Energy & Climate Desk
Daily energy and climate brief, drawn from a six-persona AI analyst roster: Grid Watch, Barrel Report, Transition Monitor, Carbon Desk, Weather Risk and Watershed.
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AI-generated analysis from Apprised's automated desks, synthesized from cited sources and editorially accountable to J.A. Watte. How we report · Corrections.
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Grid interconnection queue — MISO
- 232,807 MW active in the queue, but only 2.7% has reached an advanced study stage.
- 79.9% of all resolved megawatts withdrew rather than reaching service.
- Of 557 completed interconnection agreements, 268 have not started construction and 92 are generating — a signed agreement is not a power plant.
- Queue entry to an executed agreement runs 3.3 years (n=384); queue entry to actually in service, 3.1 years (n=90).
Today’s Snapshot
Iran Conflict Drives Oil to $101 WTI; Fertilizer Shock Threatens Global Food Supply
The U.S.-Israeli military strike on Iran has severed Asia-Europe trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz, producing what the IEA characterizes as the worst oil supply disruption in history. WTI crude is trading at $101.56/bbl and Brent at $106.11/bbl, with the EIA's latest weekly data showing a concurrent 4,306 kbbl crude inventory draw and a 4,084 kbbl gasoline stock draw for the week ending May 8. The oil shock is transmitting into the fertilizer supply chain, threatening a global food crisis as farmers in the U.S. and globally report desperate cost conditions. Meanwhile, an incoming East Coast heat wave — AccuWeather projecting RealFeel temperatures near 100°F — is arriving just as the power sector faces a structural 'war for electricity' driven by AI data centers and EV load growth on an aging grid. Cuba's reported total oil depletion and Venezuela's post-military-operation production under U.S. control add geopolitical texture to an already volatile physical market.
Synthesis
Points of Agreement
Barrel Report reads the Hormuz-driven oil shock as a genuine physical-market event confirmed by EIA inventory draws; Grid Watch reads the same shock as a constraint on the transition timeline given 4.69% renewable share; Transition Monitor reads the DRC mining governance failure and water stress as compounding the supply-chain vulnerability that makes high-oil periods dangerous for transition momentum; Carbon Desk reads the $101 oil price as an involuntary, regressive carbon-pricing mechanism with perverse stranded-asset incentives; Weather Risk reads the food and agricultural stress as the human-cost layer of the same shock. All five voices agree: the Iran conflict has triggered a multi-domain cascade that the energy system — in its current state — is structurally underprepared to absorb.
Points of Disagreement
The core tension is between Barrel Report and Carbon Desk on the stranded-asset question. Barrel Report is tracking physical-market tightness that validates new fossil investment (Shell in Libya, YPF in Vaca Muerta) as rational responses to a supply gap; Carbon Desk reads the same dynamic as a perverse incentive that deepens long-run climate exposure and delays transition capital flows. Grid Watch and Transition Monitor disagree on near-term pathway: Grid Watch sees brownfield oil-well repurposing as an underappreciated near-term capacity tool; Transition Monitor is more cautious, noting that even brownfield conversions face permitting and community opposition that the deployment curves don't capture. Weather Risk and Carbon Desk diverge on framing: Weather Risk prices the farm-crisis as an actuarial uninsured-loss pipeline; Carbon Desk prices it as evidence of carbon markets failing to deliver gradual, predictable pricing that could have made agricultural adaptation fundable before the crisis hit.
Pivotal Question
What would move these views toward convergence: How long does the Hormuz disruption persist? If the strait reopens within 30–60 days (diplomatic resolution or military de-escalation), Barrel Report's physical-market thesis moderates, Carbon Desk's stranded-asset repricing reverses, and the fertilizer-food cascade is contained. If Hormuz remains closed or partially blocked for 6+ months, every voice's most alarming scenario becomes operative simultaneously — and the grid's 4.69% renewable share becomes not just a transition-pace problem but an acute energy security vulnerability.
Bias Flags
- Barrel Report: Physical-market bias may underweight the possibility that speculative positioning and financial flows are amplifying the WTI/Brent spike beyond what the actual supply-demand balance warrants; the $101 print may include a substantial geopolitical risk premium that could reverse sharply on any diplomatic signal.
- Transition Monitor: Deployment-curve optimism on natural hydrogen (Saskatchewan) may move too quickly from a drill-target MOU to a commercially significant supply signal; the permitting, political, and infrastructure pathway from discovery to commercial production is long and uncertain.
- Carbon Desk: Finance-first lens frames the fertilizer and food crisis primarily as a carbon-market design failure, which risks underweighting the immediate distributional harm to low-income farmers and food-insecure populations who are not participants in any carbon market.
- Weather Risk: Actuarial framing of Maine blueberry losses and the agricultural climate cascade quantifies insured losses accurately but flattens the community and cultural dimension of crop failure for multi-generational farming families — a dimension that matters for policy and political economy even when it doesn't appear in loss tables.
- Grid Watch: Brownfield oil-well repurposing is correctly identified as an underappreciated near-term grid resource, but enthusiasm for this pathway may underestimate the time-to-interconnection even for sites with existing infrastructure, and the actual generation capacity available from conversion is highly site-specific.
Routing
Voices seated: Barrel Report, Weather Risk, Grid Watch, Transition Monitor, Carbon Desk
Today's corpus is dominated by a multi-domain crisis: the US-Israeli strike on Iran has triggered what the IEA calls the worst oil disruption in history (WTI $101.56, Brent $106.11), with downstream shocks cascading into fertilizer, food security, and U.S. farm costs. Weather Risk activates on the Tornado Alley supercell, the imminent East Coast heat wave, and Maine agricultural climate stress. Grid Watch activates on the incoming heat load signal and the 'war for electricity' AI/data center demand story. Transition Monitor covers natural hydrogen commercialization and renewable share data. Carbon Desk covers the stranded-asset and carbon-market implications of a sustained oil price spike. All five voices warranted.
Analyst Voices AI analysis
Barrel Report Conrad Stahl
Paper trades the narrative. Barrels tell the truth. And right now, the barrels are screaming. WTI at $101.56 and Brent at $106.11 — that's not speculation running ahead of fundamentals, that's the physical market repricing a genuine, sustained supply shock. The Strait of Hormuz closure, triggered by the U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran, has severed the most critical chokepoint in global oil logistics. The IEA calling this the worst oil disruption in history is not hyperbole; roughly 20% of global seaborne crude transits Hormuz. When that corridor closes, you don't reroute — you ration.
The EIA weekly data confirms the domestic tightness is not illusory. Crude inventories drew 4,306 kbbl in the week ending May 8, landing at 452,876 kbbl. Gasoline stocks drew another 4,084 kbbl simultaneously. You don't get concurrent crude and product draws of that magnitude without genuine demand pull against a constrained supply picture. Henry Hub at $2.91/MMBtu is up $0.16 week-over-week — a modest move, but directional. The 30-day WTI change of +$5.10/bbl reflects a market that has already absorbed the initial shock and is pricing for duration.
The downstream effects are the story within the story. Fertilizer production is energy-intensive and heavily dependent on natural gas feedstocks, some of which transit through now-disrupted trade corridors. The cascade from $101 oil to a global food crisis is not theoretical — it's already in the Axios and OilPrice.com reporting on farmers facing desperate input costs. YPF's $25 billion Vaca Muerta acceleration play and Shell's Libya field studies are both rational responses: every non-Hormuz barrel is suddenly worth a premium. Watch tanker route data for Cape of Good Hope diversions — that's where the physical dislocation will show up first, adding 10–14 days of voyage time and roughly $2–4/bbl in freight uplift.
Cuba's reported oil depletion is a leading indicator of what happens to smaller, import-dependent economies when the physical market tightens this fast. The regime question is geopolitical theater, but the underlying energy bankruptcy is real. Venezuela's production under post-Maduro U.S. management adds a wild card: if Trump's claim of making a 'fortune' from Venezuelan crude is operationally grounded, that's incremental non-OPEC supply entering a tight market — but the volumes are unlikely to offset Hormuz disruption at scale.
The Hormuz closure has produced a genuine physical supply shock — not a paper trade — confirmed by concurrent U.S. crude and gasoline inventory draws, with downstream fertilizer and food cascades already materializing at $101 WTI.
Bias flag — Physical-market bias may underweight the possibility that speculative positioning and financial flows are amplifying the WTI/Brent spike beyond what the actual supply-demand balance warrants; the $101 print may include a substantial geopolitical risk premium that could reverse sharply on any diplomatic signal.
Weather Risk Dr. Maya Castillo
The insured loss is the headline. The uninsured loss is the story. And this week, the story is bifurcating across two timescales. Near-term: an incoming East Coast heat dome — AccuWeather projecting RealFeel temperatures approaching 100°F — arriving while the NOAA 7-day degree-day window (May 8–14) recorded zero cooling degree-days across all 10 monitored metros and a cross-metro 1,487 HDD total, heavily weighted to Chicago's 153.9 HDD. That heating-load hangover is about to flip to a cooling-load surge with minimal transition. That asymmetric load swing is exactly the scenario that stresses grid operators and emergency managers simultaneously.
The Tornado Alley low-precipitation supercell over Oklahoma is a reminder that the convective severe-weather season is fully activated. LP supercells are deceptive — they produce less visible precipitation, which can cause storm chasers and emergency managers alike to underestimate structural wind and hail threat. The broader pattern — an unseasonably cold Midwest (Chicago 153.9 HDD in a week in mid-May) juxtaposed with near-100°F RealFeel in the urban Northeast — is consistent with the kind of meridional jet stream configuration that has become more frequent under climate-forced atmospheric dynamics.
The structural story is Maine's wild blueberry farms. Heat and drought stress reducing yields, forcing small farmers into higher irrigation and mulch costs, is a textbook climate-agriculture impact narrative — but what it actually represents in actuarial terms is an insured-crop-loss pipeline that grows longer each year. The uninsured fraction — small farms without federal crop insurance, or with coverage that doesn't capture quality degradation, only yield loss — is where the real economic damage accumulates without ever appearing in the catastrophe-loss tables.
The adaptation gap is the trend. Virginia Beach's $518M floodwater project breaking ground is the right kind of institutional response — and it's exactly the scale of investment that should be multiplying across coastal and inland flood-exposed metros. One project does not close the gap. The El Niño complexity reported by Yale Climate Connections — the emergence of 'super El Niño' as a contested but operationally significant classification — matters for the 12–18 month agricultural and hydrological risk outlook. If a strong El Niño pattern overlays an already oil-stressed global food system, the second-order impacts on grain yields, water availability at mining and processing sites, and insured agricultural losses could be severe.
A rapid flip from record mid-May heating load (Chicago 153.9 HDD over 7 days) to near-100°F RealFeel East Coast heat is the immediate grid and health risk, while Maine agriculture signals the long-duration uninsured loss trend.
Bias flag — Actuarial framing of Maine blueberry losses and the agricultural climate cascade quantifies insured losses accurately but flattens the community and cultural dimension of crop failure for multi-generational farming families — a dimension that matters for policy and political economy even when it doesn't appear in loss tables.
Grid Watch Lena Hargrove & Sam Okafor
The policy assumes electrons that do not yet exist. Here is what the grid can actually deliver — and right now, the grid is about to be asked to deliver a great deal more than usual, very quickly. The NOAA degree-day data for May 8–14 shows zero CDDs across all ten monitored metros and a combined 1,487 HDDs, with Chicago alone logging 153.9 HDDs. That is a late-spring heating signature. AccuWeather is now projecting RealFeel temperatures near 100°F for large portions of the East Coast within the coming days. The load swing implied by that transition — from heating-dominated to aggressive air conditioning demand, compressed into a short meteorological window — is operationally significant for PJM and NYISO. Reserve margins tighten fastest when load ramps faster than forecast.
The structural backdrop is the 'coming war for electricity' framing circulating on the economics commentary circuit. It is not wrong. AI data centers, EV charging infrastructure, and industrial reshoring are all arriving simultaneously on a transmission and generation system that was not designed for this demand profile. The interconnection queue nationally is measured in thousands of gigawatts of proposed capacity that will take years to clear permitting, siting, and interconnection studies. The renewable share of U.S. generation, per EIA data through February 2026, stands at 4.69%. That is the grid as it actually exists — not the grid as modeled in 2035 target documents.
The Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant situation deserves a technical note: running Europe's largest nuclear facility on a single external power feed — the backup to safety systems — for over two months is an ongoing structural risk. It does not directly affect U.S. grid operations, but it represents the kind of cascading nuclear safety scenario that reshapes European energy policy and, through LNG demand pull, affects U.S. export volumes and domestic Henry Hub pricing. The EU Commission's Hormuz commentary signals Europe is already thinking about LNG rerouting.
On the positive side, old oil and gas well repurposing — geothermal conversion, compressed air storage — is a genuine resource that Wired is covering for good reason. These are shovel-ready sites with existing grid interconnections, transmission rights-of-way, and often workforce infrastructure. The interconnection queue problem is dramatically less severe for brownfield energy redevelopment than for greenfield solar or wind. This is an underappreciated near-term capacity pathway.
With renewable share at 4.69% of U.S. generation and a rapid heating-to-cooling load flip incoming, the grid faces a stress test that exposes the gap between transition targets and installed capacity in real time.
Bias flag — Brownfield oil-well repurposing is correctly identified as an underappreciated near-term grid resource, but enthusiasm for this pathway may underestimate the time-to-interconnection even for sites with existing infrastructure, and the actual generation capacity available from conversion is highly site-specific.
Transition Monitor Dr. Amara Osei
The target says 2030. The supply chain says 2035. The mineral deposits say maybe. And this week's corpus adds a layer: the geopolitical context says 'which deposits, controlled by whom, at what cost?' The DRC community leader arrests in Lualaba province are not an isolated incident — they are a data point in a pattern of governance fragility around the cobalt and copper supply chains that underpin battery storage and EV transition. Community opposition to mining operations in critical mineral regions is systematically underweighted in deployment-curve models that treat mineral supply as a financial constraint rather than a political one.
The natural hydrogen commercialization story out of Saskatchewan — MAX Power Mining and Moose Jaw advancing toward drill testing of a second discovery — is worth tracking carefully. Natural hydrogen, or 'gold hydrogen,' represents a potentially transformative feedstock if geological prevalence proves out at commercial scale. The target says 2030 for green hydrogen cost parity. The Saskatchewan drill results could reshape the conversation entirely, depending on what the subsurface shows. This is a low-velocity story today with potentially very high future significance.
The water stress story from mining.com cuts directly across the critical minerals supply chain. Water-intensive processing for lithium, copper, and cobalt is already a project-killer in arid regions of Chile, Australia, and the American Southwest. The technology solutions emerging — dry-stack tailings, atmospheric water generation, closed-loop processing — are real, but they add cost and timeline to projects already under permitting pressure. The renewable share of U.S. generation at 4.69% through February 2026 is a reminder that the installed base is the starting point, not the destination.
Pertamina NRE's Bangladesh renewable exploration is a small but directionally correct signal: national oil companies in the Asia-Pacific are diversifying their mandates. The question is always execution velocity against their existing fossil infrastructure inertia. Indonesia's Pertamina has a very large base of stranded-asset risk in its conventional portfolio — the NRE subsidiary is the hedge, but the hedge is not yet the core business. Watch for the size of capital allocation, not the announcement.
Community resistance to critical mineral extraction in the DRC and water stress at mine sites represent political and physical constraints on the energy transition that deployment-curve models systematically undercount.
Bias flag — Deployment-curve optimism on natural hydrogen (Saskatchewan) may move too quickly from a drill-target MOU to a commercially significant supply signal; the permitting, political, and infrastructure pathway from discovery to commercial production is long and uncertain.
Carbon Desk Henrik Lindqvist
The commitment is net-zero by 2050. The verified reduction is 3%. Price the difference. And right now, that difference is being priced — chaotically, through the oil futures curve rather than through carbon markets. WTI at $101.56 and Brent at $106.11 represent an involuntary carbon-reduction mechanism: demand destruction. The fertilizer cascade, the farm cost crisis, the food security shock — these are the distributional consequences of oil prices doing the work that carbon markets were supposed to do gradually, transparently, and with revenue recycling. Instead, the shock is concentrated, regressive, and permanent in its near-term harm.
The Hormuz closure has effectively repriced the stranded-asset calculus overnight. At $100+ oil, projects that were economically marginal at $70/bbl — Canadian oil sands, ultra-deepwater, Libya's stranded fields that Shell is now studying — are suddenly viable. That repricing creates a perverse incentive structure for the energy transition: the higher oil goes, the more capital flows into new fossil extraction, even as the physical disruption simultaneously accelerates the policy case for transition. The $25 billion YPF Vaca Muerta acceleration is the clearest expression of this dynamic.
The EU Commission's Hormuz commentary — framed around an LNG and shipping roundtable — signals that European carbon market governance is under pressure from the supply shock. When energy security and carbon pricing objectives diverge, carbon pricing loses. We saw this pattern in 2022 with Russian gas cutoffs and European coal restarts. The structural lesson is that carbon markets without a price floor are vulnerable to supply-shock-driven political rollback.
The broad dollar index at 118.04 with a 30-day decline of -0.32 matters for carbon credit markets and climate finance flows. A weakening dollar makes dollar-denominated carbon credits cheaper for non-U.S. buyers, which should support voluntary carbon market demand — but VCM integrity concerns persist, and the macro noise from the Iran shock is drowning out the signal. The HY OAS at 2.76% in risk-on territory suggests credit markets have not yet priced the duration risk of sustained $100+ oil into corporate balance sheets. When they do, stranded-asset writedowns in the fossil sector will accelerate, but so will financing costs for transition projects.
At $101 WTI, the oil price spike is doing demand-destruction work that carbon markets were designed to do gradually — but the distributional harm is regressive and the stranded-asset repricing is paradoxically incentivizing new fossil extraction.
Bias flag — Finance-first lens frames the fertilizer and food crisis primarily as a carbon-market design failure, which risks underweighting the immediate distributional harm to low-income farmers and food-insecure populations who are not participants in any carbon market.
Simulated Opinion
If you had to form a single opinion having heard the roundtable, weighted for known biases, it would be this: The Hormuz closure and Iran conflict have produced a genuine, multi-domain energy crisis — not a paper trade, not a forecasting artifact — that is simultaneously exposing the fragility of a global food system dependent on affordable energy inputs, the inadequacy of the U.S. grid's 4.69% renewable share as a buffer against supply shocks, and the fundamental design failure of carbon markets that lack price floors robust enough to survive geopolitical disruption. The $101 WTI price includes a real geopolitical risk premium that Barrel Report is right to anchor on but may be partially overstating in duration; Carbon Desk is right that the perverse incentive to drill more at $100+ oil is real and will delay transition capital allocation; Grid Watch is right that the incoming East Coast heat dome arriving on zero-CDD baseline is an acute near-term reliability stress; and Weather Risk is right that the agricultural cascade — from Maine blueberries to global fertilizer shock — represents the uninsured, non-actuarial human cost of a system that has been running without adequate resilience margins for years. The pivotal uncertainty is Hormuz duration; everything else is downstream of that single variable.
Watch Next
- Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic data: any tanker tracking signal of partial reopening or Cape of Good Hope diversion surge in next 48 hours will be the leading indicator of whether $101 WTI holds or reverses.
- EIA weekly petroleum status report (next release): watch for a third consecutive concurrent crude and gasoline draw, which would confirm sustained physical tightness beyond the initial shock.
- PJM and NYISO day-ahead price spike: the East Coast heat dome arriving with near-100°F RealFeel temperatures should trigger elevated day-ahead power prices in PJM and NYISO by Monday — watch for demand-response activations and reserve margin alerts.
- Fertilizer futures (urea, DAP): the transmission from $101 oil and Hormuz disruption to fertilizer input costs will show up in spot and futures markets before it shows in crop production data — a 10–15% urea spike would validate the food-crisis cascade thesis.
- MAX Power Mining Saskatchewan drill results: any update on the natural hydrogen drill test timeline could move this from a low-velocity background story to a significant transition-narrative disruptor.
- Shell Libya field study submission (end of May deadline): the NOC MOU study submission is a concrete near-term data point on how much stranded-asset capital is being mobilized at $100+ oil prices.
- U.S.-Iran diplomatic back-channel signals: any reporting on back-channel talks, ceasefire feelers, or third-party mediation attempts (Qatar, Oman) would be the most significant market-moving signal across all five desks.
Historical Power Lenses AI analysis
J.P. Morgan 1837-1913
Morgan's defining move in the Panic of 1907 was to recognize that systemic risk required a single actor willing to impose order on a fragmented, panic-driven market — gathering bank presidents in his library and refusing to let them leave until a recapitalization plan was agreed. Today's Hormuz closure presents an analogous systemic chokepoint: no single OPEC member, no SPR release, no rerouting decision resolves the disruption without coordinated action among actors with conflicting interests. Morgan would look at the fertilizer cascade, the food shock, and the oil price spike and identify the single binding constraint — Hormuz access — then ask who has the balance sheet and the political capital to force a resolution. The answer in 2026, as in 1907, is the United States; the question is whether the institutional will to play that coordinating role exists.
Andrew Carnegie 1835-1919
Carnegie's vertical integration strategy — controlling ore, coke, steel mills, and railroads simultaneously — was built on the insight that supply chain control, not product innovation, was the durable source of competitive advantage. The DRC community leader arrests, the water stress killing mining projects, and the critical minerals bottleneck are all symptoms of a transition supply chain that has not been vertically integrated by any single actor or national strategy. Carnegie would find it absurd that the United States is attempting to build an EV and battery storage industry without securing upstream control of the cobalt and lithium supply chains the way he secured Mesabi Range iron ore. The lesson: whoever controls the mine, the processing facility, and the port in the critical minerals supply chain will control the energy transition — and currently, that actor is not the U.S.
Machiavelli 1469-1527
Machiavelli's counsel in The Prince was to never allow a vacuum of power to persist — nature abhors it, and your enemies will fill it faster than you expect. The Cuba oil depletion story and the Venezuela post-Maduro production narrative are both expressions of this principle: energy bankruptcy creates political vacuums, and political vacuums in oil-producing states create opportunities for whoever moves first. Trump's claim of making a 'fortune' from Venezuelan crude is, in Machiavellian terms, the correct strategic instinct — resource control as the foundation of political order — regardless of its legality or moral framing. Machiavelli would also note that the Hormuz crisis creates an opportunity: a state that can credibly offer alternative routing, storage, or production will extract political concessions that would be unavailable in a stable market. The question is which state has prepared for that moment.
Thomas Edison 1847-1931
Edison's great insight was not the lightbulb but the system: generation, transmission, metering, and the consumer device had to be developed as an integrated whole or none of them worked at commercial scale. The 'war for electricity' framing — AI data centers, EVs, industrial reshoring colliding with an aging grid — is exactly the problem Edison solved in the 1880s, except in reverse: the load is growing faster than the system, rather than the system being built ahead of the load. Edison would look at the 4.69% renewable share, the interconnection queue backlog, and the brownfield oil-well repurposing opportunity and conclude that the U.S. is making the same mistake his DC-network critics made — trying to optimize components without redesigning the system architecture. The solution in 1882 was Menlo Park's integrated Pearl Street Station; the solution in 2026 is a transmission build-out that matches the scale of the demand surge, not incremental generation additions.
Sources Cited
18 sources — show
- oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Fertilizer-Shock-That-Could-Tr…
- Axios — axios.com/2026/05/16/farmers-agriculture-crops-iran-energy-… News / analysis Axios profile
- U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) — eia.gov Government / official · primary record
- AccuWeather — accuweather.com/en/weather-forecasts/summerlike-heat-humidi…
- Washington Post — washingtonpost.com/weather/2026/05/16/storm-chaser-finds-da… News / analysis The Washington Post profile
- Grist — grist.org/food-and-agriculture/wild-blueberry-farms-across-…
- Wired — wired.com/story/oil-wells-second-life-clean-energy News / analysis Wired profile
- mining.com/max-power-mining-moose-jaw-ink-mou-to-advance-natural-hydr…
- mining.com/water-shortages-are-quietly-killing-mining-projects-new-te…
- Mongabay — news.mongabay.com/short-article/2026/05/tensions-rise-in-dr…
- Buenos Aires Times — batimes.com.ar/news/economy/argentinas-ypf-seeks-incentive-…
- Libya Herald — libyaherald.com/2026/05/shell-finalising-study-on-several-l…
- MarketWatch — marketwatch.com/story/the-iran-war-could-be-a-300-billion-s… News / analysis MarketWatch profile
- European Commission — ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_977 Government / official · primary record
- Yale Climate Connections — yaleclimateconnections.org/2026/05/whats-a-super-el-nino-an…
- Construction Dive — constructiondive.com/news/flatirondragados-virginia-floodwa…
- MSN — msn.com/en-us/money/general/cuba-is-out-of-oil-can-the-regi…
- TASS — tass.com/economy/2131823 State-affiliated media (Russia) TASS profile