECOND, TO HAVE DUANE EVANS HERE WITH US.
00:01:40HE'S A FORMER CIA OPERATIONS
00:01:42OFFICER WITH FIELD TOURS AND FOUR CONTINENTS, INCLUDING
00:01:46SERVING AS A CHIEF OF STATION, WHICH AS MANY OF YOU KNOW IS
00:01:49CIA'S MOST SENIOR FIELD POSITION.
00:01:52HE IS A RECIPIENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE STAR FOR VALOR IN THE CAREER COMMENDATION MEDAL.
00:01:55AND PRIOR TO JOINING THE AGENCY, HE WAS A US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
00:01:59AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. HE'S A GRADUATE OF THE NEW
00:02:03MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY. GO AGGIES, I GUESS, AND AND IS
00:02:06THE AUTHOR OF A NOVEL NORTH FROM
00:02:09CALCUTTA, AS WELL AS FOXTROT AND KANDAHAR, A MEMOIR OF A CIA
00:02:14OFFICER IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE INCEPTION OF AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR.
00:02:18WELCOME, DUANE. THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO TALK TO US HERE AT THE SPY MUSEUM. THANK YOU FOR HAVING ME.
00:02:22SO WHEN ANYONE WRITES A MEMOIR, ESPECIALLY SOMEBODY WHO IS A
00:02:25FORMER PRACTITIONER, THE
00:02:26QUESTION TENDS TO BE WHY.
00:02:29AND EVEN MORE SO WITH THIS BOOK, BECAUSE THIS IS NOT JUST A MEMOIR OF YOUR LIFE.
00:02:33IT'S NOT YOU KNOW, WHEN I WAS BORN, IT'S REALLY A MEMOIR OF A
00:02:35VERY PARTICULAR TIME IN YOUR HISTORY.
00:02:38IT'S A SNAPSHOT OF A SPECIFIC PERIOD.
00:02:41SO WHY FOCUS SPECIFICALLY ON
00:02:43THIS TIME AND NOT, YOU KNOW,
00:02:47HERE IS A 400 PAGE BOOK ABOUT MY LIFE AND MY CHILDHOOD.
00:02:49YEAH, GOOD QUESTION.
00:02:51I, I FEEL FOR THE REASONS YOU
00:02:55STATED, THAT IT'S A SPECIAL TIME. IT WAS A VERY SPECIAL TIME FOR
00:02:59ME. IT WAS A VERY EMOTIONAL TIME.
00:03:01THE WHOLE CATALYST FOR MY
00:03:04INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WAS
00:03:06FOR THE 911 ATTACKS, WHICH TODAY, OF COURSE, IS THE
00:03:10ANNIVERSARY OF AND AND IT WAS
00:03:12SUCH A POWERFUL EXPERIENCE FOR ME THAT I KNEW I WANTED TO WRITE
00:03:16ABOUT IT, IF ONLY FOR MYSELF, IF ONLY FOR ME, MY FAMILY TO READ
00:03:18ABOUT IT. AND SO BUT AS YEARS PASSED, EVEN
00:03:22THOUGH I HAD WRITTEN AN INITIAL
00:03:26SPINE OF OF THE STORY JUST FOR
00:03:26MY OWN REMEMBRANCE AS THE YEARS
00:03:30PASS AND WE CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN AFGHANISTAN AND I
00:03:33REALIZE HOW IMPORTANT THIS STORY WAS TO ME.
00:03:36AND I BEGAN TO SEE IT AS AS FROM A HUMAN INTEREST STANDPOINT THAT IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO OTHER
00:03:41PEOPLE AS WELL AS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF IT BEING A
00:03:43HISTORICAL CALIBER OF A VERY SPECIAL TIME.
00:03:46THE WHOLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE CIA
00:03:49IN AFGHANISTAN IN THAT INITIAL PERIOD WAS KIND OF UNIQUE, AND
00:03:52IT WAS UNDER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
00:03:54AND FOR THOSE REASONS, I THOUGHT I SHOULD JUST I COULD WRITE SOME
00:03:58OF THAT, JUST FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON THAT AND NOT GO INTO ALL THE OTHER THINGS THAT YOU MENTIONED.
00:04:02WE HAVE A LOT OF AUTHORS WHO ARE FORMER PRACTITIONERS WHO COME TO THE MUSEUM OR THEY'RE ON THE
00:04:06PODCAST, AND MANY OF THEM HAVE NIGHTMARE STORIES ABOUT THE
00:04:11PUBLICATION REVIEW BOARD AT CIA. YOU ACTUALLY TALK ABOUT
00:04:15OPERATIONS HERE. YOU TALK ABOUT LET'S USE THE
00:04:17SOURCES AND METHODS IN CERTAIN
00:04:19CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN YOU HAD VERY LITTLE TROUBLE GETTING THIS THROUGH THE PRB.
00:04:23CAN YOU TALK ABOUT HOW THAT HAPPENED? IS THERE CERTAINLY OTHERS THAT
00:04:26MIGHT WANT TO KNOW HOW YOU WERE, HOW THE SUCCESSFUL PRB
00:04:31EXPERIENCE, BUT ALSO WAS IT
00:04:33PURPOSEFUL WHEN YOU WERE WRITING IT? WERE YOU TRYING TO FIGURE OUT
00:04:36WHAT COULD YOU SAY AND WHAT COULDN'T YOU? DEFINITELY, IT WAS PURPOSEFUL
00:04:41BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT TO RUN INTO A LOT OF PROBLEMS WITH THE
00:04:44PRB, AND I'VE SEEN OTHER BOOKS AND I HAD A GOOD SENSE OF WHAT
00:04:48THE PUBLICATIONS REVIEW BOARD IS LOOKING FOR IN TERMS OF WHAT
00:04:51THEY WOULD CENSOR OUT. AND THEY'RE LOOKING AT IT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CLASSIFIED
00:04:56INFORMATION, AND PARTICULARLY REGARDING PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS.
00:04:59SO I WROTE THE BOOK IN A WAY THAT I THINK I PROTECTED SOURCES
00:05:03AND METHODS AND IT WAS THE
00:05:05NATURE OF THE OPERATIONS WE WERE DOING IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE TIME.
00:05:09WEREN'T YOUR CLASSIC ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS? WE WEREN'T. YOU KNOW, THE BOOK ISN'T REALLY
00:05:13ABOUT RUNNING AGENTS, RUNNING ASSETS, RECEIVING INTELLIGENCE
00:05:18REPORTING, SOMETHING THAT WAS GOING ON, BUT THAT FOCUSED ON
00:05:21THAT BECAUSE THAT WASN'T THE
00:05:24MAIN THEME OF THE BOOK OR THE MAIN THING THAT WE WERE DOING, FOR THAT MATTER.
00:05:28SO BECAUSE IT WAS A IT WAS A PYRAMID MILITARY OPERATION FOR
00:05:31THE MOST PART, AND A LOT OF THIS BECAME PUBLIC ANYWAY.
00:05:34AND OVER THIS NOW 16 YEARS AFTER THE FACT.
00:05:37SO THERE'S BEEN SOME OTHER THINGS WRITTEN, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THAT DEALT WITH THE NORTH.
00:05:41MOST OF THE THINGS THAT WERE WRITTEN ABOUT AFGHANISTAN IN THOSE DAYS, WE DEALT WITH THE
00:05:45NORTH. AND SO THE SOUTH HADN'T BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT.
00:05:47AND BECAUSE SOME OF THESE THINGS HAD ALREADY BEEN APPROVED
00:05:51DEALING WITH THE NORTH, I USUALLY THE POLICY WITH PRB IS
00:05:54THAT IT'S BEEN APPROVED SOMETHING SIMILAR HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THEM.
00:05:58THEN IF YOU WRITE ABOUT IT, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY INITIALLY SAY YOU CAN'T DO IT, IF YOU CAN
00:06:02POINT TO AND SAY, BUT YOU ALLOWED THIS OTHER BOOK TO
00:06:05PUBLISH THIS AND IT WAS FINE, THEY WILL THEY WILL RECONSIDER
00:06:08AND ALLOW YOU TO TO PUBLISH THAT IN YOUR BOOK.
00:06:13WE BROUGHT UP 911. AND HOW COULD YOU NOT? I MEAN, THE ANNIVERSARY OF IT
00:06:16AND THERE'S VERY FEW YOUNG PEOPLE IN HERE, SO JUST ABOUT
00:06:19EVERYBODY PROBABLY REMEMBERS WHERE THEY WERE ON 911.
00:06:23YOU WERE A BLOCK FROM HERE. THAT'S CORRECT. ON 911, ACTUALLY, AT THE FBI
00:06:29HEADQUARTERS ALREADY KIND OF TALKING ABOUT SOME OF THE SAME
00:06:32CONCERNS THAT EVERYONE WOULD BE TALKING ABOUT A COUPLE HOURS LATER.
00:06:36YOU TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE THAT DAY. SURE.
00:06:38AND HOW YOU AND OTHERS KIND OF STARTED SEEING THE WRITING ON
00:06:41THE WALL LONG BEFORE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC DID.
00:06:44YEAH, WELL, ON 9/11, REALLY INTERESTING.
00:06:47LIKE I SAY, I WAS ONLY A BLOCK OR SO FROM HERE, A COUPLE BLOCKS FROM HERE.
00:06:51I WAS AT THE FBI HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, AND THERE'S A
00:06:54GENTLEMAN IN THE AUDIENCE HERE, A VERY DEAR FRIEND OF MINE, WHO HAPPENED TO BE WITH ME, WHO I
00:06:58TALK ABOUT IN THE BOOK. AND I DIDN'T KNOW HE WAS GOING
00:07:00TO BE HERE, BUT HE HAS SHOWED UP.
00:07:03BUT I'LL JUST CALL HIM FRANK. FRANK IS A FBI, WAS AN FBI
00:07:09SPECIAL AGENT, AND I WAS ON LEAVE ON THE DAY OF 911. IN 2001.
00:07:13AND I HAD JUST COME BACK OVERSEAS A FEW WEEKS BEFORE. AND I ACTUALLY HAD THE BENEFIT
00:07:17OF BEING ON A VERY EXTENDED LEAD BECAUSE I HAD A LOT OF CAME INTO THE CUMULATED LEAVE.
00:07:20SO I WAS LOOKING AT A LONG LEAD PERIOD.
00:07:23AND IN FACT, I WAS SUPPOSED TO GO TO WORK UNTIL LATE OCTOBER
00:07:27AND THAT WAS GOING TO BE AT THE FBI AS A CIA LIAISON OFFICER.
00:07:31AND FRANK, WHO HAD BEEN WORKING WITH ME OVERSEAS, HAD BROUGHT UP
00:07:33A FOREIGN DELEGATION TO VISIT
00:07:35THE FBI AND TO TAKE TO CIA
00:07:38HEADQUARTERS AS WELL FOR A BRIEFING ON THE THREAT OF
00:07:42INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. AND FRANK INVITED ME TO JOIN HIM
00:07:46AT FBI HEADQUARTERS TO SEE THIS GROUP, SOME OF WHOM I KNEW THIS
00:07:49AMERICAN DELEGATION, AND GET A TOUR OF THE BUILDING.
00:07:52AND I THOUGHT AS I WAS GOING TO BE A LIAISON OFFICER IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS, QUITE A GREAT
00:07:56OPPORTUNITY. PLUS, I WANTED TO SEE FRANK AND SEE HIM NOW AND IN A MONTH OR
00:07:59TWO SINCE I LEFT THE STATION WHERE WE'D WORK TOGETHER.
00:08:02SO FRANK AND I HAD GONE THROUGH A LOT TOGETHER ALREADY.
00:08:06WE RAN CT OPERATIONS, COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
00:08:09OVERSEAS, AND WE HAD OTHER OTHER VERY DRAMATIC EXPERIENCES THAT
00:08:13WE WENT THROUGH THAT ARE MENTIONED IN THE BOOK.
00:08:16WE HE MET ME OUTSIDE. I WAS SIPPING A CAPPUCCINO,
00:08:20ENJOYING THE WEATHER JUST LIKE TODAY. BEAUTIFUL DAY NOW, SEEING HOW
00:08:22GOOD LIFE WAS AND WAITING FOR FRANK TO SHOW UP WITH HIS
00:08:26DELEGATION. SO I MET HIM THERE.
00:08:29WE WENT UP TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE FBI HEADQUARTERS, UP INTO
00:08:32THEIR OPERATION CENTER, AND WE
00:08:33GOT THERE AROUND 9:00 AND THINGS
00:08:38WERE WE COULDN'T FIND THE PERSON WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET.
00:08:40AND SOON, SOON WE WERE ASKED TO
00:08:44ESCORT THE FOREIGN DELEGATION OUT OF THE OPERATIONS CENTER
00:08:46THAT THERE WAS A HAD BEEN AN INCIDENT IN NEW YORK, A PLANE
00:08:50HIT THE BUILDING. WE ASSUMED IT WAS SMALL PLANE. WE WENT DOWNSTAIRS AND AND WE
00:08:55WENT TO THE CAFETERIA TO FIGURE OUT WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO NOW THAT WE'RE NOT GOING TO HAVE
00:08:58THIS TOUR AND THIS THIS BRIEFING. AND THAT'S WHEN WE SAW THE NEWS
00:09:02REPORTS, ALL THE TELEVISION FOR THE FIRST TIME. WE SAW WHAT WAS REALLY GOING ON
00:09:05AND REALIZED RIGHT THEN, OKAY, THIS IS SOMETHING MAJOR, MUCH
00:09:08BIGGER THAN WHAT I THINK EITHER ONE OF US HAD HAD IMAGINED.
00:09:11AND IT WAS QUITE, QUITE A SHOCK AS IT WAS TO EVERYONE.
00:09:15AND I AND I KNEW AT THAT MOMENT WHEN THIS PARTICULAR WHEN THE
00:09:19SECOND PLANE HIT THE BUILDING, I KNEW THAT THIS WAS AL QAEDA.
00:09:23I INSTANTLY KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND WHO HAD DONE IT.
00:09:27AND I KNEW IT WOULD MEAN WE WERE GOING TO GO TO WAR AND WE WOULD BE IN A WAR SOON.
00:09:31AND AND I KNEW I HAD TO BE PART OF THAT BECAUSE YOU HAD BEEN
00:09:34FOCUSED ON COUNTERTERRORISM FOR YEARS.
00:09:36AT THIS POINT, YOU ANOTHER INTERESTING KIND OF YOU WERE
00:09:39THERE IN A WEIRD TIME STORY IN THE BOOK IS A MONTH BEFORE THE
00:09:43AFRICAN EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN 1998, YOU WERE ACTUALLY AT ONE OF THE AFRICAN EMBASSIES TALKING
00:09:48ABOUT HOW BAD THE SECURITY WAS. THAT'S CORRECT.
00:09:51I HAPPENED JUST BY CHANCE VISITING THAT ONE IN NAIROBI.
00:09:55ACTUALLY, I WAS IN NAIROBI,
00:09:57KENYA, AND TALKING TO AN EMBASSY
00:09:59AFTER THEIR ABOUT THEIR THEIR
00:10:01POOR SECURITY THAT THE PHYSICAL
00:10:04SECURITY OF THE EMBASSY. AND WE HAPPENED TO BE STANDING
00:10:08IN IN THE EXACT SPOT WHERE A
00:10:10TRUCK BOMB WOULD LATER A MONTH LATER WAS GOING TO DETONATE AND
00:10:13KILL A LOT OF PEOPLE. AND I EVEN I WAS OVERSEAS AT THE
00:10:17TIME WHEN THAT ATTACK HAPPENED.
00:10:19AND I WAS BACK AT THE POLICE STATION.
00:10:23I'D LEFT FROM WHEN I WENT OUT TO VISIT IN AFRICA. AND I SAW THE PAPER, THE
00:10:27NEWSPAPER THAT MORNING, AND I SAW THE GRAPH OF THE PICTURE OF
00:10:30WHERE THE BOMB HAD GONE OFF. AND I REALIZED INSTANTLY I KNEW
00:10:34EXACTLY WHERE THAT PLACE WAS. THAT WAS A PLACE I'D VISITED, AND THAT WAS A PLACE I AND OUR
00:10:38EMBASSY OFFICER HAD STOOD.
00:10:39SO, YEAH, I WAS FAMILIAR WITH TERRORISM FOR SOME TIME.
00:10:43THIS WITH THE EMBASSY OFFICER SAID TO YOU HE UNDERSTOOD THAT
00:10:46THERE WERE SECURITY ISSUES. OH, ABSOLUTELY. IT WASN'T A SURPRISE TO THEM. THEY KNEW ABOUT IT MORE THAN I
00:10:50DID, AND THEY HAD REQUESTS. THE AMBASSADOR THERE HAD MADE
00:10:54REQUESTS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO MOVE LOCATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME
00:10:58TIME BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF THIS OF THE
00:11:00EMBASSY AND THE OFFICER TOLD ME AT THAT MOMENT, HE SAID, YEAH,
00:11:04WE KNOW IT'S VULNERABLE, BUT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING.
00:11:07SO THE AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, THERE'S NOT GOING TO BE CHANGES DONE UNTIL THIS BUILDING COME
00:11:11DOWN AND A MONTH LATER IT WAS BLOWN DOWN.
00:11:14KNOW, YOU HAD MENTIONED THAT IMMEDIATELY BY WATCHING THE TV
00:11:18COVERAGE ABOUT 911, THAT YOU KNEW THAT WE WERE AT WAR.
00:11:21AND MOST PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT ESSENTIALLY THE CIA RAMPED UP
00:11:25ITS IMMEDIATELY FOR THE WHAT WOULD BE CALLED THE GLOBAL WAR
00:11:28ON TERROR FOR WHATEVER WORDS YOU WANT TO USE.
00:11:30AND CERTAINLY EVERYONE ATTEMPTED
00:11:33TO RAMP UP AS QUICKLY AS THEY COULD.
00:11:36BUT THERE'S BUREAUCRACY THAT STARTED GETTING IN THE WAY AND
00:11:40ONE OF THE BIGGEST ISSUES THAT YOU OUTLINE IN THE BOOK IS THAT
00:11:42THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN DIVISION OR THE ANY DIVISION
00:11:46WHICH WAS FOCUSED ON THAT AREA
00:11:48OF THE WORLD, HAD POTENTIAL
00:11:53RESPONSE ABILITY. NOW, VIEWS OF AFGHANISTAN, AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS A COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION.
00:11:57YOU HAD THE COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER AT CIA.
00:12:00HOW DID SOME OF THESE INTERSERVICE RIVALRIES BEGIN TO
00:12:03PLAY OUT IN AND CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE MISSION? MOVING FORWARD?
00:12:09WELL, BECAME A PROBLEM FOR ME IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE I WAS I WAS CAUGHT BETWEEN THE TWO.
00:12:13THOSE TWO DIVISIONS. I WAS ACTUALLY HOME BASE WITH ANY DIVISION IN THE EAST
00:12:18DIVISION, SOUTH ASIAN DIVISION. BUT I WAS ON A ROTATIONAL ASSIGNMENT TO THE
00:12:22COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER WHEN I WAS OVERSEAS AS CHIEF OF STATION.
00:12:24SO WHEN I RETURN AND WHEN 911 HAPPENED, I LITERALLY AS SOON AS
00:12:28THAT TRAFFIC CLEARED OUT OF MY WASHING, I GOT IN THE CAR, WENT
00:12:32TO HEADQUARTERS, TO THE CIA HEADQUARTERS TO TO SAY I'M
00:12:36COMING UP. LIAM, I'M HERE WHEN I WANT TO HELP. WHO'S GOING TO BE WHO'S WHO'S
00:12:39GOING TO BE RUNNING THE SHOW HERE IN TERMS OF THE RESPONSE? AND THEY DIDN'T KNOW.
00:12:44AND FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME, DAYS ANYWAY, WHILE THIS WAS KIND
00:12:48OF BEING DEBATED, WOULD IT BE COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, WHICH
00:12:51HAS THE THE MISSION OF OF COUNTERING TERRORISM OR ANY
00:12:55DIVISION WHICH HAD OWNED ON THE TERRITORY WHERE WE WOULD BE
00:12:59OPERATING AGAINST AL QAIDA AND THE TALIBAN?
00:13:02SO THERE WAS THERE WAS A I THAT THOSE DECISIONS WERE MADE AT A
00:13:05VERY HIGH LEVEL. I WAS SITTING IN A MEETING WHEN THOSE WERE MADE, AND BUT
00:13:09RELATIVELY QUICKLY THEY WERE MADE. BUT INITIALLY, NO ONE KNEW WHO
00:13:13WAS ACTUALLY GOING TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THE THE CIA RESPONSE TO
00:13:17911. AND SO IT TOOK A WHILE TO PLAY OUT.
00:13:19AND ULTIMATELY, THAT DECISION WAS MADE. WHAT COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER IS
00:13:23GOING TO BE TAKING THE LEAD ON THIS? AND ANY WOULD PLAY A VERY
00:13:25IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE. OF COURSE, YOU WERE THERE IN LIMBO TRYING TO VOLUNTEER, AND
00:13:29THEY COULDN'T EVEN FIND YOUR
00:13:32INFORMATION RIGHT, RIGHT, RIGHT. YOU KNOW, IT WAS LIKE YOU CAN'T
00:13:35VOLUNTEER BECAUSE YOU DON'T TECHNICALLY EXIST. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT YOUR FILE IS. YEAH, THEY COULDN'T.
00:13:38THE NEW OFFICE WITHIN COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, SPECIAL
00:13:44OPERATIONS THEY CALLED IT WAS WAS WANTED VOLUNTEERS, OF
00:13:48COURSE, THEY WERE GOING TO DO A SPECIAL VETTING OF THEM TO MAKE SURE THEY HAD THE PEOPLE THEY WANTED.
00:13:51AND SO I WENT IN AND I WAS LIKE, WHEN THE BRAVERY FIRST PEOPLE WERE ONLY HANDFUL OF PEOPLE
00:13:55THERE WHEN THEY FORMED UP AND THEY SAID, WELL, WE HAVE TO VET YOU.
00:13:58AND THEY SAID, FINE. AND BUT THEN THEY COULDN'T FIND MY FILE.
00:14:02THEY DIDN'T HAVE IT. ANY DIVISION DIDN'T HAVE IT. SO THEY CAN READ MY FILE. BUT IT TURNED OUT I KNEW THE I
00:14:06KNEW THE PERSON WHO WAS APPOINTED BE THE CHIEF OF THE
00:14:09SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER. AND WHEN HE CAME BACK, HE JUST
00:14:12HAD NOT WE CAN TAKE HIM. THEY DIDN'T BOTHER TO REVIEW MY FILE.
00:14:16SO LET'S TALK ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY THAT THAT'S KIND OF THE FOCUS HERE.
00:14:20THE CIA DIDN'T JUST FIGURE OUT
00:14:24AFGHANISTAN WAS THERE ON 911. THEY CERTAINLY KNEW ABOUT IT BACK IN THE 80S.
00:14:28BUT EVEN DURING THE 90S AND EARLY 2000S, THERE WERE SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING HAPPENING
00:14:31IN AFGHANISTAN.
00:14:34THERE WAS LIAISON BETWEEN CIA. ABSOLUTELY. AND THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE.
00:14:37THERE WAS CONSTANT ATTEMPT TO
00:14:40KEEP IN CONTACT. BUT RIGHT BEFORE 911, AND THIS
00:14:43IS ACTUALLY SOMETHING THAT MANY PEOPLE DON'T KNOW, THE HISTORY OF THE TOP PERSON OF THE
00:14:47NORTHERN ALLIANCE, THE PERSON THAT WE WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY REACHED OUT TO TO WORK WITH WAS
00:14:53ASSASSINATED BY AL QAEDA. YEAH. YEAH.
00:14:55MASOOD WAS THE LEADER OF THE OF
00:14:57THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND 3 OR 4
00:15:00DAYS NOW I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHEN, BUT HE WAS HE WAS
00:15:04ASSASSINATED BY A COUPLE OF PEOPLE POSING AS JOURNALISTS WHO WERE AL QAEDA AFFILIATED.
00:15:08AND THEY'VE BEEN WAITING FOR DAYS AND DAYS TO SEE HIM IN
00:15:11THEIR IN THEIR CAMP WITH AN ALLIANCE HEADQUARTERS AREA.
00:15:15AND FINALLY, THE LAST MINUTE HE SAID, YEAH, BRING HIM IN. I'LL I'LL SEE HIM.
00:15:18AND THEY THEY HAD EXPLOSIVES WITH HIM AND THEY THEY KILLED HIM.
00:15:21AND THE PROBLEM THAT IMMEDIATE
00:15:23IMMEDIATELY PRESENTED WAS HE WAS THIS VERY CHARISMATIC, VERY
00:15:27CAPABLE OF LEADER OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE.
00:15:30AND WHEN HE WAS KILLED AGAIN,
00:15:32JUST DAYS BEFORE 911 AND THEN 911 HAPPENED AND WE HAD THIS, AS
00:15:37YOU MENTIONED, THIS LIAISON GOING WITH WITH THE NORTHERN
00:15:39ALLIANCE, WHO WE THEN TURN TO TO TO JOIN FORCES WITH.
00:15:43BUT THEIR LEADER HAD JUST BEEN ASSASSINATED. AND I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS EVER
00:15:47PROVEN OR KNOWN IF IT WAS ACTUALLY DONE, THAT THAT ASSASSINATION WAS DONE AS A AS
00:15:51PART OF THE WHOLE PLOT FOR 911,
00:15:54THEM ANTICIPATING THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT WE DID, WHICH JOIN
00:15:58FORCES WITH THEM. I DON'T KNOW. I CAN'T SPEAK TO THAT. BUT THAT'S CERTAINLY A POSSIBILITY.
00:16:02I MEAN, THE TIMING IS SO COINCIDENTAL. IF NOT, I MEAN, THAT SEEMS
00:16:05EXTRAORDINARY THAT YEAH, IT SEEMS ALMOST HAS TO BE A FIRST SHOT.
00:16:10YEAH. BEFORE 911 FOR THAT. WELL, I THOUGHT I'LL GO BACK TO
00:16:14BUREAUCRACY BECAUSE OF THE KIND OF THE UNDERCURRENT HERE IS WE WANT TO GO WE WANT TO DO
00:16:18SOMETHING ABOUT IT. HE ALREADY TALKED ABOUT THE COUNTERTERRORISM SPECIAL
00:16:23OPERATIONS. THE PROBLEM THAT YOU LAY OUT WAS
00:16:26ONE THAT I THINK ALL OF US CAN APPRECIATE AND UNDERSTAND, EVEN
00:16:28IF WE HAVEN'T EXPERIENCED OURSELVES, IS THAT YOU HAVE A
00:16:31NEW UNIT STANDING UP, BUT NO ONE
00:16:34IN OTHER UNITS WANTS TO GIVE UP THEIR BEST PEOPLE. AND YOU WANT TO GO FIGHT THE WAR
00:16:38ON TERROR. YOU WANT THE BEST PEOPLE AROUND.
00:16:40BUT AS LEADERSHIP THROUGHOUT
00:16:42CIA, WHY WOULD YOU GIVE UP YOUR
00:16:45TOP YOUR TOP OPERATORS TO GO WITH SOME TO SOME NEW UNIT?
00:16:49YEAH, THAT WAS THAT. AND I SAY IN MY BOOK, IN FACT, I
00:16:51CALL THAT A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP, THAT WAR WE HAD SO
00:16:55MANY PEOPLE, SO MANY SENIOR
00:16:57OFFICERS WHO WHO BASICALLY WANTED TO CONTINUE AS IF NOTHING
00:17:00HAD HAPPENED IN TERMS OF THEIR MANAGEMENT OF PERSONNEL, THAT
00:17:04WHEN REQUESTS WERE MADE FOR THEIR OFFICERS TO COME JOIN OUR
00:17:08CASE. SO IT WAS WE HAD TO FIGHT TO GET THOSE OFFICERS BECAUSE THEIR
00:17:11EITHER THEIR CHIEFS OF STATION OR THEIR DIVISION CHIEFS DIDN'T
00:17:15WANT TO GIVE THEM UP. THEY JUST DIDN'T RECOGNIZE, IN MY VIEW, THEY DIDN'T RECOGNIZE
00:17:19THAT THE WORLD HAD CHANGED WITH 911, THAT THIS WAS NOT GOING TO BE THE STANDARD KIND OF THING
00:17:23THAT CIA DID FOR A WHILE. WE'RE GOING TO WE'RE GOING TO WE'RE GOING TO BE THINGS ARE
00:17:27GOING TO CHANGE HERE. AND WE NEEDED PEOPLE WITH PARTICULARLY PEOPLE WHO HAD
00:17:31PREVIOUS MILITARY SKILLS. PEOPLE HAD CERTAIN LANGUAGE
00:17:34SKILLS THAT WOULD BE APPROVED FOR, YOU KNOW, OPERATING IN
00:17:38AFGHANIS. DAN AND FRANKLY, THEY WEREN'T THAT MANY THAT HAD THOSE THOSE
00:17:42THE COMBINATION OF TALENT. SO WHEN WE FOUND ONE, WE REALLY
00:17:45WANTED THEM, WE REALLY NEEDED THEM, BUT YET WE OFTEN RAN INTO
00:17:48PROBLEMS WITH THEIR CHIEFS OR THE STATION CHIEFS, DIVISION
00:17:52CHIEFS NOT WANTING TO GIVE THEM UP. DID YOU SEE IT?
00:17:55DID YOU PERCEIVE IT AS A BELIEF
00:17:57THAT THIS WHOLE COUNTERTERROR ISM THING WAS A BIT OF A A BLIP
00:18:01IN THE MISSION AND THAT EVENTUALLY IT WOULD GO BACK TO BEING NORMAL?
00:18:04AND HOW THE PERCEPTION OF SOME
00:18:06OF THE LEADERSHIP TREATING YOU THIS WAY?
00:18:08I CERTAINLY DIDN'T SEE IT AS A BLIP. I MEAN, I KNEW THIS WAS MAJOR.
00:18:12THIS WAS A GAME CHANGER. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU DID SAY DID YOU PERCEIVE THAT THEY WERE
00:18:16THINKING THAT WAY AND THAT'S WHY THEY WERE UNWILLING TO GIVE UP? YEAH, I PERCEIVED EXACTLY THAT'S
00:18:20WHAT THEY WERE THINKING. I EVEN HEARD THEY HEARD COMMENTS TO THAT EFFECT. WELL, YOU KNOW.
00:18:25YEAH, THIS IS BAD, BUT IT'S GOING TO CHANGE AND THINGS WILL GET BACK TO NORMAL AND WE'RE
00:18:28STILL GOING TO HAVE OUR REGULAR MISSION. AND I HEARD THAT SORT OF TALK SO
00:18:32THAT THAT THAT THAT KIND OF PHILOSOPHY WAS THERE.
00:18:36AND I FOUND IT VERY DISAPPOINTING. NOT EVERYBODY IS THAT WAY TO WANT TO GIVE THE WRONG
00:18:39IMPRESSION HERE, BUT THERE WERE ENOUGH PEOPLE THAT FELT THAT WAY
00:18:42THAT DID MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO GET SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE TRYING TO GET.
00:18:46ULTIMATELY, I THINK WE GOT PRETTY MUCH EVERYBODY WON BECAUSE I THINK DIRECTOR TENET,
00:18:50ULTIMATELY WHEN HE GOT INVOLVED IN IT, HE WOULD SUPPORT WHAT
00:18:54WHAT THAT MISSION WAS AND CSOS REQUEST FOR THOSE PERSONNEL.
00:18:57HE WOULD LAY IN IT AND AND WE'D GET THE PEOPLE EVENTUALLY.
00:19:01SO YOU'D MENTIONED ALREADY THAT
00:19:03THE LOOKOUT WAS FOR PEOPLE WHO
00:19:05WERE CIA OFFICERS, BUT ALSO HAD MILITARY BACKGROUND, WHICH YOU FIT THAT ROLE.
00:19:09YOU HAD BEEN BOTH IN SPECIAL FORCES AND IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, BUT IT'S BEEN A
00:19:13WHILE AT THAT POINT. YEAH.
00:19:17DID YOU HAVE TO RETRAIN YOURSELF
00:19:19VERY, VERY QUICKLY AND THE STUFF THAT YOU LEARNED IN THE PAST?
00:19:22I KNOW THAT YOU YOU YOU GOT IT. YOU FLEW COMMERCIAL, WHICH I
00:19:25THOUGHT WAS INTERESTING AS WELL. YEAH. AND THERE'S A GREAT STORY OF YOU GOING THROUGH CHARLES DE GAULLE
00:19:29AIRPORT, WHICH YOU CAN TELL OR NOT. YOU CAN LEAVE IT FOR PEOPLE TO READ IN THE BOOK.
00:19:32IF YOU IF YOU DECIDE. BUT WHEN YOU HIT THE GROUND, YOU'RE WORKING WITH PEOPLE WHO
00:19:35ARE CURRENTLY IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS, WHETHER DELTA OR F
00:19:39OR SEALS AND THEN PEOPLE IT'S
00:19:41NOT USE THE WORD YOUNGER PEOPLE WHO HAD MORE RECENT MILITARY
00:19:47EXPERIENCE THAN YOU DID. HOW HIGH WAS THE LEARNING CURVE
00:19:49TO TRY TO COME BACK AND
00:19:51RELEARNED SOME OF THOSE SKILLS THAT YOU HAD BEFORE?
00:19:54WELL, I DIDN'T HAVE A LOT OF TIME TO RE LEARN ANYTHING OTHER
00:19:58THAN GOT RE QUALIFIED ON. ACTUALLY, I WAS PROBABLY I THINK
00:20:01I WAS ALREADY QUALIFIED FOR MY PREVIOUS TOURS, BUT I THINK I DID DO A RECALL FOR WEAPONS TRAINING.
00:20:06BUT THAT WASN'T A BIG ISSUE WHERE I WAS REALLY IN THE DARK.
00:20:10MOORE WAS WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT THAT THE MILITARY WAS USING, THAT
00:20:13KIND OF THING. AND SO BASICALLY, BECAUSE WE HAD
00:20:16OAKLEY AND THE TEAM THAT I LED, WE EVENTUALLY HAD A COUPLE OF
00:20:20SPECIAL OPERATORS FROM THE MILITARY THAT WERE DETAILED TO
00:20:24US THAT WERE PART OF THE TEAM AND THEN WE WERE WORKING JOINTLY WITH THE SPECIAL FORCES TEAM AND
00:20:28ODA. SO I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO RELEARN
00:20:32ALL THAT. I HAD TO RELY ON THE PEOPLE WHO KNEW THOSE SKILLS. THE PROBABLY THE BIGGER
00:20:36ADVANTAGE FOR ME HAVING PRIOR MILITARY EXPERIENCE WAS I
00:20:40UNDERSTOOD, I UNDERSTOOD THE ENVIRONMENT. YOU KNOW, BEING OUT IN THE FIELD
00:20:44THAT KIND OF LIVING, THAT THE TYPES OF THINGS WE WERE WERE
00:20:48HAVING TO CONTEND WITH. I WASN'T UNFAMILIAR. TO ME, IT'S BEEN A WHILE, BUT I
00:20:52FELT I FELT PRETTY MUCH AT HOME ACTUALLY. WELL, YOU MENTIONED THAT.
00:20:55SO SORRY TO INTERRUPT YOU. I THINK THAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY BECAUSE MOST PEOPLE WHO GET
00:20:59DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN THINK THEY'RE ON THE MOON BECAUSE IT'S
00:21:02SUCH A IT'S SUCH A FOREIGN ENVIRONMENT FOR MANY PEOPLE WHO
00:21:05GREW UP IN THE UNITED STATES. AND IT YOU KNOW, MOST A LOT OF
00:21:08PEOPLE ACTUALLY THOUGHT THEY WERE GOING TO THE DESERT, WHICH ONLY A SMALL LITTLE PORTION OF AFGHANISTAN.
00:21:13BUT YOU SAID IT WAS ALMOST LIKE BEING AT HOME BACK IN NEW
00:21:16MEXICO, LIKE ALPS, YOU KNOW, OUTGOING FISHING AND HUNTING,
00:21:18YOU KNOW, LIKE WHEN I WAS IT WAS I FELT I REALLY HAD TO I FELT SO
00:21:24COMFORTABLE IN THERE JUST BECAUSE OF THE NATURAL
00:21:25ENVIRONMENT IS SO FAMILIAR TO ME
00:21:28IN TERMS OF JUST WHAT I SAW AND FELT HOW THE AIR FILL, HOW THE
00:21:32LAND LOOKED IN A RIFLE WHEN I WAS A KID.
00:21:36I GREW UP. THAT'S ALL I DID WAS HUNT AND SO
00:21:39IT WAS VERY NATURAL FEELING. SO I DIDN'T FEEL LIKE I WAS IN
00:21:42AN ALIEN ENVIRONMENT AT ALL. IN FACT, I HAD TO KIND OF REMIND MYSELF, HEY, THIS IS A WAR ZONE.
00:21:46THIS ISN'T MEXICO. YOU'RE NOT OUT. HUNT QUAIL HERE.
00:21:51SO. WELL, LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR
00:21:53YOUR ARRIVAL THERE, BECAUSE YOU DIDN'T GO DIRECTLY TO
00:21:57AFGHANISTAN. YOU WENT TO PAKISTAN FIRST. AND THIS AGAIN, SHOWS ANOTHER
00:22:01LEVEL OF TENSION, A BUREAUCRATIC
00:22:02TENSION WITHIN THE CIA BECAUSE UP UNTIL 911 OR UP UNTIL RIGHT
00:22:06AFTER, WHEN YOU GUYS SHOWED UP TO START THE OPERATIONS THERE,
00:22:10AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN CONTROLLED
00:22:13BY THE STATION AND PAKISTAN AND
00:22:17THEY DIDN'T QUITE REALIZE MUCH AS THE WAY PEOPLE BACK IN HEADQUARTERS DIDN'T QUITE
00:22:20REALIZE THE WORLD HAD CHANGED AS DRAMATICALLY AS IT HAD. TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THAT
00:22:25TENSION BETWEEN NOT ONLY A TV STATION, BUT MORE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF. YEAH, WELL, I THINK I THINK THEY
00:22:29UNDERSTOOD THE THE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED.
00:22:33I THINK WHAT IT WHAT HAD CHANGED AND MAYBE THEY HADN'T REALLY
00:22:37REALIZED IT WAS ORGANIZED
00:22:39NATIONALLY WHEN CXO WAS FORMED
00:22:41UP THEN ALL OF A SUDDEN THEIR ROLE BECAME DIFFERENT FROM WHAT
00:22:44I HAD BEEN BECAUSE PREVIOUSLY IN AFGHANISTAN WE HADN'T HAD A
00:22:47STATION IN KABUL FOR YEARS. AND SO ISLAMABAD BEING THE
00:22:51CLOSEST TO KABUL, HAD TAKEN
00:22:55OVER. THEY WERE BASICALLY WHAT WE CALL STATION IN EXILE. AND SO FOR CIA OPERATION, I
00:23:00WON'T SAY THEY CONTROL AFGHANISTAN CAUSE I DON'T THINK YOU CAN USE THAT TERM WITH
00:23:02AFGHANISTAN, BUT EVEN TODAY. YEAH, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN
00:23:06RESPONSIBLE FOR RAIN, CIA OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN
00:23:12AFGHANISTAN UP UNTIL 911, WHEN CTC ALSO CAME ON AND CTC WAS
00:23:15GIVEN THE MISSION OF OF RUNNING
00:23:18AND MANAGING CIA'S RESPONSE TO
00:23:22911 INSIDE AFGHANISTAN.
00:23:25AND SO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PREVENTING THAT WAR FROM THE CIA STANDPOINT.
00:23:29AND THAT CAUSED A LOT OF FRICTION BECAUSE I THINK STATION
00:23:32STILL SAW ITSELF AS THE PREMIERE LEADER IN THAT REGARD.
00:23:36THEY WERE STILL VERY IMPORTANT AND DO NOT WANT TO IN ANY WAY
00:23:40UNDER UNDER UNDER ESTIMATE OR UNDER DESCRIBE WHAT THE ROLE WAS
00:23:44FOR FOR THE STATION. THEY PLAYED A HUGE, IMPORTANT ROLE.
00:23:48BUT THEY WERE NOT IN CHARGE ANY LONGER. SO WAS AND THAT SO THERE WAS
00:23:52FRICTION EVEN BEFORE I GOT OUT TO THE PAKISTAN. THERE HAVE BEEN PLENTY OF
00:23:56COMMUNICATIONS BACK AND FORTH AND THE FRICTION WAS EVIDENT IN
00:23:58THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SOME
00:24:00FORD STATION AND CXO THAT THAT
00:24:02THERE WAS A LOT OF FRICTION, DIFFERENT IDEAS ABOUT HOW WE
00:24:05SHOULD PROCEED IN THE WAR, THAT KIND OF THING. AND SO WHEN I WENT OUT THERE,
00:24:09ALONG WITH A COLLEAGUE OF MINE, WHEN WE ARRIVED OUT THERE, WE
00:24:13WERE PRETTY MUCH SEEN AS ALMOST THE ENEMY BY BY CERTAIN MEMBERS
00:24:17OF THE STATION. I MEAN, CENTRAL FIGURE IN
00:24:20AFGHANISTAN AT THE TIME WAS HAMID KARZAI.
00:24:23AND HIS TURN INTO A BIT OF A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE BECAUSE HIS
00:24:27RISE TO POWER WAS SEEN AS A HUGE
00:24:29WIN FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
00:24:32EVERYBODY AGAINST THE TALIBAN.
00:24:34BUT HIS ACTUAL REIGN IN CHARGE
00:24:38OF AFGHANISTAN WAS SEEN AS LESS SUCCESSFUL. BUT YOU KNEW KARZAI PRETTY WELL.
00:24:42YOU HAD A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP TO KARZAI THAN A LOT OF OTHER PEOPLE.
00:24:45IN JUST ABOUT ANYBODY YOU ENDED
00:24:48UP BEING ALMOST IN COULD KNOCK ON THE WALL AND TALK TO KARZAI.
00:24:52YOU WERE HIS ROOMMATE, BUT CLOSE ENOUGH.
00:24:54CAN YOU DESCRIBE A LITTLE BIT ABOUT WHO HE WAS AS A MAN?
00:24:58AND YOU DO DESCRIBE HIM IN THE BOOK. AND IT'S INTERESTING.
00:25:02HOW POSITIVE, ESPECIALLY SINCE A
00:25:06LOT OF THE NEGATIVITY ABOUT KARZAI HAS COME OUT SINCE. RIGHT.
00:25:10WELL, I GOT TO KNOW HIM. IT REALLY IT WAS A BRIEF PERIOD
00:25:13THAT I WAS ACTUALLY WITH HIM. BUT I WAS LIKE I SAY, LITERALLY
00:25:16RIGHT NEXT TO THE ROOM NEXT DOOR. AND I WAS KIND OF HIS GO TO GUY.
00:25:20SO I GOT TO SPEND A LOT OF TIME WITH HIM DURING THAT COMPACTED TIME FRAME.
00:25:24AND THERE ARE OTHER OTHER AGENCY OFFICERS AND OTHERS THROUGHOUT
00:25:27THE GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE GOTTEN TO KNOW HIM MUCH BETTER THAN I DID AT THE TIME.
00:25:30BUT I MEAN, AT THAT MOMENT IN TIME, I DID I DID GET TO KNOW HIM AND I SAW HIM AGAIN LATER
00:25:34ON. BUT HE I MEAN, I KNOW ABOUT THE
00:25:38NEGATIVE THINGS HAVE COME OUT ABOUT KARZAI SINCE.
00:25:40BUT IN MY BOOK, EVEN I WROTE THAT RETROSPECTIVELY.
00:25:44I DIDN'T WANT THAT TO IMPACT AT ALL HOW I FELT ABOUT HIM AT THE TIME. I WANTED TO PORTRAY HIM AS I AS
00:25:49I KNEW HIM THEN, AND I WAS EXTREMELY IMPRESSED WITH THE
00:25:52MAN, THE GUY WAS. I SAY THIS IN BOOK. I KNEW THAT I WAS IN THE
00:25:56PRESENCE OF A HISTORICAL FIGURE WHEN I WAS AROUND HIM.
00:25:59HE WAS EXTREMELY DEDICATED, TOTALLY FOCUSED ON ON FREEING
00:26:04AFGHANISTAN OF THE TALIBAN, JUST JUST A GENTLEMAN.
00:26:07AND NOT A VENAL BONE IN HIS BODY.
00:26:11HE WAS HE'S NO I MEAN, I CAN'T
00:26:14IMAGINE HIM BEING PERSONALLY CORRUPT, EXTREMELY BRAVE.
00:26:17THE MAN HAD ALREADY GONE INTO
00:26:19AFGHANISTAN BY HIMSELF JUST TO
00:26:22INITIALLY START THIS REBELLION AGAINST THE TALIBAN.
00:26:26SO I HAVE NOTHING BUT RESPECT
00:26:28FOR KARZAI AT THE TIME.
00:26:30AND GENUINE LIKED HIM. AND I THINK MOST PEOPLE I DON'T
00:26:34KNOW ANYONE WHO DIDN'T LIKE HIM,
00:26:36YOU KNOW, OVER TIME, YOU KNOW,
00:26:38HE IS AS THE YOU KNOW, THE
00:26:40PRESIDENT IN AFGHANISTAN, YOU
00:26:42KNOW, HE THERE'S BEEN DIFFERENT THINGS HAVE BEEN SAID ABOUT HIM.
00:26:45AND I WASN'T WORKING WITH HIM THEN. AND I I'VE GOT TO SAY, THOUGH,
00:26:49HE HAD A TOUGH ROW TO HOE WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT IT.
00:26:51I MEAN, HE'S TRYING TO BALANCE ALL THE ALL THE CONFLICTING
00:26:55INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND BE
00:26:57THE LEADER OF HIS OWN COUNTRY. SO SOMETIMES WHEN HE WOULD MAKE
00:27:00A DECISION THAT WE AS AMERICANS MIGHT NOT LIKE, I THINK WE WERE
00:27:05FAILING TO REALIZE, WAIT A MINUTE, HE'S IN CHARGE OF HIS OWN COUNTRY.
00:27:08HE'S ACTING, TRYING TO ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF HIS COUNTRY.
00:27:11SO HE'S TRYING TO BALANCE ALL THIS. SO I CAN'T IMAGINE HOW HE DID THE JOB. HE WAS IN IT FOR 12 YEARS.
00:27:15OH, AND RUNNING A COUNTRY THAT'S NEVER REALLY ABOUT OUR COUNTRY.
00:27:19EXACTLY. YEAH. KARZAI WENT IN WITH A TEAM
00:27:22CALLED ECHO TEAM, WHICH YOU WERE
00:27:24SUPPOSED TO BE ON, BUT YOU GOT BUMPED AT THE LAST MINUTE,
00:27:28LITERALLY ON THE LAST MINUTE BECAUSE OF SPACE.
00:27:30I MEAN, SOMETIMES, AGAIN,
00:27:32HISTORY HAPPENS BECAUSE A HELICOPTER OR A PLANE CAN'T HOLD
00:27:35ENOUGH PEOPLE. AND YOU AT THAT POINT END UP
00:27:39LEADING THE TEAM CALLED FOXTROT
00:27:41TO DRESS THE TITLE OF THE BOOK.
00:27:43AND SO KARZAI GOES IN WITH THAT
00:27:45GO TEAM YOU INSTEAD ARE MATCHED
00:27:49UP WITH ANOTHER AFGHAN WHO GETS THE NICKNAME, THE GOOD GUY.
00:27:52THE GOOD GUY MOVES ON.
00:27:54LET'S TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT
00:27:57HIM BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE HE COULD BE ANY MORE DIFFERENT THAN
00:28:01HAMID KARZAI. DEFINITELY A DIFFERENT PERSONALITY.
00:28:05CLEARLY A DIFFERENT MAN.
00:28:07BUT THIS IS A GUY CALLED GUL.
00:28:09OTHER SHARES I AND HE HAD BEEN
00:28:13THE GOVERNOR IN KANDAHAR UP UNTIL THE TALIBAN HAD TAKEN OVER.
00:28:17AND HE WAS, YOU KNOW, HAD TO FLEE KANDAHAR TO GOVERNORSHIP.
00:28:19AND HE'D BEEN LIVING IN EXILE IN PAKISTAN FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.
00:28:23AND THAT'S WHERE THE MONIKER TO
00:28:25EMERGE CAME FROM. PEOPLE THOUGHT, WELL, HE'S SAYING HE WANTS TO GO BACK AND
00:28:29FIGHT THE TALIBAN, BUT IS HE REALLY UP TO THE UP TO THE TASK
00:28:32TO DO THAT? AND HE HAD TO PROVE HIMSELF. THAT WAS KIND OF THE IDEA.
00:28:36AND HE HE DID. HE HAD GONE INTO COUNTRY AND SET
00:28:40UP A SET UP A BASE JUST INSIDE
00:28:42AFGHANISTAN AND HAD ARMED AN
00:28:46ARMED GROUP OF GUYS AND SOME
00:28:47EQUIPMENT AND BASICALLY WAS, YOU
00:28:51KNOW, SHOWED SOME CAPABILITIES AND A CAPACITY FOR FOR ENGAGING
00:28:53THE AL QAIDA AND THE TALIBAN AND
00:28:58THAT'S WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE KIND OF LATE. YOU KNOW, KARZAI TAKES OFF THE ECHO TEAM.
00:29:01THEY GO IN IN THE NEXT DAY.
00:29:04I'VE CALLED THAT GOES LONG BY SAID, HEY, WE'RE GOING TO DO THIS OTHER TEAM.
00:29:08AND THAT HAD BEEN TALKED ABOUT FOR SOME TIME. BUT JOINING UP WITH JERSEY AND
00:29:12THEN IT WAS LIKE YEAH WE WANT TO DO FOR THE TEAM AND YOU GOT FOUR DAYS TO DO IT RIGHT.
00:29:16YOU KNOW, WHAT WAS IT, THE ABBREVIATED DEPLOYMENT TIME ON? MY NEXT QUESTION WAS GOING TO BE
00:29:20ABOUT THE FOXTROT TEAM IS A SEVERE LIMITATIONS THAT YOU HAVE
00:29:24GOING IN. NOT ONLY DO YOU HAVE VERY LITTLE TIME TO PREPARE FOR THIS, BUT
00:29:28EVERYTHING FROM YOUR COMMUNICATIONS TO WEAPONS TO
00:29:31EVERYTHING ELSE IS VERY AD HOC. YEAH, VERY MUCH.
00:29:33SCRAP IT TOGETHER WHEN YOU CAN FIND IT. CORRECT KIND OF THINGS.
00:29:37KIND OF A LITTLE BIT. THE PROBLEMS YOU RAN INTO BECAUSE NOT ONLY IS AS I
00:29:41DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHIC ACTUALLY
00:29:44IN HAMID KARZAI THERE COULDN'T BE TWO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. I MEAN KARZAI IS A RELATIVELY
00:29:49SMALL OR SOMEWHAT YOU PROBABLY THINK OF HIM AS A MEEK IS THE
00:29:53WRONG WORD. I'M LOOKING FOR A BETTER WORD.
00:29:56THE HUMBLE FROM LEAST FROM. OKAY. AND THEN SURE, AS I IS LARGER
00:30:00THAN LIFE, FIGURATIVELY, I'M REALLY KIND OF GUY.
00:30:02AND HOW HOW HOW DIFFICULT WAS IT? NUMBER ONE TO GET FOXTROT TEAM
00:30:06PUT TOGETHER WITH ALL THE LIMITATIONS THAT YOU HAD?
00:30:08BUT NUMBER TWO, TO DEAL WITH THAT KIND OF A PERSONALITY THAT
00:30:12WAS SO DIFFERENT THAN HAMID KARZAI? YEAH, AND ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES, TOO, IS LANGUAGE.
00:30:16KARZAI, OF COURSE, SPEAKS BEAUTIFUL ENGLISH, PROBABLY BETTER THAN MINE.
00:30:19AND AND SHEARS. I SPOKE NO ENGLISH.
00:30:22WAS PASHTU AND WE HAD NO PASHTU
00:30:25SPEAKERS AMONGST US. SO WE HAD TO WE WE HAD TO USE A
00:30:30INTERPRETER. FIRST COUSIN, HIS GREAT GUY WHO I CALL KAHLIL IN THE BOOK TO BE.
00:30:34HE'S ALWAYS, IF I WANT TO TOUCH KARZAI, I MEAN, TO AS SURE AS I
00:30:37AM TALKING THROUGH KAHLIL TO TALK TO HIM. SO YOU GOT THAT DIFFERENCE THERE
00:30:42THAT MAKES IT A DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIP BECAUSE I CAN'T I DON'T I CAN'T SPEAK TO HIM IN MY
00:30:46OWN NATIVE LANGUAGE. THAT'S A BIG, IMPORTANT FACTOR.
00:30:49A LOT OF PEOPLE FORGET ABOUT THAT. THE LANGUAGE IS IS SOMETHING TO CONSIDER. YEAH.
00:30:53HIS PERSONALITY WAS WAS HE WAS
00:30:55MORE OF ABOUT PHYSICAL KIND OF GUY, A HANDS ON KIND OF GUY.
00:30:59WELL, KARZAI IS MORE OF AN INTELLECTUAL OR MORE
00:31:04SOPHISTICATED IN THE WAY HE THOUGHT ABOUT THINGS. AND AND HOW HE ACTED.
00:31:06BUT AS FAR AS COMING TOGETHER,
00:31:09THE TEAM, IT WAS IT WAS KIND OF DIFFICULT.
00:31:12BUT WHAT WE ENDED UP DOING, WE HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS GEAR.
00:31:15AND IT'S KIND OF INITIALLY THEY SAID, NO, YOU GOT NO COMMS GEAR.
00:31:19AND I'M LIKE, WELL, HOW AM I GOING TO HELP ANYBODY IF I CAN'T TALK TO ANYBODY?
00:31:22BUT WE MANAGED TO SCRAPE TOGETHER SOME COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.
00:31:26I HAD MY WEAPONS FROM HAVING
00:31:28GOTTEN IN FROM ECHO TEAM, BUT ONE OF THE GUYS THAT WAS COMING
00:31:32WITH ME, MARK, WHO WAS WHO WAS COMING OUT OF ISLAMABAD STATION,
00:31:35HE HADN'T HE HAD NO WEAPONS IN THE STATION THAT ISSUED ALL
00:31:38THEIR HANDGUNS OUT. SO HIS THOUGHT. BUT THEN WHEN WE FINALLY,
00:31:42THROUGH DIGGING THROUGH SHELLS AND CLIMBING UP ON THE RAFTERS,
00:31:45FOUND A HANDGUN FOR HIM, AT
00:31:47LEAST, AND AND SO HE HAD TO GET HE COULD GET HE CAN GET AN AK 47
00:31:51TILL HE GOT IN COUNTRY. AND GOT ONE FROM ONE TO SHEER SIZE GUYS.
00:31:55BUT SO JUST BASED ON BASIC STUFF AND CALM WILL BE A MOST
00:31:59IMPORTANT AND WELL, FOR MARK, PROBABLY THE WEAPON MY RIGHT. YEAH RIGHT.
00:32:02WE'RE SENDING YOU TO AFGHANISTAN WITH OTHER GUYS LIKE. YEAH.
00:32:06HE WASN'T TOO THRILLED ABOUT THAT BUT WE GOT THAT WORKED OUT
00:32:10AND THEN WE FORTUNATELY WE FOUND
00:32:13TO A SPECIAL MILITARY TASK FORCE
00:32:14THAT WAS THERE IN ISLAMABAD, TWO
00:32:18GUYS WHO WERE LIKE THE ADVANCE ELEMENT FOR WE GOT THEM WROTE
00:32:21ASSIGNED, DETAILED, WHICH WAS A
00:32:23MIRACLE, FRANKLY DETAILED TO IN
00:32:27BUREAUCRACY, DETAIL TO OUR TEAM. AND I SAY THAT BECAUSE THEY HAD
00:32:31WE HAD YET ACTUALLY HAVE YET SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD SIGNATURE FOR THOSE TWO GUYS TO
00:32:34COME IN WITH US INTO INTO AFGHANISTAN.
00:32:37BUT WE NEEDED THEM BECAUSE THEY HAD THE COMMS GEAR WE NEEDED, AT
00:32:41LEAST FOR PART OF THE COMMS GEAR. LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THAT RELATIONSHIP, BECAUSE THAT'S, I
00:32:44THINK, VERY INTERESTING TO ME ABOUT THE CIA AND SPECIAL
00:32:48OPERATIONS HAD BEEN WORKING A LITTLE BIT TOGETHER BEFORE 911.
00:32:52BUT 911 CHANGES EVERYTHING WHERE THAT LINE THAT USED TO BE PRETTY
00:32:55THICK, THE DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY, SPECIAL OPERATIONS
00:32:59AND CIA IS COMPLETELY GONE. AND REALLY, THIS IS THE
00:33:03BEGINNING OF THAT MELDING OF FORCES.
00:33:05SO HOW HOW WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND SPECIAL
00:33:09OPERATIONS AND DID THE SEPARATE COMMANDS, THE SEPARATE RULES OF
00:33:12ENGAGEMENT SEPARATE BUREAUCRACIES? DID THEY CAUSE HICCUPS ALONG THE WAY?
00:33:16WELL, YOU KNOW, IN THOSE INITIAL INITIAL MONTHS AND OR WEEKS OR
00:33:20MONTHS, I WOULD SAY IT WAS ALMOST SEAMLESS.
00:33:24HOW AND I THINK THE WHOLE REASON WAS ALMOST SEAMLESS WAS SIMPLY
00:33:26BECAUSE WE WERE ALL SO MOTIVATED, YOU KNOW, JUST LIKE BACK HERE AT HOME.
00:33:30THINK OF HOW THE PEOPLE CAME TOGETHER AFTER 911. SAME THING, BUT EVEN MORE SO
00:33:34WITH THE MILITARY AND CIA. AND IN AFGHANISTAN, WE KNEW WHAT
00:33:38OUR MISSION WAS SO PEOPLE DIDN'T YOU KNOW, THERE WAS REALLY NO
00:33:41FRICTION ON THE GROUND, ON THE GROUND LEVEL.
00:33:44I WAS WITH SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS, WITH MY TEAM.
00:33:46WE NEVER HAD ANY CONFLICT AT ALL AT ALL.
00:33:50AND THAT WAS BECAUSE WE WERE SO MISSION FOCUSED.
00:33:53BUT BUT IN THE IN THE AGENCY HAD IT YOU KNOW, WE HAVE A
00:33:57PARAMILITARY ARM AND ARE MOSTLY MADE UP OF ALMOST ENTIRELY MADE
00:34:00UP OF GUYS FROM FROM FROM THE MILITARY SERVICES MANY OF THEM
00:34:04FROM DIFFERENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY.
00:34:07SO THEY WERE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE MILITARY. THEY STILL HAVE FRIENDS IN THOSE
00:34:11ARMS AND THINGS LIKE THAT. AND SO OUR PARAMILITARY AND MOST
00:34:14OF THOSE TEAMS IN THE INITIAL IN
00:34:16THE INITIAL PART OF GOING IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WERE MADE UP OF OUR PARAMILITARY OFFICERS.
00:34:20SO THEY, YOU KNOW, THEY'RE LIKE VERY LIKE MINDED WITH THEIR
00:34:24MILITARY COLLEAGUES THAT THEY WERE WORKING WITH. THEY HAD THE SAME TRAINING, THE
00:34:27SAME EVERYTHING, THE DIFFERENCES THEY HAVE A LITTLE BIT OF A
00:34:30DIFFERENT MISSION AT THAT POINT. YOU KNOW, OUR OUR OUR MISSION IS
00:34:35INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE,
00:34:37PROVIDING SUPPORT, SUPPLIES. THEY HAVE A WE HAVE THEIR CAPABILITIES AS WELL.
00:34:42BUT IN THIS CASE, WORKING WITH THE SPECIAL FORCES GUYS, THEIR
00:34:45MISSION PRIMARILY WAS TO BRING IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, TO SUPPORT
00:34:49THE AFGHANS WHO WERE FIGHTING ON THE GROUND. SO BUT EVEN SO, WE ALL
00:34:53UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER'S ROLE. AND THAT'S CREDIT WAS CRITICAL. I THINK WE UNDERSTOOD EACH HAS A ROLE.
00:34:57SO THERE WASN'T FRICTION. YOU KNOW, THEY'RE NOT SAYING, OH, THEY'RE STEPPING ON OUR TOES
00:35:01OR WE'RE SAYING WE'RE STEPPING ON THEIR TOES. IT WE KNEW WHAT WE WERE SUPPOSED
00:35:03TO BE DOING WHILE THAT DIDN'T HAVE FRICTION, THAT MOVES
00:35:07SMOOTHLY. THERE WAS SOME FRICTION BETWEEN
00:35:10THE PEOPLE ON THE GROUND AND HEADQUARTERS. YEAH.
00:35:12BACK IN LANGLEY OR IN THE PENTAGON, IN SEVERAL TIMES.
00:35:16IN THE BOOK, YOU DISCUSS THE JUST THE PERCEPTION, THE
00:35:20DISCONNECT IN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PEOPLE BACK AT
00:35:23HEADQUARTERS AND PEOPLE IN THE FIELD. YOU'VE GOT THEY SAY THAT
00:35:26DIFFERENT WORLDS CAN USE THAT PHRASE IN THE BOOK.
00:35:29AND SO WHAT YOU TALK ABOUT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, THERE'S A THERE'S
00:35:33AN ANECDOTE IN THE BOOK ABOUT WHERE YOU'RE RECALLING IN TO DO
00:35:35A REPORT BACK TO HEADQUARTERS
00:35:38AND YOUR COLLEAGUE HAD BEEN CALLING AND VERY CLOSE, CLOSE
00:35:41AIR SUPPORT. AND THE PERSON ON THE OTHER END
00:35:45THAT YOU WERE TALKING TO DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS HAPPENING
00:35:49THAT YOU HAD DROPPED COFFEE VERSUS A BOMB. AND THEN THERE'S THE HORSE FEED
00:35:53STORY, WHICH I WANT YOU TO TELL. AND THE IDEA THAT WHEN SOMEONE
00:35:57AT CIA DIED, THEY USE THE WORD
00:36:01SHOT. YEAH. AND RESPONSE AND IT'S LIKE, HOW
00:36:03FAR AWAY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD ARE THEY WHEN THEY DON'T REALIZE THAT THIS IS A BATTLEFIELD? YEAH.
00:36:07THAT SOMEONE IS GOING TO PROBABLY DIE AND MORE PEOPLE
00:36:12PROBABLY WILL FALL IN THAT ALSO. YEAH, I THINK THAT'S KIND OF A NATURAL THING THAT HAPPENS
00:36:15BETWEEN ANY FIELD ELEMENT IN A HEADQUARTERS ON ELEMENT.
00:36:18THEY'RE IN DIFFERENT WORLDS AND SOMETIMES, YOU KNOW, THOSE TWO
00:36:21WORLDS NEVER DON'T GEL VERY WELL. BUT IN THE CASE OF THE CLOSE AIR
00:36:25SUPPORT INCIDENT YOU MENTIONED, AND THAT WAS AGAIN FOR A WHILE
00:36:28THE YEAR I HAD, EVEN THOUGH WE GOT THE MILITARY GUYS WITH US,
00:36:30IT WAS ONLY GOOD FOR A SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. I COULDN'T SEE ANY TEXT OR EVERY
00:36:34REPORT I SENT. I HAD TO DICTATE IT AND YOU
00:36:37KNOW, I'M GOING TO TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT, I'M GOING TO DICTATE EVERY REPORT WOULD NORMALLY YOU TYPE IT UP AND
00:36:41SHOOT IT THROUGH A SATELLITE. WELL, IN THIS CASE, I HAD TO DO SATELLITE COMMS, BUT DICTATE IT.
00:36:45AND THAT WAS A IT'S A MIDDLE OF NIGHT FOR ME IS LIKE, YOU KNOW, TWO IN THE MORNING FOR
00:36:50HEADQUARTERS. IT'S TWO IN THE AFTERNOON, ROUGHLY.
00:36:52AND SO, YOU KNOW, THEY'RE IN DIFFERENT WORLDS, LITERALLY IN THAT SENSE.
00:36:58AND IN THAT CASE, YOU KNOW, WE WERE CALLING I WASN'T.
00:37:01BUT AS A TEAM LEADER IN THAT MOMENT, WAS CALLING IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, SOME CONVOYS THAT WERE
00:37:04COMING ON US. AND ONE, I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT
00:37:08HIT, BUT IT WAS REALLY LOUD AND I WAS IN THE YOU KNOW, I JUMPED
00:37:11IT WAS SO LOUD. AND BUT THE LADY I WAS TALKING
00:37:15TO ON THE OTHER END, SHE SAID, WHAT WAS THAT?
00:37:18DID YOU DROP YOUR COFFEE CUP? ALL RIGHT.
00:37:21YOU KNOW, I DIDN'T I DIDN'T EVEN ANSWER. I DIDN'T REALLY FILTER WHAT HAPPENED.
00:37:25I JUST, YOU KNOW, CONTINUED ON. BUT THEN THE HORSE FEED.
00:37:28ANOTHER EXAMPLE, A LOT OF THE TEAMS WERE OPERATING IN THE NORTH AND THEY ACTUALLY DID USE
00:37:32HORSES UP THERE. AND I REALLY WAS MAD THAT I DIDN'T HAVE A TEAM THAT HAD
00:37:36HORSES BECAUSE I GREW UP WITH HORSES THAT WERE REALLY WHAT I FELT A LITTLE LESS THAN I WOULD.
00:37:40I REALLY FELT LIKE NEW MEXICO. BUT SO I WAS REALLY UPSET ABOUT THAT.
00:37:43NOT REALLY UPSET, BUT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN KIND OF COOL.
00:37:46BUT ANYWAY, WHAT WHAT HAPPENED, THOUGH, ONE DAY WHEN WE'D GET
00:37:49AIR SUPPLIES WOULD BE DROPPED BY A PARACHUTE TO US AND WE'D HAVE
00:37:52TO GO OUT IN INVENTORY OF WHAT
00:37:54THEY SENT US, WHAT THEY HAD DROPPED TO US AND REPORT BACK.
00:37:58AND, WELL, ONE DAY WHEN THEY WHEN IT'S ACTUALLY AT NIGHT,
00:38:01WHEN THEY DROP THEM, WE GOT OUR
00:38:04SUPPLIES WERE UNLOADED AND LO AND BEHOLD, THERE'S TWO BAGS OF
00:38:08HORSE FEED. AND, YOU KNOW, SO WE DO OUR
00:38:11REPORT AND I HAVE TO, YOU KNOW, I HAVE TO CHECK EVERYTHING FOR
00:38:15IT GOES OUT WAS GOING OUT BASICALLY UNDER MY SIGNATURE, SO TO SPEAK. AND, YOU KNOW, EVERYTHING WAS
00:38:18GOOD. YEAH, IT WAS GOOD. AND IT WAS JUST A ROUTINE REPORT
00:38:22ABOUT WHAT WE'D RECEIVED. SO I PROBABLY DIDN'T PAY A LOT ATTENTION TO WHAT IT SAID.
00:38:26ACTUALLY. AND SO BUT AFTER I SENT THE THE
00:38:30MESSAGE TO HEADQUARTERS AND I WAS LOOKING AT OUR LOG SHEET AND
00:38:33LOOKING AT THE DIFFERENT MESSAGE AND I WAS READING IT AND WHAT IT
00:38:36HAD SAID, WHAT SOMEONE IT WASN'T
00:38:39ME, ONE OF MY TEAMMATES, PROBABLY ONE OF THE PARAMILITARY GUYS THAT WAS WITH US, HAD PUT
00:38:43JUST TO MAKE SURE HACKERS UNDERSTOOD. WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY HORSES WHEN
00:38:47WE PUT TWO BAGS OF HORSE FEED, THEY PUT IN PARENTS, PARENTS, PARENTHESES.
00:38:51THEY SAID, WE DON'T HAVE ANY F IN HORSES.
00:38:55BUT THEY DIDN'T SAY, BUT THEY DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING.
00:38:58AND AND THAT WAS A BIG DEAL BECAUSE YOU'D NEVER, EVER USE
00:39:03PROFANITY IN THE OFFICIAL CIA COMMUNICATION. YOU JUST DON'T.
00:39:06AND HERE I AM. LOOK AT THIS CABLE THAT SUPPOSEDLY I SENT.
00:39:10YOU KNOW, I WROTE THAT AND I SENT IT OUT IN MY HEAD CAUSE I WAS LOOKING AT THIS.
00:39:14SO THERE'S GOING TO BE SOME HISTORIAN IN 80 YEARS TELLING THE STORY OF AFGHANISTAN GOING
00:39:17THROUGH THESE DOCUMENTS THAT'LL GIVE THEM A GOOD CHUCKLE.
00:39:21BUT WHAT'S AMAZING TO ME IS
00:39:23DESPITE ALL OF THIS, DESPITE THE
00:39:25THE BUREAUCRATIC SNAFU AND THE FACT THAT FOXTROT WAS THROWN
00:39:28TOGETHER AT THE LAST MINUTE, YOU ACTUALLY WERE THE FIRST GROUP
00:39:32INTO KANDAHAR. THAT WAS THE ULTIMATE TARGET OF
00:39:36SEVERAL OF THESE OPERATIONS. AND FOXTROT WAS THE FIRST TEAM
00:39:41IN. AND YOU HUNKER DOWN AT THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE AND YOU
00:39:44ACTUALLY WERE ABLE TO GO BACK
00:39:46AND LEAVE THE PARAMILITARY AREA ASIDE AND DO SOME HARDCORE
00:39:49INTELLIGENCE WORK. ONCE YOU GOT THERE, CAN YOU TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE TAKE FROM
00:39:52THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE IN KANDAHAR? YEAH. WELL, A COUPLE THINGS I WOULD
00:39:56LIKE TO SAY. YES. WE WERE THE FIRST TEAM IN VERY PROUD OF THAT.
00:40:00HOWEVER, ECHO TEAM CAME IN.
00:40:02BASICALLY HALF THE TEAM CAME IN THE NEXT DAY AND THE NEXT DAY AFTER THAT.
00:40:06AND THE REASON THEY WEREN'T, WE WERE IDEALLY WE WERE GOING TO HIT THE TARGET.
00:40:10KANDAHAR, AT THE SAME TIME. BUT THEY HAD JUST A FEW DAYS BEFORE HAD BEEN HIT BY AN ERRANT
00:40:14BOMB AND IT KILLED A NUMBER OF
00:40:16PEOPLE TO INCLUDE TWO OF THE STAFFERS THAT WERE WITH ECHO
00:40:20TEAM WORKING WITH US. WHEN I WAS THERE BEFORE I GOT SWITCHED OVER TO FOXTROT AND
00:40:24WOUNDED EVERYONE ELSE ON THE ON THE ORDER.
00:40:26SO THEY HAD BEEN DELAYED. THEY HAD, YOU KNOW, KARZAI
00:40:29HIMSELF WAS INJURED IN THAT BOMBING. SO THEY WERE DELAYED A BIT, BUT
00:40:33THEY CAME DOWN. THEY WERE THE NEXT DAY. BUT WE WERE GIVING YOU A CHANCE
00:40:37TO TAKE A VICTORY. I KNOW. I KNOW. I KNOW. AND ALSO, I WANT TO I GOT I GOT
00:40:41TO SAY ALSO, IT WASN'T IT WASN'T IT WASN'T THE CIA GUYS, FOXTROT.
00:40:44IT WAS ALSO THE SPECIAL FORCES. OH, YEAH. THEY ENTERED THE TOWN SAME TIME AS WE DID.
00:40:47SO IT WASN'T JUST US, YOU KNOW, THERE WERE OTHERS INVOLVED IN THAT.
00:40:50BUT ANYWAY, YOU MENTION NOW I FORGET YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE
00:40:55COMPOUND. WE WERE IN THE TANK. THEN YOU GOT A CHANCE TO DO SOME REAL HARDCORE. YEAH, YEAH.
00:40:58WE HAD WE ARE HEADQUARTERED ALREADY. PREPARE TO A LIST OF PLACES THEY
00:41:02WANT US TO RAID THERE IN KANDAHAR. THAT'S WHERE AL QAEDA HAD BEEN
00:41:05KIND OF HEADQUARTERED THERE. THAT WAS KIND OF A MAIN CENTER SANCTUARY FOR THEM.
00:41:09AND SO WE WERE HOPING WE WERE
00:41:12GOING TO MAYBE CAPTURE SOMEONE. WE ACTUALLY CAPTURED SOME AL
00:41:14QAEDA CAPTURED OR KILLED SOME AL QAEDA ON THE WAY TO KANDAHAR IN
00:41:18THE VILLAGE OF TALK TO PULL THAT WE HELD FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS WHEN
00:41:22WE WERE TRYING TO GET INTO
00:41:24KANDAHAR AND HAD THEM GET PAST THE AIRPORT THERE IN KANDAHAR. THAT WAS BEING HELD BY THE BAD
00:41:29GUYS. AND ONCE WE WERE ABLE TO GET MOVE PAST, WE GOT TO KANDAHAR
00:41:32AND WE STARTED GOING, YOU KNOW, GOING OUT TO THOSE TARGETS THAT
00:41:34WE HAD BUILDINGS AND HOUSES THAT HEADQUARTERS HAD SAID, GO TO GO
00:41:39RAID. AND WE'RE HOPING TO CAPTURE MORE GUYS. WE FIGURED THEY'RE PROBABLY GONE
00:41:43BY NOW OR AT LEAST GET SOME INTEL OUT OF IT.
00:41:46AND WE ACTUALLY DID GET SOME
00:41:50INTEL PART OF IT. NO QUESTION. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WE GOT
00:41:52OUT OF IT WAS A A BASICALLY A
00:41:56CASING REPORT, AN ATTACK PLAN TO ATTACK A US NAVAL SHIP.
00:42:00THE CARL VINSON IN SINGAPORE BY AN AL QAEDA AFFILIATED CELL IN
00:42:04SOUTHEAST ASIA. AND THEY, YOU KNOW, CASE REPORT
00:42:07PHOTOS, VIDEO DIAGRAM, EVERYTHING. AND THIS WAS GOING TO BE
00:42:11SOMETHING LIKE ON A SCALE THE COLE, WHICH HAVE THE CARL VINSON IS NOT THE COLE.
00:42:15THE CARL VINSON IS A MASSIVE. YEAH.
00:42:19NUCLEAR POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIER, RIGHT? YES.
00:42:21IT'S A DIFFERENT SHIP. THAT'S TRUE. BUT IT'S THAT'S SORT OF WHAT I'M SAYING. IT COULD HAVE BEEN CATASTROPHIC
00:42:27BEYOND THE LEVEL. I MEAN. YEAH. AND SO THAT REPORT GOT OUT, YOU
00:42:29KNOW, IMMEDIATELY, OF COURSE. AND IT TOOK A FEW WEEKS, BUT
00:42:33THEY BASICALLY ROUNDED UP EVERYBODY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
00:42:36THAT WHOLESALE WAS WRAPPED UP SO THAT, YOU KNOW, I FEEL LIKE THAT
00:42:39ABOVE PROBABLY ANY SINGLE THING WAS MADE.
00:42:42IT ALL WORTHWHILE FOR THEM TO
00:42:44FORM A FOXTROT TEAM TO SEND IT IN, BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW HOW
00:42:47MANY HOW MANY SAILORS WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED. THERE'S ALSO A LOT OF OTHER
00:42:50TARGETS THEY WERE LOOKING AT IN SINGAPORE, INTERNATIONAL TARGETS THAT THEY WERE GOING TO GO AFTER AS WELL.
00:42:54AND THEN PEOPLE MAY KNOW THE NAME JOSE PADILLA AS WELL. AND SOME OF THE INTELLIGENCE
00:42:58TAPE, ALTHOUGH YOU DIDN'T KNOW IT AT THE TIME. RIGHT. WHAT YOU GOT ACTUALLY HELPED TO
00:43:02LEAD? THAT IS CORRECT. YOU KNOW, AL QAEDA, BELIEVE OR
00:43:06NOT, THEY'RE VERY, VERY PURE
00:43:08CRADDOCK IN THEIR IN THEIR IN THEIR KEEP KEEPING NOTES AND
00:43:11THINGS LIKE THAT AND KEEP TRACK OF THINGS. AND THEY HAVE AN APPLICATION FORM ESSENTIALLY FOR PEOPLE WHO
00:43:15WANT TO APPLY TO BECOME AN AL QAEDA MEMBER. AND AND SO THEY HAD HE HAD
00:43:19APPLIED AND WE HAD WE WERE WE
00:43:21HAD BOXES OF STUFF THAT WE GOT IN THIS IN THE GOVERNOR'S
00:43:25COMPOUND, WHICH HAD BEEN HELD BY AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN BEFORE WE
00:43:28MOVED IN THERE. SO THERE WAS STILL STUFF THEY HADN'T GOTTEN RID OF.
00:43:32AND WE FOUND FOUND THAT AND WE DIDN'T KNOW IF THAT WAS IN THERE.
00:43:35BUT IT TURNED OUT THAT WAS HIS APPLICATION FORM, HAS FINGERPRINTS ON IT AND THAT WAS
00:43:38USED IN TRIAL THAT MARK WHO DID THE SORTING AND ALL THAT
00:43:42TESTIFIED IN HIS TRIAL IN IN
00:43:44DISGUISE, AN ALIAS AFTER THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THAT INFORMATION.
00:43:48THAT WAS PART OF THE THINGS THAT HE WAS CONVICTED ON. SO IF YOU'RE STARTING YOUR OWN
00:43:50TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND LEAVE THE BUREAUCRACY BEHIND, HAVE A
00:43:54SCREAMING LINE APPROACH TO YOUR APPLICATION PROCESS OF WE'VE
00:43:58TALKED A TON ABOUT BUREAUCRACY, BUT ONE OF THE TIMES, THE CIA
00:44:01AND EVERYBODY ELSE ACTUALLY GETS OUT OF YOUR WAY IS ARGUABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT.
00:44:05AND THAT'S WHEN YOU NOW HAVE TO
00:44:09AFGHAN LEADERS IN THE SAME CITY BROUGHT IN BY TWO DIFFERENT
00:44:12TEAMS AND HAMID KARZAI BY ECHO
00:44:15TEAM AND ENSURES I BY FOXTROT TEAM WHO ARE ESSENTIALLY RIVALS
00:44:19IN MANY WAYS AND THE RIFT WAS THIS WAS HAD TO BE INEVITABLE AT
00:44:23THAT POINT AND INSTEAD OF
00:44:27TELLING YOU WHAT TO DO FROM LANGLEY, YOU ACTUALLY WERE ASKED
00:44:29TO MEDIATE AND GIVEN POWER TO
00:44:33TRY TO CAUSE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. YEAH, EXACTLY. YEAH.
00:44:36THERE WAS THERE WAS ALWAYS SOME TENSION THERE BECAUSE THERE WERE
00:44:39THERE ARE OPPOSING, YOU KNOW, THEY WERE COMING AT THE SAME OBJECTIVE. KANDAHAR RIGHT.
00:44:43AND FOR SURE AS I FOR HIM IT WAS
00:44:45COMING BACK TO TAKE HIS GOVERNORSHIP. THAT'S WHAT HE WAS AFTER TO TAKE
00:44:49HIS GOVERNORSHIP BACK. KARZAI OF COURSE, WE WERE
00:44:53LOOKING EVEN THEN, WE WERE HOPING THAT HE WOULD COME OUT ON TOP OF EVERYTHING AND AND BE THE
00:44:57FUTURE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN.
00:45:00BUT SO THERE'S AND HERE'S I KNOWS THIS AS WELL.
00:45:04SO THERE'S THERE'S SOME FRICTION THERE ON ON THEIR DIFFERENT
00:45:08ROLES AND ALL THAT AND EVEN
00:45:12THOUGH THEY ACTUALLY HAVE A RELATE THEY HAVE A VERY FAMILIAR
00:45:15RELATIONSHIP. I THINK THEIR SECOND COUSINS ARE MAYBE FIRST COUSINS IF THEY ARE RELATED.
00:45:19BUT SO WHAT HAPPENED WAS WHEN
00:45:21WHEN WE FINALLY TOOK KANDAHAR,
00:45:23THEN KARZAI KIND OF ASSUMED
00:45:26PRIMACY BEFORE HE'D BEEN NOMINATED, BEFORE HE BECAME THE ACTUAL LEADER OF AFGHANS, HE
00:45:30KIND OF TOOK CHARGE IN A WAY, IN
00:45:32A SENSE, AND HE WAS WILLING TO
00:45:35HE WANTED THE FORMER GOVERNOR OF
00:45:38TALIBAN, GOVERNOR OF KANDAHAR,
00:45:40THEN HE WANTED HIM TO BECOME
00:45:42LIKE A KIND OF A SECURITY CHIEF
00:45:44OF KANDAHAR PROVINCE TO HELP TO HELP.
00:45:47HE FELT THAT THAT GUY WOULD HELP BREACH AND BRING IN TALIBAN
00:45:51ELEMENTS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND THIS KIND OF THING. SO HE HAD A REASON FOR WANTING TO DO THIS.
00:45:55BUT SURE AS I HATED THIS GUY, THERE WAS NO WAY.
00:45:59AND ALSO WE HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT THAT HE WAS HELPING HIM OR
00:46:01HE WAS HELPING THE AL QAEDA GUYS WHO WERE STILL IN HIDING GET OUT
00:46:04OF COUNTRY AND GET OUT OF KANDAHAR.
00:46:07SO SHIRZAD WAS LIKE, NO WAY IS HE GOING TO BECOME THE
00:46:09PROVINCIAL SECURITY CHIEF? YOU KNOW, NOT GOING TO HAPPEN. AND SO THERE WAS THIS REAL
00:46:13FRICTION AND THIS WAS SO IMPORTANT THAT THEY STAY UNITED BECAUSE THESE ARE BOTH AND ARE
00:46:18PASHTUNS. TALIBAN IS MADE UP OF PASHTUNS
00:46:21AND THESE ARE AN ANTI-TALIBAN PASHTUNS.
00:46:24SO WE COULD NOT AFFORD FOR THEM TO BE A SPLIT BETWEEN THEM.
00:46:27SOMETHING LIKE 40% OF THE POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND PASHTUN AS WELL.
00:46:31SO CORRECT THERE, THAT COULD BREAK BASICALLY THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.
00:46:35ABSOLUTELY. ABSOLUTELY.
00:46:38SO WE HAD TO KIND OF LAY THE LAW DOWN, SO TO SPEAK.
00:46:41AND GREG, THE ECHO TEAM LEADER
00:46:43WHO WAS VERY CLOSE TO KARZAI AT
00:46:45THAT POINT, ESPECIALLY AFTER ALL
00:46:47THEY HAD BEEN THROUGH IN MYSELF,
00:46:50WAS SURE I AS WELL. I BROUGHT MARK ALONG BECAUSE
00:46:53MARK WAS FROM ISLAMABAD STATION AND HE HE KNEW SHIRZAD AS WELL.
00:46:55AND I WANTED HIM TO BE THERE. SO WE GO TO THIS MEETING BETWEEN
00:46:59THE TWO TO KIND OF SORT THINGS OUT.
00:47:02AND BASICALLY WE WERE JUST TOLD, HEY GUYS, YOU KNOW, YOU GET YOU
00:47:05GOT COME TO AN AGREEMENT HERE, YOU CAN'T THIS IS FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY.
00:47:08YOU'VE GOT TO GET THIS THING RESOLVED.
00:47:10AND AND TO HIS TO HIS CREDIT, KARZAI SAID, WELL, LET ME DO MY
00:47:14OWN CHECKING INTO THIS,
00:47:16REPORTING ABOUT ABOUT THE GUY
00:47:18HELPING THE THE GUY WANTED TO
00:47:21APPOINT AS THE CHIEF OF SECURITY, HELPING AL QAEDA GET OUT OF KANDAHAR.
00:47:25AND HE USED HIS OWN SOURCES AND HE WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM WHAT WE WERE TELLING THEM.
00:47:29AND AT THAT POINT, HE SAID, THAT'S FINE, WE'RE NOT GOING TO
00:47:32APPOINT HIM TO THE CHIEF OF SECURITY. AND AT THAT POINT, SHURAS, I WAS
00:47:35HAPPY AND IT WAS ALL RESOLVED
00:47:38UNTIL TEN MINUTES LATER WHEN I WENT TO AFGHANISTAN. YEAH.
00:47:42SO LET ME BEFORE WE JUMP OUT TO QUESTIONS, WHICH WE ARE SO I
00:47:46STARTED THINKING ABOUT THAT. NOW IT'S BEEN 16 YEARS AND WE'RE
00:47:51STILL THERE. IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE IT'S
00:47:52GETTING OUT SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER.
00:47:55BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES, CAN WE HAVE PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN
00:47:59WITHOUT INCLUDING THE TALIBAN, WHETHER IT'S A BIG T TALIBAN OR A LITTLE T TALIBAN OR WHATEVER
00:48:03WE WANT TO DEFINE THIS.
00:48:06AND IS THERE A MILITARY SOLUTION THAT WE HAVEN'T SOMEHOW BEEN
00:48:09ABLE TO FIND IN THE LAST 16 YEARS?
00:48:12WHAT IS YOUR PROGNOSIS FOR AFGHANISTAN MOVING FORWARD?
00:48:16WELL, I FIRST DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS A MILITARY SOLUTION THERE.
00:48:19I DON'T I DON'T THINK UNLESS WE WANT IT TO JUST COMPLETELY TURN
00:48:23INTO A MUCH LARGER THAN WHAT WE
00:48:26DID BEFORE, WITH 100 TO 100,000 TROOPS.
00:48:29AND I DON'T THINK ANYONE'S READY TO DO THAT WANTS TO DO THAT OR THAT WE SHOULD DO THAT.
00:48:33SO I DO NOT THINK THERE IS A MILITARY SOLUTION TO TO THE
00:48:37PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN. I WAS VERY HOPEFUL RIGHT AFTER
00:48:42DECEMBER 2001, WE HAD HAD THIS PRETTY GOOD SUCCESS THERE.
00:48:45THE TALIBAN WAS OUT OF OFFICE. THEY WERE ON THEIR HEELS.
00:48:48I THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE A
00:48:50CHANCE TO GET THE COUNTRY UP AND
00:48:53RUNNING AND UNIFIED AND HAVE A KIND OF STABLE COUNTRY.
00:48:57BUT I'M NOT NEARLY AS HOPEFUL ANY LONGER.
00:49:01AND, YOU KNOW, YOU'VE GOT TO LOOK AT THE THE HISTORY BEHIND
00:49:04THE COUNTRY AND THIS IS NOTHING WHAT'S GOING ON NOW IS NOTHING
00:49:08NEW. IT'S BEEN GOING ON LONG, LONG TIME.
00:49:10AND LIKE I THINK IT'S EINSTEIN WHO SAID, YOU KNOW, DOING THE
00:49:14SAME THING OVER AND OVER AGAIN,
00:49:16EXPECTING A DIFFERENT RESULT IS
00:49:18A DEFINITION OF INSANITY. AND I THINK WE GOT A LITTLE BIT
00:49:22OF THAT GOING ON IN AFGHANISTAN. WE WERE HOPEFUL WE HAD GOOD
00:49:25INTENTIONS, BUT IT'S A TOUGH COUNTRY. IT'S A IT'S A IS A PRIMITIVE
00:49:31COUNTRY. IT'S A IT'S A GEOGRAPHIC,
00:49:33THICKLY ISOLATED COUNTRY IN
00:49:37ETHNICALLY DIVIDED. IT HAS SO MANY INTERNAL TYPE
00:49:41DIVISIONS. IT MANAGES WHEN IT'S NOT, THEN HAVE FOREIGN FORCES IN THERE
00:49:46SEEMS TO GET ALONG OKAY. IT SEEMS TO MANAGE ITSELF PRETTY PRETTY WELL.
00:49:49HAS A HISTORIC PLEA AND IT COMES TOGETHER TYPICALLY WHEN THERE'S
00:49:52A LIKE A FOREIGN INVASION, LIKE WITH THE RUSSIANS OR THE
00:49:55PERSIANS OR THE MONGOLS OR THE BRITISH OR THE BRITISH.
00:49:59YEAH. THEY END UP TURNING AGAINST YOU KNOW, THEY HAVEN'T, AS A NATION, DONE THAT TO US, TO THE UNITED
00:50:03STATES YET. AND I THINK THAT'S PARTLY BECAUSE WE'VE GONE ABOUT THIS A
00:50:06LITTLE BIT SMARTER. BUT I THINK AS IT GOES, THE LONGER IT GOES, A GREATER RISK
00:50:10WE RUN OF THAT HAPPENING. SO I DON'T THINK THERE'S A MILITARY SOLUTION.
00:50:14I SAY IN MY BOOK AT THE END, YOU KNOW, THE REALLY THE ONLY
00:50:16SOLUTION IS A NEGOTIATED PEACE.
00:50:20BUT UNFORTUNATELY, I DON'T THINK
00:50:22THE TALIBAN ARE RIGHT NOW OR ANY POSITION THEY'RE GOING TO WANT TO NEGOTIATE.
00:50:26BUT I DO THINK WE NEED TO BE THINKING ABOUT LEAVING
00:50:28AFGHANISTAN, NOT GETTING UP IN
00:50:30HIGHTAILING OUT IMMEDIATELY.
00:50:33BUT WE NEED TO GIVE UP ON THE IDEA THAT WE ARE GOING TO BUILD
00:50:36THIS NATION INTO A STABLE COUNTRY.
00:50:39WAS IT WINNABLE IN DECEMBER OF OH ONE AND 2002?
00:50:43I THINK, YOU KNOW, I REALLY
00:50:45THINK WHERE WE GOT OFF TRACK, I THINK OUR BEST HOPE, ACTUALLY,
00:50:49OF MAKING IT FROM THE NATION
00:50:51BUILDING STANDPOINT, STABILITY, POLITICAL STABILITY AND ALL THAT
00:50:55WAS REALLY THOSE FIRST COUPLE OF YEARS. BUT UNFORTUNATELY, I THINK THE
00:50:58US SCREWED UP WHEN WE INVADED
00:51:01IRAQ AT THAT POINT. AND I CAN SPEAK TO THIS BECAUSE
00:51:05I WAS I WAS IN A JOB AT HEADQUARTERS IN DEALING WITH
00:51:09AFGHANISTAN AND ALL THE FOCUS OF
00:51:11THE GOVERNMENT BASICALLY REALLY WENT TO IRAQ AND WE WENT INTO A
00:51:16WHOLE, WHOLE POSITION IN IN AFGHANISTAN IN TERMS OF THE
00:51:20RESOURCES AND ALL THAT. WE WERE STILL TRYING TO DO STUFF. BUT IF WE HAD NOT INVADED IRAQ,
00:51:24IF WE'D BEEN ABLE TO KEEP FOCUSED ON ON AFGHANISTAN,
00:51:27ESPECIALLY AFTER THE INITIAL SUCCESS WE HAD IN 2001, I THINK
00:51:31THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN OUR BEST OPPORTUNITY TO BE ABLE TO STABILIZE THE PLACE AND BE GONE.
00:51:36ARE MOSTLY GONE AND UNFORTUNATELY, THAT OPPORTUNITY
00:51:39HAS COME AND GONE AND I DON'T THINK WE'RE GOING TO GET IT BACK.
00:51:42SO WE'RE GOING TO OPEN IT UP TO QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE.
00:51:44IF YOU WILL WAIT TO ASK A QUESTION AND TOLD EITHER SEAN OR
00:51:48AMANDA LOVE A MICROPHONE. BUT IF YOU HAVE A QUESTION, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND RIGHT
00:51:51DOWN HERE. JOHN IS COMING BEHIND YOU AT THE
00:51:55MIC. THANK YOU. COULD YOU TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED
00:51:58TRIBAL AREAS AND WHEN THAT
00:52:00BECAME AN ISSUE OF COMPLICATION
00:52:02ON HOW TO GET CONTROL OVER THAT
00:52:04AREA AND HOW IT BECAME AN ESCAPE POINT FOR FOLKS TO GET INTO.
00:52:08WELL, THAT AREA OF COURSE, IS
00:52:12REFERRED TO THAT LIKE A NO MAN'S LAND. AND IT'S THE PAKISTANI
00:52:15GOVERNMENT HAS, YOU KNOW, KIND OF IS AN AUTONOMOUS REGION.
00:52:19THEY PRETTY MUCH KEPT THEIR FORCES OUT OF THAT. BUT WHAT HAPPENED IS BECAUSE
00:52:23EVERYTHING YOU KNOW, I'M NOT I'M NOT A HISTORIAN. I WANT TO PRETEND I'M A HISTORIAN HERE.
00:52:26BUT BUT WHERE IT BECAME A REAL ISSUE WAS WITH WITH WITH THE
00:52:31TALIBAN, AL QAEDA, SOME OF THE CHECHENS THAT WERE COMING INTO THE AREA AND THAT THEY COULD GO
00:52:35INTO THOSE THOSE TRIBAL AREAS, LEAVE AFGHANISTAN AND GO INTO
00:52:37THOSE TRIBAL AREAS AND THEY WERE
00:52:41PRETTY MUCH NOT GOING TO BE, YOU
00:52:43KNOW, ATTACKED AT THAT POINT OR EARLY ON.
00:52:46THAT CHANGE. PAKISTANIS ACTUALLY STARTED DOING SOME, YOU KNOW, AGGRESSIVE
00:52:50MILITARY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS INTO THE TRIBAL AREAS.
00:52:53BUT, YOU KNOW, THOSE ARE VERY REMOTE AREAS. IT'S, YOU KNOW, PASHTUNS.
00:52:57YOU KNOW, A LOT OF PEOPLE THINK WE OUGHT TO JUST RAISE THAT
00:53:01BORDER AND KIND OF MAKE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE BORDER, JUST CALL IT POSTURING LAND.
00:53:04AND BECAUSE THE PASHTUNS THAT LIVE THERE, LIKE THEIR BROTHER, THEY DON'T REALLY RESPECT THAT
00:53:08BORDER BECAUSE FOR THEM, IT'S A VERY ARTIFICIAL THING.
00:53:11SO I REALLY CAN'T SPEAK TO IT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT BECAUSE
00:53:14IT WAS KIND OF A NO MAN'S LAND IN A WAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
00:53:18PAKISTAN DID NOT TRY TO INTERVENE MILITARILY THERE UNTIL
00:53:22THINGS GOT REALLY BAD. AND AND THEY DID START
00:53:26INTERVENING THERE WHEN, AGAIN, A LOT OF THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS WERE COMING IN THERE. AND THEN ALSO SOME OF THIS BLED
00:53:29OVER INTO PAKISTAN, JUST WASN'T JUST AFFECTING AFGHANISTAN, BUT
00:53:32THIS WHOLE THE WHOLE PAKISTAN ISSUE IS WHAT REALLY IS ONE OF
00:53:36THE OTHER MAJOR COMPLICATIONS TO TO THAT WHOLE SITUATION IN
00:53:41AFGHANISTAN. BECAUSE BECAUSE THE BORDERS ARE PRETTY POROUS, BECAUSE OF THE
00:53:45PACTS THERE. WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS THEIR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THAT IN
00:53:51AFGHANISTAN JUST REALLY COMPLICATES THE WHOLE IDEA OF TRYING TO COME UP WITH SOME KIND
00:53:54OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION. AND I THINK A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE
00:53:58FOCUSED ON, YOU KNOW, THEY KNOW THE STORY OF THE KURDS AND THE FACT THAT THE KURDS ARE LIKE
00:54:02FOUR DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, PASHTUN AND SAME BASIC I MEAN,
00:54:05YEAH, I THINK WITH THE HISTORICALLY WITH THE BREAKUP
00:54:08OF, YOU KNOW, THE THE BRITISH
00:54:11EMPIRE IN SOUTH ASIA, THERE WAS THIS ATTEMPT TO CREATE, I GUESS,
00:54:15A PASHTUNISTAN THAT WOULD BE
00:54:17BOTH IN PAKISTAN AND IN AFGHANISTAN, BECAUSE THEY JUST
00:54:20THEY SEE THEMSELVES AS TRIBE,
00:54:23TRIBE BEFORE COUNTRY, RIGHT? ABSOLUTELY. ABSOLUTELY.
00:54:26DO. YES.
00:54:29SHE'S COMING RIGHT BEHIND YOU.
00:54:33SO IT SO IT'S IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PRESENT
00:54:36ADMINISTRATION SOMEHOW THINKS THAT THE STRATEGIC INTEREST OF
00:54:39THE PAKISTANIS CAN BE ALIGNED
00:54:41WITH OUR INTERESTS AND I'M JUST
00:54:43CURIOUS ABOUT YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THAT.
00:54:46YOU THINK THAT'S CORRECT, THAT COULD ACTUALLY OCCUR. AND AND I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT
00:54:50ARE THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE PAKISTANI IS. AND AS IT RELATES TO AFGHANISTAN?
00:54:54WELL, THEY'RE PROBABLY THEIR
00:54:55BIGGEST CONCERN FROM A FOREIGN
00:54:59NATIONAL SECURITY STANDPOINT IS INDIA.
00:55:01INDIA IS, IN FACT, THEIR NUMBER ONE SECURITY CONCERN.
00:55:05AND AND AFGHAN AUSTIN IS SEEN AS
00:55:09A A BUFFER STATE, IF YOU WILL. AND THEY DON'T WANT THE INDIANS
00:55:12HAVING A LOT OF INFLUENCE IN IN AFGHANISTAN. AND THAT'S WHY, YOU KNOW,
00:55:17PRESIDENT TRUMP THE OTHER DAY MENTIONED IN A SPEECH THE IDEA
00:55:20FIRST KIND OF CHASTISING THE PAKISTANIS AND THEN THEN THEN
00:55:24SAYING WELCOMING THE IDEA OF INDIANS INVESTING MORE IN IN
00:55:28AFGHANISTAN HAD TO GET THE PAKISTANIS ATTENTION.
00:55:30BUT THAT'S THEIR THEIR STRATEGIC
00:55:32STRATEGIC INTEREST IS MINIMIZING
00:55:35THE INFLUENCE OF INDIA IN THAT
00:55:37REGION AND SPECIFICALLY IN IN AFGHANISTAN.
00:55:39BUT AL-AZHAR IS ALIGNING. I MEAN, THERE ARE SOME PLACES
00:55:43WHERE OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS ARE ALIGN WITH WITH PAKISTAN.
00:55:47WE WANT PAKISTAN TO BE A STABLE COUNTRY AND THE US ARM THE
00:55:50NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE DON'T WANT TERRORISTS RUNNING
00:55:54AROUND THEIR COUNTRY THAT MAYBE GET THEIR HANDS ON THOSE WEAPONS. SO AND I DON'T THINK THE
00:55:58GOVERNMENT WANTS THAT EITHER. SO THAT'S ONE AREA THAT WE CAN
00:56:02YOU KNOW, ALL AGREE ON.
00:56:03WE'RE JUST KIND OF DICEY IS IS
00:56:06JUST FOR HISTORICAL REASONS. AND THE GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
00:56:09IN THE EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WE WERE WORKING WITH THEM
00:56:12ON BACK DURING THE DAY WHEN THE RUSSIANS HAD INVADED. AND WE WERE WE WERE SUPPLYING
00:56:15THE MUJAHIDEEN WITH ARMS AND THAT WE'RE DOING THAT BASICALLY
00:56:19THROUGH THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT, OF COURSE, THROUGH THEIR THEIR ISI, THEIR INTEL SERVICE.
00:56:23AND THEY HAVE A LONG, LONG
00:56:27CONNECTION TO A LOT OF THE TALIBAN ELEMENTS.
00:56:29THE HAQQANI NETWORK THAT THEY
00:56:32HAD WORKED WITH OVER THOSE YEARS. AND SO THERE'S THERE'S THIS IDEA
00:56:36THAT THERE'S A RESIDUAL FEELING OF SUPPORT.
00:56:41OUR PEOPLE WHO SUPPORT THESE GROUPS STILL WITHIN THE
00:56:46GOVERNMENT THERE, THE PACTS, I THINK, HAVE TRIED TO ACTUALLY
00:56:49MINIMIZE THAT AND WEED OUT PEOPLE THEY THINK ARE ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THEM. BUT I DON'T KNOW.
00:56:52I'M NOT INVOLVED ANYMORE. BUT THAT'S ALWAYS BEEN A CONCERN
00:56:56THAT THE PACTS ARE STILL SOMEHOW THROUGH THEIR THEIR SERVICE
00:57:00SUPPORTING SOME OF THESE THESE PLAYERS IN AFGHANISTAN THAT WE
00:57:04ARE AT WAR WITH ALL THE WAY IN
00:57:06THE BACK.
00:57:09THE TALIBAN HAD A
00:57:13DISPROPORTIONATE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WOMEN.
00:57:16HOW DO YOU THINK THE ROLE OF
00:57:19WOMEN DID YOU SEE ANY OF THAT TURN OUT?
00:57:21I KNOW THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT IS SPENDING A LOT OF MONEY RIGHT NOW BUILDING EMPOWERMENT
00:57:27STRATEGIES FOR WOMEN.
00:57:29WELL, I CAN TELL YOU, I DIDN'T SEE A SINGLE WOMAN MY ENTIRE TIME IN AFGHANISTAN.
00:57:34NOW, ONE, THEY WERE THERE, JUST
00:57:37NOT ALLOWED TO BE ANYWHERE WHERE ESPECIALLY A FOREIGNER MIGHT SEE
00:57:41THEM. SO I JUST SEE AND I WILL SAY
00:57:43THAT I DO THINK THAT THERE ARE SOME STATISTICS, IF YOU WILL,
00:57:47THAT IT SHOWS WHEN RESEARCH SHOWS IT. ONE GOOD THING ABOUT OUR
00:57:49INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND NOT JUST US, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN
00:57:53AFGHANISTAN, THAT MORE MORE WOMEN ARE AND MORE CHILDREN.
00:57:57GIRLS ARE GOING TO SCHOOL THAN THERE WERE.
00:58:00SO THERE'S BEEN SOME SOME SOME PROGRESS THERE.
00:58:02I THINK THE PROBLEM WILL BE IN THE FUTURE GOING FORWARD IS IF
00:58:06THE TALIBAN EITHER ULTIMATELY
00:58:08DOES TAKE CONTROL OR ARE THERE
00:58:11SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT REACHED WHERE THEY THEY BECOME PART OF
00:58:15THE GOVERNMENT AND ARE WILLING
00:58:15TO TO DO THAT, THAT THEY'RE
00:58:19GOING TO FIGHT AGAINST THAT JUST BECAUSE OF THEIR TRADITIONAL BELIEFS ABOUT THE WOMEN OF THE
00:58:23ROLE OF WOMEN AND THAT KIND OF THING. SO, YOU KNOW, IT'S GOING TO BE A
00:58:27LONG, HARD ROAD, I THINK, ON A LOT OF FRONTS.
00:58:30BUT CERTAINLY ON THE IDEA OF, YOU KNOW, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR
00:58:33WOMEN, EDUCATION FOR GIRLS.
00:58:35BUT SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. THAT'S ONE OF THE I THINK WE
00:58:38SHOULD FEEL PROUD ABOUT THAT HAVING HAPPENED IN AFGHANISTAN.
00:58:42SO IT HASN'T EVEN IF WE LEFT TOMORROW, IT WOULDN'T ALL BE A LOT.
00:58:45THERE'S BEEN SOME PROGRESS THERE. HEALTH, THEIR HEALTH IS OVERALL BETTER.
00:58:49BUT GOING MAKING MORE PROGRESS
00:58:52IS JUST IT'S GOING TO BE HARD.
00:58:57YEAH, LET'S GO BACK THERE ALSO,
00:59:03LET ME THANK YOU FOR FOR A
00:59:05REALLY INTERESTING PRESENTATION,
00:59:08BUT I HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS.
00:59:09THE FIRST QUESTION IS REGARDING
00:59:13THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIA IN
00:59:19AFGHANISTAN. EARLY ON, OBVIOUSLY THEY WERE
00:59:23HELPING WITH THE, YOU KNOW, PLANES COMING IN, ETC., ETC. IS THAT ONGOING?
00:59:27AND, YOU KNOW, THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN RUSSIA, HAS THE RELATIONSHIPS BECOME MORE
00:59:32PROBLEMATIC? LIKE THEY'RE STARTING TO CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THAT CASE?
00:59:35AND MAYBE YOU CAN TALK ABOUT THAT. AND THE SECOND QUESTION IS IRAN
00:59:41OBVIOUSLY, IRAN HAS QUITE TENSE
00:59:45RELATIONSHIPS WITH AND OFTEN WITH THE TALIBAN.
00:59:49BUT, YOU KNOW, ALSO TENSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
00:59:52HOW DO YOU SEE THAT COMPLEXITY DUOPOLY, ETHICAL AND
00:59:56GEOSTRATEGIC, ARE PLAYING OUT GOING FORWARD?
00:59:58AND DO YOU BELIEVE ULTIMATELY TO
01:00:01HAVE SOLVED A PROBLEM IN IN AFGHANISTAN THAT BETTER
01:00:05RELATIONSHIPS WOULD ULTIMATELY
01:00:07ALSO BE NEED TO BE REALIZED OR
01:00:10SOME COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS COME
01:00:12TO WHERE THE BOTH RUSSIA AND AND
01:00:17AND IRAN AND MAYBE TALK ABOUT CHINA TO US.
01:00:18I THINK YOU YOU KNOW, I FRANKLY
01:00:23I, I CAN'T REALLY SPEAK SO MUCH TO THE THE WHOLE RUSSIAN CURRENT.
01:00:26YOU'RE TALKING CURRENT INVOLVEMENT OF RUSSIA IN
01:00:30AFGHANISTAN AND THEY'RE AND THEY'RE TRYING TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY. I REALLY I REALLY AM NOT IN A
01:00:34GOOD POSITION TO COMMENT WHEN WE ARE THERE ON THAT.
01:00:38I THINK THAT IT'S IT'S CERTAINLY YOU KNOW, THEY THEY'VE HAD A
01:00:42HISTORICAL INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN, AS WE KNOW IT PROBABLY THEIR INVASION THERE.
01:00:45AND THEN THEY'RE THERE. THEY'RE LEAVING THEIR PROBABLY
01:00:49RESULTED IN THE YOU KNOW, THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
01:00:53SO THEY THEY HAVE A LONG TERM
01:00:57HISTORICAL CONNECTION TO AFGHANISTAN. AND THEY SEE THEY MAY SEE THIS,
01:01:00AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE SOME SOME YOU KNOW, THERE'S SOME WEALTH IN
01:01:05AFGHANISTAN IN TERMS OF, YOU KNOW, SOME NATURAL RESOURCES.
01:01:09AND SO THEY MAY WANT TO GAIN INFLUENCE THERE AND TRY AND TRY
01:01:11TO BE HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION IN GENERAL GOING THROUGH AFGHANISTAN.
01:01:16BUT I REALLY I REALLY DON'T I CAN'T ANSWER YOUR QUESTION VERY WELL ON THE ON THE WHOLE RUSSIAN
01:01:20FRONT ASPECT AS FAR AS THE UN
01:01:22AND THE AMERICANS. YEAH, WE YOU KNOW, WE OFTEN
01:01:25CONFLICT WITH THE UN OR ARE ARE
01:01:29ARE NOT ARE NOT ON THE SAME SHEET OF MUSIC WHEN WE'RE TRYING TO DO THINGS.
01:01:31I THINK YOU'RE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN THAT, YOU KNOW, IF WE'RE ANY
01:01:35ANY KIND OF SITUATION LIKE IN AFGHANISTAN A SITUATION IF WE
01:01:38ARE THERE IN A BIG WAY AND THE UN IS THERE IN A BIG WAY, IT'S
01:01:41ALL THE BETTER IF WE ARE REALLY
01:01:43COORDINATING WHAT WE'RE DOING AND MAKE SURE WE'RE NOT
01:01:47UNDERMINING EACH OTHER THERE. BUT BEYOND THAT, I REALLY WORRY ABOUT IT.
01:01:50I MEAN, WHEN YOU WERE THERE, WERE YOU COGNIZANT OF ANY OF THE
01:01:56LARGER REGIONAL TENSIONS BETWEEN SUNNI SHIITE AND THEN?
01:01:59WELL, OF COURSE, IRAN WAS
01:02:01BASICALLY AN ENEMY OF THE TALIBAN.
01:02:04IRAN ACTUALLY OFFERED TO HELP US
01:02:05AFTER THE 911 ATTACKS BECAUSE THEY WERE THE, YOU KNOW, THE
01:02:10TALIBAN IS A IS A YOU KNOW, NOT A SHIA ORGANIZATION.
01:02:14OTHER SUNNI. AND THEIR THEIR HOBBIES.
01:02:16AND AND SO THERE WAS A NATURAL IN THAT. AND ALSO NOT THEY'RE NOT
01:02:20PERSIANS. SO THERE WAS A NATURAL CONFLICT THERE BETWEEN THEM.
01:02:24IRANIANS ACTUALLY WERE WILLING TO HELP US OUT A BIT THERE IN
01:02:27THE INITIAL PART, THINGS HAVE CHANGED.
01:02:29NOW, PART OF THAT IN THE ARE CERTAINLY THERE'S A LOT OF NEWS REPORTS IN WAY ABOUT THE
01:02:33IRANIANS TRYING TO GET INVOLVED
01:02:35IN AFGHANISTAN AND GIVING SUPPORT TO ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER.
01:02:38AND AGAIN, I TRACE THAT BACK, FRANKLY, TO THE INVASION OF IRAQ.
01:02:42WE ELIMINATED SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT WAS THAT WAS IRAN'S
01:02:46COUNTERBALANCE, STRATEGIC COUNTERBALANCE IN THE REGION WHEN HE WENT AWAY.
01:02:50WE SHOULDN'T BE SURPRISED THAT THAT THE IRANIANS ARE NOW
01:02:55GAINING A LOT OF INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. WE JUST TOOK OUT THE ONE ONE GUY
01:02:58LEADER WHO HAD KIND OF HELD IT IN PLACE.
01:03:02SO THAT HAS COME BACK TO HAUNT US IN A LOT OF WAYS.
01:03:04I FEEL TIME FOR ONE LAST
01:03:08QUESTION RIGHT DOWN HERE IN FRONT. YEAH, SURE. YEAH.
01:03:13YOU YOU MENTIONED HOW YOU REACHED OUT AND THE IMPORTANCE
01:03:18OF PASHTUN ELEMENTS.
01:03:20TO WHAT EXTENT DID YOU REACH OR
01:03:22TRY TO REACH THE NON PASHTUN GROUPS AND WHAT PROBLEMS DID YOU
01:03:28HAVE WITH COORDINATING BETWEEN
01:03:30THE PASHTUNS, THE TAJIKS, HAZARAS AND OTHERS?
01:03:34YEAH, WE WOULD ONLY ONLY GROUP WE HAD.
01:03:36THAT WASN'T PASHTUN WITH US WAS
01:03:40WE HAD A GROUP OF HAZARAS, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS GREAT. I WAS SO EXCITED ABOUT THAT
01:03:43BECAUSE THEY SPEAK DARI AND I USED TO SPEAK FARSI, WHICH IS
01:03:47KIND OF SAME LANGUAGE. SO I WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO TALKING TO THEM IN THAT LANGUAGE.
01:03:50BUT IT TURNS OUT THEY HAVE SUCH
01:03:51A THICK ACCENT AND THAT IT WAS
01:03:55THEY WOULD LAUGH AT MY MY SPEAKING TO THEM. BUT SO THEY WERE THE ONLY GROUP
01:03:58OTHER THAN PASHTUNS THAT I WORKED WITH NOW. BUT IN THE NORTH, THAT WAS THE
01:04:01NORTHERN ALLIANCE WAS MADE UP PRIMARILY OF TAJIKS AND UZBEKS
01:04:04AND EVEN EVEN SOME PORTIONS WERE PART OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AS WELL.
01:04:09AND I'M NOT SURE THERE ANY HAZARAS. BUT YEAH, THERE WERE SOME HAZARAS WITH THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE.
01:04:11SO BUT THAT WAS SO WE HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL THOSE THE
01:04:15AGENCY DID IN A WAY THROUGH THOSE TEAMS THAT WERE UP THERE OPERATING WITH THE NORTHERN
01:04:19ALLIANCE. THEY WERE BASICALLY UP NORTH. THE WAY IT WORKED IS OUR TEAMS
01:04:23WOULD WORK WITH ONE OF THE MAJOR COMMANDERS WITHIN THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE, AND THEY WERE DOING
01:04:27THE SAME THING WITH THOSE GUYS UP IN THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE.
01:04:30THEY HAD ACTUALLY HAD AN ARMY UP THERE IN THEIR ALLIANCE, SO THEY HAD TANKS, HELICOPTERS, ARTILLERY, ALL THAT.
01:04:34WE WERE DOING THE SAME THING IN THE SOUTH, ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T HAVE AN ARMY TO WORK WITH.
01:04:37IT HAD BASICALLY GUERRILLA GROUPS AS WHAT WE WERE DOING.
01:04:40BUT SO SO YEAH, WE HAD RELATIONSHIPS WITH THOSE AND
01:04:44THEY DID. THEY KNEW WE, WE KEPT, WE TRIED
01:04:47TO PASS INFORMATION BACK AND FORTH SO THAT THE NOR THE
01:04:51ALLIANCE GUYS KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE SOUTH AND WE KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE
01:04:54NORTH, THAT KIND OF THING. BUT WE WEREN'T DIRECTLY DEALING WITH IT.
01:04:58WHERE I WAS WITH ANY OF THE
01:04:59OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS. WELL, PLEASE JOIN ME IN THANKING
01:05:05DUANE EVANS FOR TAKING THE TIME TO TALK WITH YOU TODAY.
01:05:09HIS BOOK IS FOXTROT AND KANDAHAR.
01:05:13WE YOU STICK AROUND A LITTLE WHILE AND SIGN SOME BOOKS IF PEOPLE ARE INTERESTED. ABSOLUTELY.
01:05:17SO I ASK IS THAT YOU DON'T ACCOST HIM IMMEDIATELY.
01:05:20ALLOW HIM TO MAKE HIS WAY TO THE BACK WHERE HE CAN SET UP AT THE
01:05:24TABLE THERE. AND THEN THE CONVERSATION. ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. THANK YOU.
01:05:31ALL.
01:05:42VERY.
01:05:45IN THE SUMMER OF 2000 FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH COMMISSION,
01:05:49CREATED BY CONGRESS, RELEASED ITS FINAL REPORT ON THE
01:05:52TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE COMMISSION HELD A DOZEN
01:05:55PUBLIC HEARINGS, AN INTERVIEWED MORE THAN A THOUSAND PEOPLE