Google Speech-to-Text API Automatic Transcription (Chirp). Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a quotation record.
00:00:00regular access to western media, but
00:00:03increasingly his supporters have presented these assets as
00:00:07evidence of something much bigger, the ability to lead
00:00:11Iran
00:00:12of a after the Islamic Republic.
00:00:18That claim requires
00:00:19a different standard, because being famous is not the same as being
00:00:23powerful. A large social media following is not a political
00:00:27organization, viral hashtag " If Kahlavi is to be
00:00:31considered serious candidate to lead a political transition,
00:00:35the important questions are no longer about how many people follow him
00:00:38online? The questions are much harder.
00:00:42of Where is the organization? Where are the structures capable
00:00:46of operating inside Iran? Who coordinates
00:00:50supporters? Who makes
00:00:53of decisions? Who negotiates with rival political
00:00:56factions? Who can mobilize people beyond?
00:01:00social
00:01:01a media,
00:01:01celebrity and of when a genuine political crisis arrives, who can
00:01:05actually act? These are not minor
00:01:08details. They are the difference between having audience
00:01:12and having political
00:01:16of power. Mr. Rusbek Iskandari, an Iranian political activist based
00:01:20in Canada. What are some
00:01:22of the qualities that one should possess in order to lead a country,
00:01:26and which
00:01:26of these qualities do you think that Rezal Pahlavi lacks? there
00:01:30is famous English saying uh with great power comes great
00:01:34responsibility, anybody who wants to
00:01:38volunteer to be a political
00:01:40leader uh or ending up
00:01:44being the president or prime minister needs to have
00:01:48of some sort
00:01:50of of social
00:01:50of skills, he or she needs to be
00:01:53able uh to lead people uh when we're talking
00:01:57about the word leader - doesn't come with
00:02:01titles, it doesn't come with the name uh, it
00:02:05actually means the real uh power, the real
00:02:08ability, which makes
00:02:12this person kind of
00:02:15accountable
00:02:19of of the people who follow him or her, I hardly can
00:02:22find this sort of a specification uh in this
00:02:26person before the... war
00:02:30launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28th
00:02:33February, powerful narrative had developed within parts
00:02:36of the Iranian oppositions online
00:02:39ecosystem. The Islamic
00:02:42of Republic was portrayed as being close to collapse. Iranian
00:02:46society was supposedly waiting for an alternative and
00:02:50Pahlavi with his international profile and enormous digital
00:02:53presence was increasingly presented as the figure most
00:02:57capable of filling that vacuum.
00:03:20of
00:03:30meetings of into public ones including a meeting with
00:03:34a Israelization could present him as a symbol of a western
00:03:39in lifestyle and win him some supporters, but I don't believe he
00:03:43has gained real popularity. If he were
00:03:46popular, he would have social base and could actually
00:03:50do something inside
00:03:51Iran. But that
00:03:55narrative contained a critical assumption that visibility
00:03:59was. evidence of strength, it wasn't
00:04:02a
00:04:03person can dominate social media and still lack the machinery
00:04:07required to exercise political
00:04:09power. Mr. Muhammad Hosen Hamze, an
00:04:13iranian political analyst, and based on
00:04:17that determined the weight of different political currents. One
00:04:20tactic is artificial mass amplification, using
00:04:24organized
00:04:25bots and targeted algorithms to create the
00:04:28impression.
00:04:46their views
00:04:47and to amplify such an extent that audiences believe this person is
00:04:51actually a leader capable of mobilizing social
00:04:54movement. this is in fact a form of
00:04:57neocolonialism.
00:05:01A Rouder's investigation described Pahlavi as a
00:05:04a well-known figure in Iran's opposition, but also reported that claims
00:05:08about an extensive network of supporters inside Iran could not be:
00:05:43but the situation eventually led to killing in
00:05:46Canada and his supporters ignored his
00:05:49calls. Canadian police established that Pahlavi
00:05:53supporters were behind the killing, so he is not
00:05:57popular and there is no real unity among his
00:06:00supporters. That
00:06:04distinction is crucial. Being the most
00:06:07recognizable opposition figure does not make someone the most
00:06:11organizationally. powerful and the events of
00:06:142026 put that distinction under
00:06:17extraordinary pressure. when the United States and
00:06:21Israel launched direct military action against Iran, some
00:06:25Pahlavi supporters anticipated a rapid collapse the Islamic
00:06:29Republic. The expectation was
00:06:32straightforward. Military pressure would weaken the
00:06:36state, the system would fracture,
00:06:39and an opposition figure with an established international. profile
00:06:43could emerge as a leader of a transition, but
00:06:47that sequence did not materialize, and when
00:06:51political reality refuses to follow the script written on social
00:06:54media, movements have to confront an uncomfortable
00:06:58possibility, perhaps they confuse the size the audience
00:07:02with the size the
00:07:03movement.
00:07:07A political movement becomes consequential when it can turn
00:07:10individual supporters into a... functioning structure, people who
00:07:14communicate, coordinate, make decisions, build allies
00:07:18and act
00:07:19collectively.
00:07:24Social media can create the appearance of all of this without
00:07:27actually providing it. A million views do not create
00:07:31a political machine, viral hashtag does not
00:07:35create a chain of command, and supporters scattered
00:07:39across different countries do not automatically constitute.
00:08:14lack of support in Iranian society: one is the
00:08:18revolutionary identity of Iranian society.
00:08:21Iranians have sought independence for decades, and that is
00:08:25fundamentally at odds with the institution of
00:08:28monarchy. even Imam Khumeini, the late founder
00:08:32the Islamic Republic, viewed the palivi regime
00:08:36as a symbol of dependence and national
00:08:39humiliation. the martered leader the revolution also
00:08:42described the pahalavi regime as puppet regime.
00:08:46Based on this historical narrative, Iranians do not see the
00:08:50Pahlavi era through the lens presented by western
00:08:53media. They see someone dependent on foreign powers
00:08:57and who has spend years watching events unfold from
00:09:00western hotels as an
00:09:02outsider.
00:09:06This is precisely why the uncertainty surrounding
00:09:10Pahlavi's internal network matter. It
00:09:13does not prove that he has no supporters inside Iran. It
00:09:17reveals something much more important. The
00:09:21scale, structure and operational capacity of that
00:09:25support remain difficult to
00:09:27establish. For an ordinary
00:09:30opposition activist, that might not matter
00:09:33much. For someone being presented as the potential
00:09:37leader of national transition, it matters
00:09:40enormously. The reality. is that Reza
00:09:43Pahlavi lacks the necessary means to an end, that
00:09:47is the power to
00:09:49form a coherent coalition from different
00:09:53groups. now uh, do you think that such a person can
00:09:57claim to be the leader of a political transition?
00:10:01if this person uh is
00:10:03eligible to run the
00:10:05revolution, is he capable of performing
00:10:09the job? does he? won this
00:10:13job? is
00:10:14there any organic relationship between him and his
00:10:18supporters and the real people of Iran who live
00:10:22there right now as we speak?
00:10:25"yes, you can be a president, you can be the prime
00:10:29minister, you can be the king in media, but what about the real world
00:10:33that we're all living in? so if media stops
00:10:37supporting him, will his
00:10:40follower uh, go look up for another way
00:10:44to be connected with him, is there any
00:10:47organism, is there any system, is there any
00:10:50other tool that his followers can be connected with him?"
00:10:55for his team, well, I would say these things doesn't
00:10:58exist in reality,
00:11:02and the big question is, do they let the
00:11:06critics ask him, challenge
00:11:10him, anybody who wants to know
00:11:14about his plan, his big plan, his master plan, will be
00:11:17criticized, will be put down by his
00:11:20followers, so this is not a good sign
00:11:24of a person. Who claim to
00:11:28be the to
00:11:30be the because eventually
00:11:34followers have to become something tangible,
00:11:37people, networks, structures,
00:11:41leadership mechanisms and the ability to
00:11:44act. Without those things, political
00:11:47influence remains largely
00:11:50rhetorical.
00:11:55For decades, American military interventions in West
00:11:58Asia have left behind countless innocent victims and
00:12:02immeasurable human suffering. The war against Iran is no
00:12:06exception. Beyond the headlines and geopolitical calculations
00:12:10are personal tragedies that rarely appear in world's major
00:12:14news reports. This is one
00:12:15them. That
00:12:19night was supposed to be night of joy in Kuhestak aport
00:12:23town in Siri County. hormosgon province, families were
00:12:27getting ready for a wedding, night for new clothes, seeing the
00:12:31bride and groom, music and laughter and children playing
00:12:35among their relatives, the wedding venue with smoke and rubble,
00:12:38music and laughter gave way to screams and cries. in the attack
00:12:42carried out by US force, five people were killed and nearly
00:12:4670 were injured. one of those killed was
00:12:50four-year-old boy named Amir Ali Kharimi. Amir Ali had not gone to
00:12:54war, he had gone... to a wedding, that day he had taken a
00:12:57bath, fixed his hair and could hardly contain his excitement about
00:13:01going to the celebration. his mother was supposed to leave a little
00:13:05later with him and the rest the family, but Amir Ali, his
00:13:0914-year-old sister Kiyana and several other children left early.
00:13:13few minutes later, the explosion happened. Amir
00:13:17Ali's mother later said there was a terrible sound, everything was filled with
00:13:20smoke, my heart sank. I ran into the street and started looking for.
00:13:25my children, but she could not find Amir Ali, the youngest child in the
00:13:29family, was no longer among the injured. his body
00:13:33had been taken to the hospital within the first few minutes, so
00:13:36quickly that his mother did not even have the chance to hold her
00:13:40son one last time, but Canana had survived, sharpnell
00:13:44had wounded her and she was taken to the hospital, doctors saved her
00:13:47life, but the wound she brought home was not only a physical
00:13:51one. kyono had witnessed her little brother's fight. final
00:13:55moments. Her mother says that even while she was
00:13:59injured herself, Kana kept crying and saying, "I saw blood coming from
00:14:02Ameri's head. I saw him fall to the ground, home
00:14:06that was supposed to be filled with laughter and memories.
00:14:10After
00:14:11the wedding is now missing one voice, Amida
00:14:14Ai's voice, and perhaps the hardest question in his grief is
00:14:18this: a child who only wanted to go to a wedding and play with
00:14:21his relatives children, why did his last night?" have to be spent
00:14:25among smoke, sharpenel, blood and
00:14:28tears.
00:14:32Then comes an even harder test: can Pahlavi build a coalition
00:14:36or can he mobilize the people who already support
00:14:39him?
00:14:42Iran's opposition is not a single political
00:14:45camp, it includes monarchists,
00:14:49republicans, liberals, leftists, secular
00:14:52activists, ethnic and regional. movements, former
00:14:56officials and groups with radically different visions for Iran's
00:15:00future. A potential transitional
00:15:03leader, therefore has to accomplish something much harder than
00:15:07attracking supporters. He has to bring people who
00:15:11fundamentally disagree with one another into
00:15:14the same political framework, and that is where the
00:15:18division surrounding Pahlwie become
00:15:20significant. Mr. Amin
00:15:24soبحhi.
00:15:3722 campaign, it's clear that they each had their own
00:15:41personal goals. Some of those goals were interpreted
00:15:45as regime change, but ideologically, Pahlavi lacked
00:15:49clear vision for overthrowing the
00:15:51system. The ali
00:15:55karimi episode is one example, but it is
00:15:59hardly the only one. Public disputes have
00:16:02repeatedly erupted among opposition personalities over
00:16:06who represent. the movement, who belongs inside its
00:16:10political coalition, who has the authority to speak for
00:16:13it, and who gets to define its political
00:16:16direction. Ali karimi, who was once a supporter
00:16:20of Reza Pahlawi, has now uh turned against him, even
00:16:24issuing threats to expose certain issues. now what does this say
00:16:28about the current situation and position the
00:16:32opposition camp? کار آقای کریمی،
00:16:35ستاد یا سیاست یا.
00:16:37with
00:16:40Karimi a was large number of followers and during the 2022
00:16:43campaign they recruted many high profile
00:16:47influencers, now he is pressuring them to deliver on
00:16:50promises they made to him. palavi also issued several
00:16:54calls during the recent war, apparently expecting something
00:16:58similar to the recent riats. cademy opposed the Islamic
00:17:02Republic, moved abroad and continued his campaign,
00:17:06but saw no results. and became laughing
00:17:09stock, more likely their dispute is
00:17:13over funding they had agreed on, we may
00:17:16see more revelations from other
00:17:19bloggers. the problem
00:17:23is not that political movements contain disagreements,
00:17:27every serious political movement does. the
00:17:30problem is that pahlavi's personal popularity has so far failed to
00:17:34translate into a stable discipline. and broadly
00:17:38accepted political coalition, that remains one of
00:17:42Pahlavi's biggest unresolved challenges.
00:17:46In the recent years, Reza Pahlawi has tried to demonstrate
00:17:49himself as the prominent alternative to the current
00:17:53ruling system in Iran. Uh, what were some the
00:17:56factors that reinforced uh this image at some point in
00:18:00time? اومدن حالا با تکنیک های
00:18:04رسانه ای فضایییو ایجاد کردن که انگار. They use
00:18:08media techniques to create the impression of significant popularity,
00:18:12economic problems give some people an opportunity to ride that
00:18:15wave, but anyone who truly understood Iranian
00:18:19society would not take such risk. Pahlavi's
00:18:23popularity has largely existed online, while
00:18:26social media does not reflect the reality of Iranian
00:18:30society. Such narratives are often driven by
00:18:33organizational interests and cyber armies.
00:18:39The question becomes even more revealing when money enters the
00:18:43picture. A Reuder's investigation reported that
00:18:47several Iranian American investors had contributed more than
00:18:51$3 million dollars to Pahlavi's political effort,
00:18:54expecting that he could play a role in leading a future transitional
00:18:58government.
00:19:02The significance is not simply the amount of money, it
00:19:06is what that money represented. These people
00:19:10were not merely supporting celebrity or a symbolic opposition
00:19:14figure. They were investing a political
00:19:17project they believed could eventually produce
00:19:20power, and some later became
00:19:23dissatisfied with Pahlavi's performance and his response to Donald
00:19:27Trump's policies. That tells us something
00:19:31important. The greater the political expectations
00:19:35surrounding Pahlavi, the more difficult. it becomes to hide the gap
00:19:39between political image and political
00:19:41capacity. People can tolerate
00:19:44ambiguity from a symbolic figure. They demand
00:19:48results from someone presented as a future
00:19:51leader.
00:19:55Then comes perhaps the most politically explosive issue, and that is
00:19:59Pahlavi's relationship with foreign power and the fact that he has
00:20:02openly welcomed American pressure on Iran as a
00:20:06whole.
00:20:10On February 28, following the launch of Operation Epic
00:20:14Fury, he published an article in the Washington Post thanking
00:20:17Donald Trump and arguing that the moment could create path toward
00:20:21Iran's freedom. He also called for the international
00:20:25community to be prepared to recognize legitimate transitional
00:20:29government when the time
00:20:31came.
00:20:38That was not simply commentary on events, it was
00:20:42clear political alignment with an American military campaign
00:20:45against Iran, and the message became even more
00:20:49striking. in the days that
00:20:51followed. After American soldiers were
00:20:55killed, Pahlavi publicly expressed condolences to their families
00:20:59and thank them for what he described as their defense the
00:21:02Iranian
00:21:03people.
00:21:09For his supporters, these statements demonstrate
00:21:12pragmatism. An opposition leader welcoming the action of
00:21:16foreign power confronting the Islamic Republic.
00:21:20for his critics, they expose much deeper
00:21:23problem. If someone wants to lead Iran, but
00:21:27his political strategy increasingly appears intertwon with the
00:21:30military and political power of another country, where does his
00:21:34political legitimacy actually come
00:21:37from? That is not merely an ideological
00:21:41question, it is a question of political
00:21:43independence. A leader cannot simply
00:21:47assume that foreign military pressure will... create domestic
00:21:50legitimacy for him. The opposite can
00:21:54happen: the more a political figure appears dependent
00:21:58on an outside power to create the conditions for his rise, the
00:22:02harder it becomes to demonstrate that his authority originates from
00:22:06inside the country itself. And there is an
00:22:09extraordinary irony here. Even Donald
00:22:13Trump, the American president whose confrontation with the Islamic
00:22:16Republic, Pahlavi, openly welcomed, as... question
00:22:20whether Pahlavi actually has enough support inside Iran to lead
00:22:24the country. In
00:22:27January, Trump told routers that Pahlavi seems very
00:22:31nice while questioning whether Iranians would actually accept his
00:22:35leadership.
00:22:39Rizal Pahlavi has tried to introduce himself beyond a monarch and
00:22:43as
00:22:43a leading figure guiding Iran's political transition. Now, to
00:22:47what extent do you think he has been successful? in solidifying this change in
00:22:51political identity among the opposition and the Iranian
00:22:55society. we need to ask
00:22:58this: where is
00:23:02this uh eligibility come from? does it come from a
00:23:06name? does it come from being
00:23:09relevant uh to a dynasty
00:23:12which was toppled back in
00:23:151979? so these are the questions we need to
00:23:19ask. "if this person is
00:23:22capable of managing or
00:23:26leading, well then we can
00:23:30discuss this issue, but we need to ask ourselves,
00:23:33what is the background of this person? so
00:23:36anything related to this
00:23:39capabilities will answer the next
00:23:42question will be, is he a good
00:23:46choice, is he able to lead Iran?"
00:23:50through transformation period, so from what I
00:23:54see or from what I observed, and there is
00:23:58no fact against it, uh, this doesn't exist
00:24:01in real world,
00:24:05that statement is revealing, strategy recognizes
00:24:09the difference between international visibility and domestic
00:24:13acceptance, how has Riza Pahlavi's
00:24:17backing of Israel and US's action.
00:24:54This is why the Ali Karim episode matters, not because
00:24:57instagram dispute is historically important, it
00:25:01isn't, and not because one former supporter criticizing
00:25:05Pahlavi proves that his movement is collapsing, it doesn't,
00:25:08it matters because it offers a glimpse into a much
00:25:12larger
00:25:16problem. Pahlavi has built an extraordinary powerful.
00:25:20image, but the evidence for equally powerful
00:25:24political organization is far less
00:25:26convincing. he has visibility, but
00:25:30visibility is not power. he has
00:25:34supporters, but supporters are not necessarily an
00:25:37organized constituency. he has
00:25:41international access, but international access is
00:25:45not domestic legitimacy. he has financial
00:25:48backing. but money does not automatically produce
00:25:52political capacity and he has famous
00:25:56name, but famous name does not create a
00:25:59government. can we say that uh...
00:26:32had social base, after years of relying on hostile media
00:26:36to build his image and gain online fame, he
00:26:39believed life streams, likes and views could win over the
00:26:43Iranian people, but the unity the Iranian people around their
00:26:47leadership and the preservation of Iran's integrity showed
00:26:51that all of this was just
00:26:52illusion.
00:26:56the question then is not whether Razza Pahlavi is
00:27:00popular, he clearly is among sections the Iranian
00:27:03opposition, the real question is whether that
00:27:07popularity can survive contact with the realities of
00:27:10politics? can he build an organization capable
00:27:14of functioning inside Iran? can he unite the
00:27:18monarchists and republicans, liberals and leftists,
00:27:22secular activists and regional movements? can he
00:27:26command loyalty beyond the digital world?
00:27:29can he persuade people who do not already support? him that he should
00:27:33lead them, can he demonstrate that his political authority
00:27:37comes from Iranians themselves rather than from Washington,
00:27:41western media or social media
00:27:43algorithms, and ultimately, can he turn
00:27:47popularity into power? so far,
00:27:51the answer to all these questions have been no, and
00:27:55the alikarimi drama has just been a case in